The Lure of Disillusion

RELIGION, ROMANTICISM &
THE POSTMODERN CONDITION

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The Lure of Disillusion
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Religion, Romanticism and the Postmodern Condition

James Mark Shields
Eheu! paupertina philosophia in paupertinam religionem ducit:—A hunger-bitten and idea-less philosophy naturally produces a starveling and comfortless religion. It is among the miseries of the present age that it recognizes no medium between literal and metaphorical. Faith is either to be buried in the dead letter, or its name and honors usurped by a counterfeit product of the mechanical understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds symbols with allegories.


[R]eligious discourse can be understood in any depth only by understanding the form of life to which it belongs. What characterizes that form of life is not the expressions of belief that accompany it, but a way—a way that includes words and pictures, but is far from consisting in just words and pictures—of living one’s life, of regulating all of one’s decisions.

– Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, 1992
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[mention Palgrave editorial staff]
INTRODUCTION

“What is today more boring,” asks Frederick Turner, in an essay published in Harper’s Magazine, “than the up-to-date?” All of our arts, all of what we call culture, including sculpture, music, painting, performance art and fiction, “tread the same postmodern circle,” in which the following alchemical formula is applied:

first, the subversion of the traditional means of representation, which are held to serve the interests of the power elite; next, what post-structuralist critics call the ‘play of the signifiers’, designed to undermine the expectations of the public; finally, the reminder that the sucker who buys the thing is complicit in the fraud described by the fashion magazines as the late capitalist commodification of desire.¹

The problem with this circle, as Turner sees it, is that there is no escape; it is an endless loop, in which the reality of anything external (“outside the text,” in postmodern parlance) is not only bracketed but also forgotten or denied. Spinning out of control, like the child’s hula hoop in the crowded fairground, the process nonetheless makes a return, the joke (if it is a joke) “always turns in upon itself,” and the perpetrators find themselves “trapped in the present, in a narrow little moving box of power struggle and injured self-esteem.”²

Turner’s remarks reflect a backlash that has been brewing in scholarly circles for some time, and now seems to have entered into the broader intellectual culture. The past few decades, in particular, have witnessed a polyphonic reaction to the hegemony of so-called postmodern modes, models, and methods, particularly those going by the labels poststructuralism and deconstruction. These are not completely synonymous terms, yet “deconstruction,” as a catchword for the program of one of poststructuralism’s patriarchs,
Jacques Derrida, became, in the 1960s and 1970s, the archetypal instance of post-Saussurean criticism, and, as such, left its indelible stamp upon both European and American (and, to some extent, Japanese) academies.

Turner’s skepticism notwithstanding, his formula for postmodernism is an apt summation of the deconstructive process: subversion of traditional means of representation; resultant play of the signifiers, now liberated from the shackles of Western metaphysics—i.e., from the shadows of Plato’s caves; and finally, the deconstruction of textual meaning, which serves to undermine (“dualistic”) expectations and challenges traditional hierarchies. It is the first stage in this process which will be most crucial to the purposes of the present study, and it is this first assumption that contemporary critic Colin Falck questions most vociferously: Why, Falck inquires, do we feel the need to subvert traditional means of representation? What, exactly, is the problem with the metaphysics of presence; and what are the implications of subverting the sense of presence, while proclaiming the dawn of a new, freer world, where unchained signifiers float languidly in the matinal breeze?

Though such deconstructive work is ostensibly to be done “without positive terms”—that is, without setting up new dichotomies to replace the old—it is obvious upon which side deconstruction stands, and how it thus falls prey to the myth of liberation so ensconced in modern Western culture. “Traditional metaphysics” and “means of representation” are clearly falsehoods to be attacked, or, to use Heideggerian terms, overcome. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of effective criticism without a certain sense of this—what I shall be calling the lure of disillusion: i.e., the curious tendency of human beings, and particularly modern Westerners, to believe in the revelation of truth negatively, through the progressive unveiling of falsehood and illusion.
Yet deconstruction, and post-Saussurean criticism more generally, hides its concern for values behind a veneer of detachment, playfulness, and irony. For all its aspirations to “answerable style” (Hartman), poststructuralist theory has been taken to task for ivory tower posturing, sterility, blindnesses, and even “crypto-Stalinism” (Paglia). Within continental thought, Jürgen Habermas has questioned postmodernism’s prima facie rejection of “the Enlightenment project,” while Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer have developed alternative methodologies of interpretation, under the broad rubric of hermeneutics. On the Anglo-American scene, where analytical philosophy has long reigned supreme, thinkers like Hilary Putnam, Nelson Goodman, and Richard Rorty have suggested syncretic alternatives to (or emendations of) poststructuralism and hermeneutics, often based in a reworking of empiricism or the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, John Dewey and William James. But the most vociferous attacks on the work of Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Julia Kristeva have come from a loose group of cultural critics (or Kulturkritiker, to use George Steiner’s term) interested in retrieving alternative ways of understanding, and, moreover, of coming to terms with, the “postmodern condition” (i.e., postmodernity), without resorting to what they perceive as the hyper-relativism/ nihilism/apathy of postmodernism—typified by the misapplied and much-abused premise that “there is nothing outside the text.” For the Kulturkritiker, poststructuralists are heirs of the Pedant in Goethe’s Faust, Part Two, who, upon seeing the beautiful Helen in the flesh, can only stick his nose back into his Homeric annotations, while stammering: “Above all I must stick to the text” (§6536–40). For the poststructuralist-as-Pedant, Beauty, feeling, love, are lost.

Traditional theories of language, like classical (post-Renaissance) theories of visual art, understand its primary function as mimesis, as an attempt to indicate the reality of the given (i.e., extralinguistic) world. Poststructuralists turn this around, and, in the
words of Paul de Man, philosophy becomes “an endless reflection on its own destruction at the hands of literature.” The critique of mimetic or naturalist representationalism in aesthetics and epistemology and the designative (i.e., Lockeian-Condillacan) theory of language, coupled with the retrieval of rhetoric as philosophical and expressive tool, are the most important aspects of post-Saussurean criticism. Yet, critics of poststructuralism are correct in suggesting that these particular ideas are not new, but have in fact been (intensively, if not always systematically) explored in the past, by other movements reacting, like postmodernism, against the philosophical and aesthetic orthodoxy of their times. One such movement, whose legacy lingers today—not only within literature and aesthetics but also, as Charles Taylor has shown, as a foundational element to modern Western culture more broadly—is Romanticism. This study re-examines the legacy of Romantic aesthetics and philosophy in relation to contemporary issues of representations and epistemology.

Colin Falck’s *Myth, Truth and Literature* was (to vary the overused trope) a depth-charge sunk in the wading-pool of academics, sending waves cascading across disciplinary ramparts—aesthetics, philosophy, literary and cultural theory—in its provocative call for a “true postmodernism.” Falck’s work is a sustained critique of post-Saussurean theory’s so-called “abolition of reality.” The linguistic turn taken by twentieth century thought in the wake of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis has, according to Falck, been extended—and thus reduced—to absurd extremes, as meaning revolves, endlessly, entrapped and useless, in a web of free (i.e., limitless) signification. As such, to borrow a term from Fredric Jameson, language becomes a “prison house” indeed, as it is severed from life—i.e., from extra-textual reality. This, for Falck, is an unnecessary and unwarranted (even, he suggests, along with Hilary Putnam, dangerous) leap in the dark. Post-Saussureanism fails to fulfill its *critical* role, and
merely legitimizes the condition of fracturation and apathy; rather than engaging, or, as I put it above, *coming to terms* with postmodernity, postmodern criticism tends to accept, and even revel in our bad faith: the “metaphysical or ontological void which existed at the heart of our culture already.” Thus does the putative *cure* reveal itself as *lure*, or perhaps even as *symptom*. Deconstruction, in particular, which in actual practice rarely approaches the quality, fineness and exactitude of Derrida’s pioneering work, proves itself not only philosophically and aesthetically sterile (or worse, as Frederick Turner would have it, boring), but also culturally and politically problematic.

At the same time, Falck recognizes the necessary and positive aspects of the linguistic turn to which poststructuralism is heir, as well as the attempts made by poststructuralists to reverse the biases against: a) literature and fiction as legitimate forms of expression and understanding; and b) rhetoric as a significant tool in philosophy and criticism. However, Falck sees this latter attempt as, ultimately, a failure, given poststructuralism’s refusal to ascribe or delimit meaning in the morass of freed significations that the unshackled text lets loose. It is from the side of literature itself that Falck builds his own propadeutic counterproposal, based on a re-examination of literary Romanticism, a movement which, it can be argued, has played not only a significant but a determinant role in shaping modern Western ways of thinking.

Romanticism is or can be many things to many people, but for the time being we define it as the reaction, in the mid to late eighteenth century, against the European Enlightenment’s vision of the world, the self, and the reality that ostensibly lies somewhere between these. For Falck, it is Romanticism’s understanding of the distinction between *allegory* and *symbol*, developed to buttress a critique of traditional representationalism in language (i.e., designative theories) and the arts (i.e., mimesis)—in short, Romanticism’s full-scale critique of a *realist* understanding of the world—which
serves as a catalyst for a reappraisal of both truth and myth within Western intellectual, cultural, and religious heritage. It is, in short, a matter of reconnecting with the literary past in order to throw some fresh light upon the blind assumptions of the philosophical present. As we shall see, though the Romantics have remained a popular foil for critics of the metaphysics of presence, poststructuralist understandings of the past, and of Romanticism in particular, frequently suffer from stereotyping and appropriation—blindnesses that may, as Paul de Man suggests, be an essential aspect of rhetorical insight, but which nonetheless must themselves be put into question as potentially egregious misreadings.

But Falck’s challenge does not end there—if it did there would be no need for the present study. While Myth, Truth and Literature is largely concerned with deconstructing postmodernism as generally conceived (i.e., as poststructuralism or post-Saussureanism), in the Preface to this work the author slips in, almost as an aside, a cursory dismissal of twentieth-century Western religion, suggesting that, not only the study of religion, but the whole idea of faith itself—by demythologizing and internalizing—has become inauthentic for people of today. Traditional faiths, in Falck’s analysis, have little to offer to any true postmodernism; the necessary remythologization can only take place with the imaginative insights of poetry and literature—Romantic poetry and literature in particular. Other culture critics of our times, in trying to get beyond the stranglehold of poststructuralist orthodoxy, have similarly neglected or disdained recent theological thinking, and given short shrift to the place of religion more generally. This, I think, is a serious lacuna, as is the obverse neglect of cultural and literary criticism by theology and philosophy.

Falck’s second challenge is the one I will address in this book, but in so doing I must first counter his primary thrust: the counterposition of neo-Romanticism to deconstruction as true postmodernism. These two critiques cannot be disengaged. It is my
contention that Falck’s dismissal of contemporary religious faith reveals an incomplete analysis of Romantic aesthetics, in which we can discern elements that nuance, and may even subvert, such a critique of religious demythologization. Thus, after a brief excursus on the foundations of Romanticism and its key concepts, Part One consists of an analysis of Romanticism as a revolutionary movement in language, aesthetics, ethics, epistemology, focusing on the Romantic symbol and the ambiguities of temporal presence. After connecting the Romantic legacy with Modernism and twentieth-century theology, I propose, in Part Two, to delimit the particular problem of myth in relation to Romantic and Christian theories of time and representation, culminating in a discussion of magic realism as a style of reading and expressing truth in religion. Using these findings, I present a re-reading of demythologization under the auspices of a magic realist hermeneutic, with regard, specifically, to the work of Thomas Torrance (1913–2007) and Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976).
Excursus One: Romanticism—A Sense of Symbol

Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), Neapolitan jurist, philosopher, and Renaissance Man, is best known today for his meta-historical speculations regarding the cycles of social history: i.e., the division of time into distinct epochs (It. corsi)—Anarchic, Theocratic, Aristocratic, Democratic—which eternally recur. Vico’s cycles are not merely political, however; they involve radical changes in the dominant or hegemonic mood—the Zeitgeist. In developing this cyclical theory of history Vico was the first modern writer to elaborate a concept of poetic logic or poetic wisdom: a style of thinking in contradistinction to classical ways and one that attempts a conflation of imagination and reason. Poetic wisdom, in the Viconian sense, is not necessarily irrational, unreasonable, or divine (in the strict, simplified and direct causal sense of divinely given or ordained); it is rather a divinely inspired or sanctioned mode of conceptualization, of knowing and understanding the rhythms of the world, and conceived by Vico as an alternative to the rationalist form of understanding emerging out of the European Enlightenment. With Vico, we might say, the jug of religion, safely contained for a time by the renascence of reason, was upended, and the seeds of Romanticism sown.

In primitive times, Vico argues in The New Science (La scienza nuova, 1725), human beings did not need to invoke the imagination in order to give utterance to their understanding of the spiritual realm; they did not have to clothe the transcendent in images (which become “diminutive signs”). Rather they “did the opposite and more sublime thing: they attributed senses and passions … to bodies … as vast as sky, sea, and earth.” Whatever the historical accuracy of such a picture, Vico resurrects and refashions the proverbial distinction between two types of thinking: knowledge and wisdom. While knowledge is scientific, wisdom is poetic, but, in spite of—or rather because of this—
eminently practical: “those who excel in knowledge seek a single cause to explain many natural effects, but those who excel in practical wisdom seek as many causes as possible for a single deed.” Here, we might add, Vico’s conception of wisdom strikingly echoes traditional Asian Buddhist teachings regarding the practical wisdom to be gained from insight into the truth of dependent co-origination (Skt. pratītya-samutpāda).

Thus Vico raises the possibility of a form of wisdom or spirit of reality comprehension that is not split into a conceptual or abstract meaning and a concrete—but merely allegorical—image or illustration. In his Ancient Wisdom (De antiquissima Italorum sapienta, 1710), Vico contrasts this wisdom—popular, poetic, and practical—with “modern” knowledge that is sophisticated, philosophical, and theoretical, and therefore less grounded in human reality. This early work, an explicit attack on Descartes, states Vico’s famous principle of verum et factum convertuntur—the convertibility of the true and the made. Here too we see the key to Viconian theory, in his notion of “imaginative universals” (It. universale fantastico: the form of thought that characterizes the religio-mythic or poetic mood) as well as his more general thesis that “There is no fixed human nature that remains identical regardless of time, place, and circumstance; human nature develops in accordance with self-knowledge and with insight into the essences of things.” However, lest we forget, Vico was, among his other trades, a theologian, and deeply committed to the exposition of religious truths. It is, he argued, Divine Providence that grants to human nature these non-rational (though not irrational) creative capacities which, operating on associative principles go on to produce “false” (i.e., not verifiable or demonstrable) beliefs from which eventually emerge greater truths. Yet, as noted above, this does not occur as a direct imposition of transcendent whim. Divine Providence, in Vico’s scheme, does not itself that provides wisdom, but rather
inspires—literally, gives breath to such—acting as a first cause from which poetic, nonrational wisdom springs.

Another important contribution of Vico was his “discovery” of the unity between philosophy and philology, a connection exploited in our own day where philosophy has taken a “linguistic turn.” Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), protégé of Hamann and mentor of Goethe, picked up on this Viconian connection and extended it, emphasizing (and this is critical when we look at the disembody state of the linguistic extremism of much deconstructionist and poststructuralist thought) not only the linguistic constitution of thought but also the concomitant embodiment of thought and language. “Thought,” Herder proclaims, “being necessarily linguistic, can take place only as an expressive activity and in a behaviourial medium, and must necessarily be physically embodied, located, and concrete.”11 This last notion makes Herder a father of pluralism, given his recognition of the embeddedness of language, and therefore of thought (and truth?) within peoples, cultures, and epochs. Falck sees in the Herderian view a warning: while acknowledging the centrality of language in our thinking and being, it raises questions about the adequacy of our concepts vis-à-vis the “previously unarticulated awareness which we make use of them to express.”12

Romanticism was born from: a) the recognition of a mode of knowing and experiencing that is neither rationalist nor empiricist, and which cannot be easily reduced to these; b) the replacement of mechanistic with biologistic and organic metaphors for thinking of art and life; c) a sense of the importance of language—particularly embodied, expressive language—in shaping human social being; and d) a commitment to the transformation of reality, often through socio-political revolution or reform, or (in the case of the Lake Poets) a form of popular poetry. Most importantly, for our purposes here, the Romantic revolution, as with the Christian revolution of the first
centuries of the Common Era, overturned conventional epistemological and aesthetic modes of apprehension—ways of thinking as well as of living—by throwing light upon the mimetic and designative traditions: setting realism, as it were, in the balance. The impetus of Vico and the extrapolations of Herder, in relation to historical consciousness, the relevance of language, and a sense of pluralism, set the stage for the Romantic explosion at the close of the eighteenth century, exemplified—in its breadth, power, and complications—by Germany’s two foremost poet-sages: Goethe and Schiller.

Herder was nothing if not syncretic, catalysing—in his alchemical fusion of the Enlightenment, Vico, Rousseau, humanism and Christianity—both die Romantik and der Klassizismus, the German classical revival, and producing from the crucible of such a truly Mephistopholean homunculus: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). Goethe, the most living of all dead writers—indeed, a figure of such Olympian proportions that his literary work, however great, always suffers in comparison with his biography—combines Vico’s poetic logic and imaginative universals with Herderian linguistic embodiment. Yet Goethe, in his vitalistic hubris, was disdainful of the intellectual work required to lend substance to his intuitions of poetic wisdom and embodiment. His principle trope, the Urphänomen—“an archetypal phenomenon, a concrete thing to be discovered in the world of appearances in which ‘significance’ (Bedeutung) and appearance, word and thing, idea and experience, would coincide”¹³—was never given sufficient elaboration, remaining a vague and nebulous concept, however suggestive. Elaboration was the domain of men like Kant, the Königsberg sage and intellectual anchorite, and Friedrich Schiller, Kant’s foremost disciple (in terms of aesthetic theory) and Goethe’s friend, acquaintance, and sometime rival. Indeed, Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790) can be seen as the foundation stone of modern aesthetics, the resurrection, as it were, of the place of art and beauty in philosophical
inquiry after the early hatchet job of Plato and his epigones. This work inspired not only Herder and the Frühromantiker—despite Kant’s own distaste for Romantic poetry—but also the German Idealist thinkers, from Schelling through the Schlegels to Hegel.

In Critique of Judgment, Kant speaks famously about the fundamental “disinterestedness” of beauty, which is the effect of the interplay between our understanding and our imagination. Though based in subjectivity, the sense of beauty does not require conceptualization, and thus “pleases universally.” Kant’s idea of the convergence of perception and imagination echoes Vico’s fantasia: the active power that forms or makes something true in human experience. In Kantian terms, the imagination apprehends what is given in intuition and combines the diversity of such so that it matches an already existing concept; thus the imagination presents—or exhibits (darstetten)—the concept, matching it with a corresponding intuition. While this preliminary expression of aesthetic judgment opens up a separate realm for beauty, it ultimately falls into the abstract disembodied trap of the Platonistic tradition of metaphysics. Friedrich Nietzsche, here, as elsewhere, playing Goethe’s bulldog, would late rage against Kantian disinterestedness:

Kant, like all philosophers, instead of viewing the esthetic issue from the side of the artist, envisaged art and beauty solely from the “spectator’s” point of view, and so, without himself realizing it, smuggled the “spectator” into the concept of beauty…. That is beautiful,” Kant proclaims, “which gives us disinterested pleasure.” Disinterested!

At the same time, Kant’s vision in Judgment is not entirely consistent. Occasionally, he posits an “aesthetic idea” that seems to extend beyond the subjective, and strains after something lying “beyond the confines of experience.” This rhetoric of
transcendence and transgression, of “going beyond,” or “overcoming” the temporal and subjective (or even objective) realm is, of course, quite popular in our own post-Nietzschean times, but Kant was either unwilling or unable to complete his rudimentary suggestions in this direction—though he does allude to the symbol as an analogical mode of representation later on in this work.\(^{18}\) It was Schiller who was to take Kant’s provisional work and develop its implications in several ways: namely, by anthropologizing the Kantian aesthetic; that is, relating it to lived human experience, while focusing on the Kantian analogical mode of representation expressed in the concept of the symbol. Thus was Schiller—with, to paraphrase Karl Barth, Kant’s aesthetic Bible in one hand, and the living Goethe in the other—able to give philosophical buttress to Vico’s poetic wisdom as well as the Kantian-Romantic intuition of a deeper symbolism.

Crucial to our examination of the development of Romantic poetics out of the Viconian impetus, besides the incarnational aspect of Goethe and the anthropological element of Schillerian aesthetics, is the distinction, to become a trope of Romantic and post-Romantic theory, between symbol and allegory. In Kantian terms, judgment is “the faculty of thinking the particular as being contained in the universal.”\(^{19}\) It is the power of judgment (Urteilskraft), which subsumes the particular under some universal (i.e., under some general principle) supplied by understanding, and thereby enables reason to make an inference from the universal to the particular. Goethe begs to differ: the particular, he argues, contains the universal—it is not merely an illustration of a general truth nor an immanent pointer to an inaccessible realm of ideas. From his Maxims (1822):

> It makes a great difference whether the poet seeks the particular for the universal or beholds the universal in the particular. From the first procedure originates allegory, where the particular is considered only as an illustration, as an example of the universal.
The latter, however, is properly the nature of poetry: it expresses something particular without thinking of the universal or pointing to it. Whoever grasps this particular in a living way will simultaneously receive the universal too, without even becoming aware of it—or realize it later.20

This distinction is a hub upon which early Romantic symbolism turns, and distinguishes it from the highly Platonistic and allegorical effusions of many later Romantics and neo-Romantics. Goethe’s is a Romanticism informed by the classic; in Nietzsche’s terms, his Dionysianism is tempered by Apollonianism. It is a High Romanticism in being less fully Romantic—i.e., not driven by nationalistic or patriotic sentiment; unmoved by a self-conscious cult of Beauty—and thus emobodies a vitalism closer to that of Walt Whitman or Nietzsche in his cheerier moods than what can be found in Keats, Wagner or the poètes maudit of France. Grasping the particular in a living way—in order to receive the universal through the back door—this is the forge in which was crafted the prototype of the Romantic Symbol.

It would take another poet-philosopher, however, this time from across the English Channel, to delve further into the significance of the symbol for Romantic poetics, setting the criteria for true and false art that typifies not only Romantic but also much of post-Romantic aesthetic theory and literary criticism. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834), in his late work The Statesman’s Manual (1839), gives explicit definition to Goethe’s terms, connecting them to the appropriate forms, or faculties, in which they are made use: fancy (for allegory) and imagination—the latter being the realm of the Symbol, and as such the only true source of art and poetry. Coleridge, as well versed in German metaphysics as in English poetics, saw allegory as “a translation of abstract notions into a picture language, which is nothing itself but an abstraction from objects of the senses.”21
As a move from abstraction to abstraction, allegorization is (like art for Plato) the phantom of a phantom—“both alike are unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot.” Against this stands the Symbol, which “is characterized by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general”; a poetic form revelatory in its concrete particularity, one which shows much more than it says. Moreover, Coleridge adds to this an all-important temporal aspect: the symbol is characterized, above all, “by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal.” In this sense, it is a “signifier” ineluctably fused with its “signified,” partaking of “the reality that it renders intelligible.” Notice: the symbol does not illuminate a given reality, but rather renders a novel or encroaching reality intelligible. For, “[t]he possibility of perceiving a coherent representation of the world does not alter the fact that the world as it is in itself is not the world as reflected in the human mind.” Facts are facta, as much created as discovered—“and made in part by the analogies through which we look at the world as through a lens.” (Abrams, 1953, p. 31). Or, perhaps, through a glass darkly.

Thus, the symbolic faculty is the imagination, described as:

that reconciling and mediating power, which incorporating the reason in images of the sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors.

The imagination, in this organic and monistic schema, is, in a sense, embodied reason. The imaginative capacity, by way of the production of symbols, provides the essential mediary or bridge between the literal and the metaphorical; between the
real/historical and the fictive/mythical. It is “the modifying and coadunating faculty.”

Moreover, it is from the imagination, and only from the imagination, which involves both
the ability to distinguish allegory from symbol, and the capacity, or grace, to use the latter
“appropriately,” that great art is born—whether the art is that of Shakespeare or the
biblical poets—where “each thing has a life of its own, and yet they are all our life.”
PART ONE: ROMANTICISM AND (POST-)MODERNITY

Dudkin: “Nikolai Apollonovich, it’s just your sensations that appear strange to you; it’s just that you’ve been sitting too long with Kant in an unaired room; you’ve been struck by a tornado—and you’ve started to notice things about yourself….”

Nikolai: “That everything is what is, and yet different?”

Dudkin: “That is, a kind of symbolic sensation that does not correspond to the stimulus of a sensation […] a modernist would call this sensation the sensation of the abyss—that is to say, he would look for an image that corresponds to a symbolic sensation that is not normally experienced.”

Nikolai: “So there’s an allegory here.”

Dudkin: “Don’t confuse allegory with symbol; an allegory is a symbol that has become current usage… while a symbol is your appeal to what you have experienced there…; an invitation to experience artificially something that you experienced for real.

– Andrei Bely, Petersburg (1916)
Chapter One: Romancing the Postmodern

The Forge and the Flame

If it is true, as M. H. Abrams, Harold Bloom, Colin Falck, and Frank Kermode have suggested, that we can date the birth of the modern sensibility—our inherited version of the Occidental critical and affective persona—to the lifetime of Coleridge (whether we place its genesis with Rousseau, Herder, Kant, Hegel, Goethe, or the Lake Poets), then we would do well to re-examine the most innovative and provocative ideas of this era, ideas which, under various transmutations, supply us with much of our present worldview. Since, as Abrams and René Wellek both attest, Romanticism is defined in large part by the pervasive elements of “symbolism, animism and mythopeia,” it may be time to reassess the Romantic sense of symbol and myth, now that the mimetic ideal (in art and theory, if not in common-sense) has fallen so decisively asunder, setting realism once more in the balance. Indeed, the symbol retained enough ambiguity in the days of the early Romantics to be employed fruitfully, if somewhat vaguely, in their aesthetics. As Blumemberg notes:

[it] presented itself as a term that, while it did derive dignity from the sacral phase of its history, had not acquired any additional meaning that would be important where it was now needed—except perhaps for the spread of indefiniteness, which continues to the present day to make the ‘symbol’ the terror of the struggling interpreter.
Heeding Blumenberg’s warning, we will avoid the ambiguity as much as possible, by limiting ourselves herein to the concept of the symbol as developed by Goethe and Coleridge, later connecting such with the ideas of Schiller, Herder, and the modernists.31

Abrams entitled the first of his two seminal works *The Mirror and the Lamp* (1953)—after the antithetical metaphors of the classical mimetic mirror and the Romantic creative/expressive lamp; and the second *Natural Supernaturalism* (1971)—after a phrase out of Thomas Carlyle’s *Sartor Resartus*, referring to the mediating aspect of Romanticism, where salvation is sought not solely in the creative capacities of the mind, but just as much in the creative inspíritus of Nature, a mix which justifies T. E. Hulme’s (derisory) appellation of Romanticism as “spilt religion.” My argument in the next few chapters will effectively limn these two titles. In analyzing the Romantic critique of realism, of the classical mirror, I will nuance the contrasting alternative, the lamp, with two more specific illuminating devices: the forge and the flame. With these leitmotifs, I will proceed to discuss several variations on the Romantic theme in terms of the Symbol and its implications in representation, language, knowledge, and belief. Natural supernaturalism implies not only a re-supernaturalization of the natural world, but also, a concomitant rejection of traditional supernaturalism, as embodied in classical Christian theism.

What makes Coleridge of particular interest to this study is the fact that he was a Romantic poet and thinker who engaged in a lifelong struggle with the truths of the Christian religion.32 Thus, Coleridge stood not only between poetry and philosophy, he rode the even more precarious line of balance between Christian orthodoxy and Romanticism. For Colin Falck, this is a limitation to Coleridge’s work, and perhaps the reason he stopped writing poetry at such an early age, devoting his time to metaphysics and religious and literary criticism. But Coleridge’s Christianity cannot be made
marginal, as it led him to rethink certain aspects of Romantic symbolism, particularly its lapses into the blind worship of the moment, and its corresponding conviction that all symbols are, *prima facie,* “successes.” The histories of the Scriptures, he argues in *The Statesman’s Manual,* are not just histories in the objective sense, nor mere stories—rather they are *myths,* in the fullest, symbolic sense. As such, they are:

> the living educts of the imagination, of that reconciling and mediating power, which incorporating the reason in images of the sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors.\(^{33}\)

One of the principal components of natural supernaturalism is the rejection of the habitual—i.e., of custom—and a subsequent retrieval of *wonder,* of the “miraculousness of daily-recurring miracles.”\(^{34}\) Yet Coleridge recognized that a commitment to the Symbol and the Imagination meant a revocation of clarity—and was thus a risk, a leap into the dark river of time and eternity. To forsake the mirror, i.e., to reject a realistic understanding of the world, is not without consequences. “To him who is compelled to pace to and fro within the high walls and the narrow courtyard of a prison,” he suggests, “all objects may appear clear and distinct.” Yet even from the look out of the prison (the word for which in Latin, *speculum,* is the same as mirror), one’s horizon is limited. Extending the Romantic trope of the questing pilgrim, Coleridge suggests that it is the traveler journeying onward, “full of heart and hope, with an ever-varying horizon, on the boundless plain, who is liable to mistake clouds for mountains, and the mirage of drouth for an expanse of refreshing water.”\(^{35}\) An ambiguous legacy indeed.
A “True” Postmodernism

I have spent considerable time outlining the development of Romanticism, and its most recognizable leitmotif—the distinction between symbol and allegory—because it is Romantic poetics upon which Colin Falck seeks to build a true postmodernism: a propadeutic for scholarship (and, it would seem, a heuristic for life more generally) in our postmodern situation/condition. In the next section, I will explain the importance of Romanticism in Falck’s thesis—particularly in its aspect as successor to traditional religion and doctrinal faith: as fortuitously “spilt religion.” At the same time, I will argue that, in his efforts to re-evoke the Romantic ideal, Falck errs in too-readily conflating divergent (and sometimes antipathetic) facets of this complex and multiform movement, which results in a facile distinction between Romantic and Christian modes of conceptualization and perception, centered in the (mis-)use and (mis-)understanding of the symbol vis-à-vis presence. As buttress to my critique, I will briefly examine structuralist and deconstructionist arguments against Romantic presence and the cult of immediacy, while recognizing that these critiques also suffer from a misunderstanding of the breadth and polyphony of Romanticism, and particularly its realism.

As we have seen above, Falck plays Kant to Derrida’s Hume: though dogmatic rationalism, traditional metaphysics, and classical theism may have failed, skepticism can be equally dogmatic, and just as implausible. Moreover, poststructuralism throws the real baby out with the metaphysical bathwater—in large part because it fails to acknowledge previous departures, heresies, and schisms from the orthodox metaphysical tradition (Plato’s bastard progeny, beginning with his first begotten son—Aristotle). Though poststructuralist theory claims to be making a radical break with traditional philosophical method, by emulating and looking towards literature as a model, Falck argues that what
postmodern theories need is a real commitment to integrating “the sometimes competing claims of literature, theology, and positive knowledge.”

Falck’s thesis can be briefly summarized as follows. Poststructuralist (or, as he calls it, post-Saussurean) theory is moribund, largely because it cannot adequately come to terms with, or even recognize, the spiritual void of postmodernity. Thus it serves as an apology for, rather than a critical interpretation of our age. In fact, the “philosophically incoherent anti-metaphysical posturings” of post-Saussureanism contribute to this spiritual void, by masking or denying the real presence of the spiritual dimension in human life; by, in effect abolishing reality. Falck espouses a more openly aesthetic evaluation of postmodernity, one that, in his eyes, falls prey neither to the anti-metaphysical biases of post-structuralism nor the politicization of critical and so-called multicultural theory—in which everything is subsumed under the auspices of cultural-political criticism. In short, what is needed already exists: in the inescapable, yet under-acknowledged legacy of Vico, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, Blake and Coleridge. In particular, Falck cites the innovations of Kant, who provides us with a number of fertile suggestions on the function of the imagination, in particular its world-making and transgressive, going beyond capacities. These provide us with “the basis of a philosophically coherent account of the function of creative insight or intuition—in every area of our experiential life” (pp. 35–6). Only from such can we gain “some aesthetically non-sterile critical ways in which we might at last once again begin to move forward.”

Thus, in reaction to the presumed spiritual void of our present day, Colin Falck retrieves the much-abused and much-neglected legacy of Romantic poetics as the natural and inevitable successor to traditional religious faith, which itself has followed philosophy into abstraction, internalization, and demythologization. It is not so much that religion and theology are to be replaced, but rather subsumed within the neo-Romantic
paradigm. It is only within the bounds of such that they will be able to “discover or …
rediscover their own spiritual meanings.”\textsuperscript{40} It is my task in the following chapters to
critically develop and expand upon Falck’s thesis. In this first chapter I nuance the neo-
Romantic heuristic by suggesting some limitations of the allegory-symbol distinction
upon which Romantic poetics rests, and I also provide a counterweight to a pertinent
critique (coming from the post-Saussurean theory so despised by Falck) of the atemporal
and epiphanic tendencies of Romanticism more generally.

The Two Faces of Romanticism

Instead of providing anything like a comprehensive summary of Romanticism, I will rely
upon the four elements outlined above; i.e., the Romantic invocation of:

a) the creative and poetic imagination;
b) organicist and vitalist imagery;
c) expressive language-use; and
d) socio-political, cultural, and personal transformation.

The Romantic Symbol is the trope that draws these facets together, and is what
distinguishes Romantic art and Romantic style from other forms of creation,
representation and understanding.

Falck sees two faces to Romanticism. The first, and most recognizable visage is
that of the Byronic or Faustian rebel, the heroic vitalist—e.g., Prometheus stealing fire
from the gods and bringing it to earth.
Even more than the rather mechanical atheism which preceded it, Romanticism made possible a realistic engagement with humanity’s problems, because it was with Romanticism that men began to grasp the seriousness of what they were doing in questioning their long-sacred beliefs—and yet remained determined to go on doing it.\textsuperscript{41}

This is an auspicious remark, given its stress on the realistic engagement of Romanticism, and its aspect of rebellion against the sacred truths\textsuperscript{42}—and not only those of religion, but also of the scientistic and materialistic assumptions of the European Aufklärung. Here a determined hope for the future (an idealism, to employ the less technical sense of this term) mixes with a practical realism concerning the situation of the present. Perhaps the key to Romanticism, and to its lingering presence in our Occidental atmosphere, is this Janus-face: as a force at once conservative (hoping to preserve the sacred yearnings, sense of wonder, and humanism of religious faith against mechanical atheism and materialistic scientism) and radical (questioning the status quo, the traditional historical roots of religious stagnation and political conservatism).

In short, like Nietzsche’s madman, the Romantics actually lament the so-called Death of God; for it is we, they intuit, who have killed Him. Yet if the old God has fallen, the power of deity lingers, even if it now resides, as for William Blake, in the human breast. Blake’s gods are strange deities, however, and not easy to see, at least face to face. This brings us to the second face of Romanticism—the side most closely linked with traditional religious belief, and the one that (in Falck’s eyes) makes it the necessary heir to Christianity—i.e., Romanticism’s realization of human imperfectibility in the face of mystery and divinity: its sense of wonder.\textsuperscript{43} This is at once the lighter and the darker side of Romanticism. It is a sense of the discrepancy between what is and what could be; or rather, the refusal—by (naïvely) assuming a fluid barrier between the ideal and the real,
and the eternal and the temporal—to hypostasize the gap between is and ought; between, as Schiller would have it, *what is real and what is necessary*. Coleridge felt this keenly, more so than those Romantics less intent on building a bridge for Christianity across the churning waters of modernity.

These two faces could be called the *political* and the *spiritual* sides of Romanticism, though this would be somewhat imprecise as both involve political and spiritual elements. Rather, we shall call the first the recognition of *agency* (which will be discussed below vis-à-vis the use of expressive language) and the second an acknowledgement of *temporality* or *relativity* (which will be discussed in terms of an understanding of history and memory). It is Falck’s thesis (following Goethe, Blake, and Keats) that these two faces can co-exist, not in the “vulgar superstitions” of Christianity, nor the disembodied pronouncements of materialistic and mechanistic science or metaphysics—but *only* in the type of imaginative and creative understanding known as Romanticism. It will be my task now to deconstruct the two-faced mask of Romanticism, to “think the decoy” of this Janus.

**Worldmaking: Romanticism as Reality-Inscription**

The most promising aspect of Romanticism—or, perhaps, of literature and art understood, created or performed under Romantic auspices—is the Romantic capacity for *worldmaking*. Romanticism bequeathed or revived the magic of words; i.e., the latent potentiality of words to beget worlds. Particularly at this stage in human history, when, according to the tenets of postmodernity, our reality (or realities) has been fractured and dispersed, what is required is a new understanding of reality and truth—or, perhaps, of the new truth of reality. It might be that, as Falck suggests, it will be literature that “gives
us our purest and most essential way of grasping reality or truth.”

The abyss of uncertainty and relativism in which we have been plunged after the Death of God as proclaimed a century ago by Nietzsche and corroborated by Marx, Darwin, and Freud, can be made livable by virtue of the insights of art and literature. This is a vision of aesthetics as a propadeutic for postmodern life. The problem with postmodernisms is that, by and large, they have only dug the abyss more deeply, by abolishing not only God and the subject, but our felt sense of reality—by eliminating, with the critique of the metaphysics of presence, any possibility of extra-linguistic, or even extra-textual presence or reality that is worth discussing. “How hollow and empty did we feel in this melancholy, atheistic half-night, in which Earth vanished with all its images, Heaven with all its stars.”

Taking a cue from the Kantian theory of perception, Falck understands human reality to be a confluence of outside and inside (he judiciously avoids the problematic terms objective and subjective). That is to say, the world in which we live is the creation, in large part, of our pre-conceptual (“animal,” Santayana would say) awareness, or sympathy. The minute we perceive, we create. Furthermore, it is this sympathy, rather than knowledge, that “links our own experiencing and other people’s experiencing into a single world of human apprehension and agency.” This preconceptual faith does not imply that reality is solely the creation, ex nihilo, of our perceiving, conceiving, and imagining minds—for just as reality is inscribed in our apprehension, the soul (Falck reappropriates this very un-modern term) is also inscribed in our subsequent linguistic or poetic expression. There is no a priori self. Poetry is, as Keats suggested, a “vale of soul-making,” as much as it is the locus for a recognition and exhibition—i.e., presentation—of reality or truth.
The true Romanticism of Goethe, as previously discussed, where the symbol is the meeting-place—the locus or nexus of the particular and the general; the transcendent within the infinite; the eternal as temporal—is a Romanticism tempered by a certain classical impulse. These terms are, of course, hardly less vague than realism and idealism, but here I shall follow Walter Pater, heir to the Romantics, father and priest of the British Symbolists—the so-called Aesthetic Movement—and grandfather, by way of Woolf, Proust, Yeats, and Joyce, of literary Modernism. In an essay on Coleridge, Pater alludes to the English poet’s epitomization of the autre façon of Romanticism, suggesting that it is in fact Coleridge’s “inexhaustible discontent, languor, and home-sickness”—chords which “ring all through our modern literature”—that signifies our Romantic legacy.48 This homesickness, so evident in Heidegger’s favorite Frühromantiker Hölderlin, is, for Pater, what characterizes the Romantic at its best. On the other hand, the classic is not a mere longing for the solidity of the past, as it is often characterized by false Romantics, but rather the “forgetting of the distant horizon” in order to take stock or “be content with” the present situation.49 In other words, to re-evolve a metaphor, it is to remain, at least for a time, within the prison walls of the immediate and the present.

And yet, within the classic sensibility Pater includes the charm of the well-known tale, the Märchenlust so loved by another Romantic classicist, Heine, with its melodic beauty of repetition and familiarity, and its universal welcome. “The classic comes to us out of the cool quiet of the times, as the measure of what a long experience has shown will at least never displease us”—“the essentially classical element is that quality of order in beauty.”50 True Romanticism is classical, in this (i.e., realistic) sense, retrieving the past as a path towards the blinding horizon—in short: heritage made task. It is the romantic, however, that adds strangeness to beauty—“it is the addition of curiosity to this desire of beauty, that constitutes the romantic temper.”51 To the Romantic classicists,
Goethe, Byron and Wincklemann (beloved of Pater), like the Renaissance humanists but unlike the polite classicism of the Age of Reason—Greece was less a past civilization to be studied scientifically than a living idea: “a summons to new forms of art and sentiment.”\textsuperscript{52} Weimar classicism was, indeed, a reaction to the didactic naturalism of the \textit{Stürmer und Dränger}, not to the ideals of the \textit{Frühromantiker}. For Schiller, art’s role is vital, but not directly so, rather it affects (often imperceptibly) the totality of our humanness, our cosmos.\textsuperscript{53} Like Goethe, Schiller “was never so romantic as when he was classical.”\textsuperscript{54}

Romantic classicism is, in some ways, the vision of Nietzsche’s Dionysus, who, in Nietzsche’s later works, is really a Dionysus who has sublated or transvalued Apollo, his rival and antipode. At the end of Part One of \textit{Faust}, as his beloved Gretchen dies, our hero resolves to pursue no longer \textit{experience} as such, but rather the \textit{best} experience (\textit{Du, Erde...regst und rührst ein kräftiges Beschliesen zum höchsten Dasein immerfort zu stürben})—to streamline, as it were, his energies, in order to explore the externality of human life, to encounter more fully the world outside. For experience alone is superficial; experience in its particularities opens up vistas—“objects, ideals, and unanimities that cannot be experienced but may only be conceived.”\textsuperscript{55} Santayana points to the power of Romanticism as methodology, but also to its limitations; namely, its blind obedience to the moment, never learning (like Faust, even the mature Faust of \textit{Part Two}) from experience.

The classic and the Romantic, Pater insists, define two very real tendencies in the history of art and literature. Yet these two tendencies are not always easy to distinguish and are not always in open battle in what Salman Rushdie has called “the war over the nature of reality.”\textsuperscript{56} Just as the former cannot be equated with mere traditionalism, neither can the latter be exhausted by the various poetic movements which have flown its
banner—the Romantische Schule of Germany (criticized by Heine); the Lake Poets (satirized, mercilessly, by Goethe’s friend Byron); or the French Romantics (lambasted by Gautier and the Parnassians). Romanticism is not a school or a tradition so much as a spirit—one which can be found well before the eighteenth century and well after its supposed demise at the hands of first Symbolism, then Modernism, and finally postmodernism.

Of course, the classic-romantic split is another example in the long temptation of Western thought towards dichotomy—the temptation to make of two things dissociative binaries—carried over, in this case, into twentieth-century thinking in terms of Nietzsche’s division of art (and life) into extremes of pure feeling (Dionysus) and pure form (Apollo). Yet, as Suzanne Langer points out, these dualisms, even in Nietzsche’s own work, are easily obscured by nuance and caricature. By “slipshod thinking,” she asserts, the conception of polarity “intriguing though is be, is really an unfortunate metaphor whereby a logical middle is raised to the dignity of a fundamental principle.”

Thus, in discussing the classic-romantic divide, I am not trying to suggest a media res between these two verities; rather I am suggesting that they are facile and ultimately useless polarities—true Romantics will recognize the fluidity of these terms. Here we see the muddiness of realism when framed in terms of the Romantic and the classic, but also, perhaps, the translucency which will prove its redemption.

**Romantic Realism**

I have invoked this classic-romantic dialectic in order to introduce the temporal aspect of Romanticism, as well as its corresponding political component. Romanticism, as much as it is critical of mimetic representation in art and the designative theory of language, is
supremely “realistic” in its commitment to the battle over the nature of truth and reality, framed in historical, temporal terms. The Romantic commitment to particulars comes out of a recognition of the disjunction of the “is” and the “ought”—one might say, the seeming gap between the Herderian body and the Kantian mind; but it also involves a refusal to allow this gap to remain unbridged. This is, in essence, Romantic realism.

We have come then, to a working definition of the Romantic, which involves the four elements cited above: a) a recognition of a mode of knowing and experiencing that is neither rationalistic nor empiricist; b) a replacement of mechanistic with biologistic and organic metaphors for thinking of art and life; c) a sense of the importance of language in shaping human personality and the self; d) a commitment to the transformation of reality through socio-political revolution or reform; and which, as a way of informing or presenting reality, contains both the Romantic yearning for transformation and the classic desire for present accountability. It is “an existential program, according to which man posits his existence in a historical situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal with the reality surrounding him and what use he will make of the possibilities open to him”—the past being a storehouse of these possibilities. Romanticism is thus an archetypal modern instance, and can be fruitfully conceived as the capacity for transformation (or, more suggestively, transfiguration) in and out of the imaginative, redescriptive, or expressive use of language. This points to a possible convergence of the aesthetic and the ethical, to a feeling for (G. Sorge) the world as it is for contemporary humans in the midst of a particular culture—an understanding, as Goethe would have it, “in time.”
Chapter Two: Allegory Run Amok

The whole subject has been confused by the failure to recognize the gap between the regions of vital and human feelings, and that of the absolute values of ethics and religion. We introduce into human things the Perfection that properly belongs only to the divine, and thus confuse both human and divine things by not clearly separating them…. This is the essence of all Romanticism.

– T. E. Hulme, Speculations

Structuralism’s Revenge

Romanticism has suffered the fate of many of the most crucial movements in our history: the banality of overexposure. Indeed, the heady days of Goethe, Hugo, and Coleridge, were not long past before the inevitable reactions set in. Yet the direct heirs to Romanticism in literature and aesthetics—Symbolism, the Aesthetic movement, and modernism (in its various manifestations)—kept, for the most part, to the high status given to the Symbol. On the other hand, the most explicit denunciations of Romanticism, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were often based on a misreading of the Romantic Symbol (or, to be fair, on a correct reading of the “degenerate” Romanticism of Goethe’s ire). The most famous modernist characterization of Romanticism is that of the critic T. E. Hulme, who, as mentioned, dismissed the movement as “spilt religion”—i.e., the last feeble gasp of Renaissance humanism, founded on an undignified yearning for perfection in strictly human terms. In short, Hulme saw in Romanticism the Pelagian heresy of the early Church, striving to resurrect itself on the cadaver of a decayed orthodoxy and a moribund rationalism. Most self-professed modernists wanted to distance themselves entirely from the taint of religious
faith, so the label stuck, despite the fact that Hulme’s reading of Romanticism is based on a narrowly rigid (one might say Burkean “conservative”) distinction between romantic and classic, whereby the former is little more than utopianism, the latter a staunch commitment to order and stability. The modernist desire to break with the past, coupled with the phenomenon Harold Bloom calls “the anxiety of influence,” worked together to cause this fundamental blindness to the Romantic legacy, a blindness which lingers today in postmodern theory.

Structuralists, justifiably suspicious of the Romantic slide into subjectivism and the solipsistic sensationism of Pater’s children, found in Romanticism a useful foil for their own theories of language and poetics. In particular, the Romantic celebration of the Symbol, the vehicle of transcendence-in-immanence, over the purely signatory or referential allegory, came under direct attack. Structuralists sought to redress the balance, as it were, against the allegory, and they succeeded to such an extent that the allegory once again became (in theory, at any rate) the primary mode of poetic representation. Walter Benjamin, in his seminal remarks on Baudelaire, may have been the first to reclaim allegory’s ground, but it was structuralist critics Jonathan Culler and Paul de Man, followed by Schlaffer and Kruse (on Goethe) who, in re-reading the Romantic legacy, proclaimed allegory “the poetic figure of modernity.”

Culler points to the ambiguities within the classic characterization of allegory, particularly Coleridge’s suggestion that we define “allegoric writing” as:

the employment of one set of agents and images with actions and accompaniments correspondent, so as to convey, while in disguise, either moral qualities or conceptions of the mind that are not in themselves objects of the senses, or other images, agents, actions, fortunes, and circumstances, so that the difference is everywhere permitted to the eye or imagination while the likeness is suggested to the mind.
In some respects this is familiar: allegory as abstraction. Yet Coleridge, despite himself, could not help but appreciate, in some way, “the artificiality of commentary, the difference between apparent and ultimate meaning” that lies latent in all allegorical writing.\(^6\) That is, allegory is not a ruse, but is rather quite honest in its revelation of the gap between signifier and signified; in fact, according to this understanding, allegory confronts representation itself as a ruse, a decoy. It is not so simple as some Romantics, like Goethe, might have wished; allegory is not only a propadeutic form of writing, a form which “demands commentary and goes some way toward providing its own”—it is also a vehicle for irony, for self-reflection, for the play of difference and the dissolution of set, settled meaning. If symbol absorbs (or incarnates) meaning, allegory destroys, or at least renders meaning problematic, and is thus the prime vehicle of polysemy.

Whereas the Romantic Symbol is a natural sign, in which there is an indissoluble fusion of significant and signifié, the allegory is a locus for “arbitrary or conventional signification,” wherein the signifier and signified are linked, precariously, by “authority or habit.”\(^6\) Symbols claim a self-revealing totality of signification; allegory bows to its own lack of power, its servile and manipulatable status, and its rhetorical capacities. Thus, according to Culler, allegory contains a kind of honesty—or, an honest duplicity, a tell-tale mask—laying bare the ruse perpetrated by the monistic, univocal, self-aggrandizing, totalitarian symbol. “Allegory,” says Culler, his commentary reaching a climax:

is the mode which recognizes the impossibility of fusing the empirical and the eternal and thus demystifies the symbolic relation by stressing the separateness of the two levels, the impossibility of bringing them together except momentarily and against a
background of disassociation, and the importance of protecting each level and the potential link between them by making it arbitrary.⁶⁷

As if this were not enough to damn the symbol to the dustbin of history, it is, Culler suggests, allegory and only allegory that “can make [this] connection in a self-conscious and demystifying way.”⁶⁸ Yet, one might wonder in reading Culler’s defense of allegory, what of “the importance of protecting each level and the potential link between them”? From whence does this imperative arise? If the connection is itself an “impossibility,” then why the desire for fusion in the face of demystification? I will postpone further remarks on Culler for the moment in order to examine Paul de Man’s more nuanced critique of the Romantic symbol, one also based on (post-)structuralist premises.

The Rhetoric of Atemporality

Humanity seems destined to oscillate forever between devotion to the world of dreams and adherence to the world of reality. And really, if this breathing rhythm of history were to cease, it might signal the death of the spirit.

– Franz Roh, “Magical Realism: Post-Expressionism”

Paul de Man’s essay on “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” once described by Culler as “the most photocopied essay in literary criticism,” forms a part of his collection entitled Blindness and Insight (1983), in which the author explores the blindesses of various rhetorical strategies in contemporary and Romantic criticism—blindesses that, as often as not, provide much in the way of illumination, even as they “misread” texts. To deploy de Man’s image: the lightning flash provides a moment of great clarity, even as it renders
one’s vision fuzzy. Interested in “the problematical nature of reading itself,” de Man explores the gaps between the words of contemporary critics and the results or effects of their practical criticism. One could say that de Man turns the deconstructive eyeglass upon his peers (and ultimately, himself).69

In “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” de Man seeks, like Culler, to redress the anathema against allegory. The lure of the symbol, its power, he insists, lies in its “religious ineffability”: its “appeal to the infinity of a totality” of meaning.70 As Gadamer notes, the opposition of symbol and allegory is based on the assumption that “the former seems endlessly suggestive in the indefiniteness of it meaning, whereas the latter, as soon as its meaning is reached, has run its full course.”71 Paradoxically, given Culler’s claims for symbolic univocity and single-mindedness, de Man follows Gadamer in seeing within the symbol a different form of control—that of an omnivorous (and omniscient?) totality of signification, a claim to an inexhaustible font of meaning. Not just one meaning but all meaning, he suggests, is claimed under the Symbol’s auspices.

In Coleridge, the Symbol is synecdoche, i.e., it is always part and parcel of the totality that it feigns to represent. Yet de Man, like Culler, points to the ambiguities in the Coleridgean analysis: the solidity or incarnational (i.e., concrete) reality of the Symbol dissolves, in Coleridge’s own terms, into translucence—the Symbol is still a dark glass, a chiaroscuro. Thus the synthetic power of the Symbol, so important for the Symbolist heirs of Romanticism, is put into question.72 Yet this does not necessarily counteract the incarnational aspect of the Symbol, which does not claim to exhaust the relationship between the terms, but rather to bring these into dissociative contact. As Jorge Luis Borges said of the Spanish bard Quevedo, he “forgot that the metaphor is the momentary contact of two images, not the methodical linking of two things.”73 To assume that the Symbol creates a static, atemporal (eternal) connection between signifier and signified is
to grossly misinterpret its function; it is to interpret the symbol, or metaphor, in a much too literal fashion. Symbolic realism is not, nor does it attempt to replace, mimetic naturalism.

The Symbol must be reconceived as mirror, not merely reflecting the world, as it is, now, but also revealing the agent in the process of attempting the connection. After all, the Greek symbolon signifies a token, a coming into relation or the making of a pact, thus effectively connecting the word to “metaphor” (Gk. metapherein, to transfer, exchange). As the French poet Léon Bloy proclaims, “Everything is a symbol, even the most tortuous pain”—but the meaning of our pain is not present, for, to reinvoke I Corinthians 13:12: “We see now… per speculum in aenigmate, literally: ‘in enigma by means of a mirror’. The “now,” our sense of the reality of the present moment, is mired in the opacity of the mirror. Yet this is as it must be, for only in the prison, only as spectators, do we see things with absolute clarity. The real world on the horizon is always partly a dream. Bloy’s contemporary, the Symbolist Paul Valéry, gives us a definition for beauty, suggesting that it “may require the servile imitation of what is indefinable in objects.” Conjoining this with Nietzsche’s aphorism, “Only that which has no history can be defined,” a syllogism results, whereby the only proper mimesis is a mirroring of the historical, the temporal, in the guise of the present.

Yet de Man’s main argument rests on “the Rhetoric of Temporality”—that is, the a-temporality of symbolic, as opposed to allegorical, writing and signification. “In the world of the symbol,” he suggests, “it would be possible for the image to coincide with the substance, since the substance and its representation do not differ in their being but only in their extension: they are part and whole of the same set of categories.” But here is the crux: “Their relationship is one of simultaneity, which, in truth, is spatial in kind, and in which the intervention of time is merely a matter of contingency, whereas in the world
of allegory, time is the originary constitutive category. De Man insists that in the case of two paradigm Romantics, Rousseau and Wordsworth, the allegorical sign distances itself from meaning—this relation becomes secondary, and the (structural) relations between signs, between signs across time, takes on primary importance. “The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist only in the repetition (in the Kierkegaardian sense) of a previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this previous sign to be pure anteriority.” Secularized allegory of this sort contains the so-called “negative moment”—the tragic sense of life that encompasses the Romantic sense of homelessness. The Symbol, contrariwise, eschews temporality by glossing over the necessary temporal relations between the sign and its (anterior) other.

Here, once again, the Symbol becomes a ruse, a (self-)delusion or opiate; in short, an attempt to “hide from this negative self-knowledge”—the knowledge of the inescapability of time, of the temporal predicament of human being. Romanticism’s second face is covered with a mask, one that resembles its primary visage, its positive desire for transformation and transfiguration in the face of the past. In sum: “Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin; and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this ‘temporal difference’.” Both Culler and de Man attempt to demystify the Romantic Symbol, by “thinking the decoy” as Derrida would have it, of the post-Christian nostalgia for the absolute: for Real Presences and lost origins.

Yet, for all the insight de Man brings to this work, his attack on the Romantic Symbol and its supposed atemporality suffers from its own significant blind spots. First, his characterization of the Symbol is monolithic—a caricature—based on an uncritical reading of Coleridge, and bypassing the contributions of Herder and Schiller.
Translucence is a necessary aspect, one that connects the Romantic Symbol to its status as “spilt religion”—and not simply a confusion on the part of Coleridge, that one-time opium eater. The Symbol, when understood in terms of Romantic expressivism, Schein, and the distinction between *kairos* and *chronos*, stands up to the challenge of temporal allegory. Second, de Man’s *allegory* itself seems to be rather a description of *irony*, which, as much as it might touch the former is hardly an equivalent, and does not correspond with the Romantic sense of allegory. De Man speaks of Schlegel’s trope of *Parekbase* (parabasis) in terms of the self-conscious aspect of irony—i.e., as a recognition of “the continued implausibility of reconciling the world of fiction with the actual world.” For Schlegel, this results, not in a commitment to naturalism, but rather “serves to prevent the all too readily mystified reader from confusing fact and fiction and from forgetting the essential negativity of the fiction.” But this, as we shall see, is precisely the ruse of naturalism and realism as so conceived; the assumption, that is, of a single reality, out there, a world of facts, to which fiction either corresponds, or (in the case of Schlegelian irony) “negates.” Once again the prison doors remain locked. Finally, the de Manian critique of symbolic presence, his assumption that it is, “in truth,” a *spatial presence*, fails to do justice to Goethe’s “understanding in time,” to the symbol as “foundational present,” and to myth. The following chapter develops counterproposals to the critiques of Culler and de Man, based largely on a reinterpretation of the critical writings of Friedrich Schiller.
Chapter Three: Counterproposals

Language itself possesses and is possessed by the dynamics of fiction. To speak, either to oneself or to another, is in the most naked, rigorous sense of that unfathomable banality, to invent, to re-invent being and the world. Voiced truth is, ontologically and logically, true fiction, where the etymology of fiction directs us immediately to that of making. Language creates…

– George Steiner, *Real Presences*

Symbol and Semblance

I have already touched upon the work of Friedrich Schiller. It is he, even more than Goethe, Kant, or Coleridge, who provides a notion of the Symbol as “semblance” (G. Schein), which in turn enables a more nuanced reading of the working and meaning of the Romantic Symbol vis-à-vis the actual lived world. It is upon a Schillerian sense of Symbol, I hope to show, that the magic realist critique of mimetic realism rests.

Romanticism instigated a shift away from a naturalistic understanding of poetry. Instead of *le vrai*, the ideal came to be *le vraisemblance*—i.e., no longer verity but verisimilitude. As such, the poet becomes a creator of the world, in analogy to the creative act of God. “The reality of things is the work of things themselves; the semblance of things is the work of men; and a nature which delights in semblance is no longer taking pleasure in what it receives, but in what it does.”85 Yet this image entails a risk of hubris, as Schiller recognized. The poet is *not* a creator in the same sense that the deity is Creator. The poet transforms or illumines the world, and thus, in the use of the Symbol as semblance, recreates the world from the materials at hand. Moreover, the
poetic creator must refrain from attempting to give “existence” to the world of illusion; that is, she must not claim for semblance a sovereignty of interpretation. Here Schiller follows Aristotle over Plato: where both agree that art is ultimately mimetic, for Plato this includes imitation, copying, impersonation, and representation, while for Aristotle mimesis involves a re-presentation of life, in the way that (for Aristotle) language represents ideas. Though this difference may seem subtle, its implications are significant: where master Plato feels that art deceives us about reality (i.e., the Forms), his erstwhile student proclaims that art and poetry, via re-presentation, inform us about reality.

In On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), Schiller takes this further, following Wordsworth’s dictum that “If words be not an incarnation of the thought, but only a clothing for it, then surely will they prove an ill gift.” He makes a distinction between true aesthetic semblance (Schein)—“which we love just because it is semblance” and which is equivalent to play; and the kind of (debased) semblance that belongs to the “realm of activity and truth” (G. Betrug, deception)—which tries to represent and therefore acts as an ostensible substitute for truth, presumptively assuming a descriptive truth of an actual, empirical world. For, “Only inasmuch as it is honest (expressly renounces all claims to reality), and only inasmuch as it autonomous (dispenses with all support from reality) is semblance aesthetic.” Yet, as Schiller is quick to add, “This does not, of course, imply that an object in which we discover authentic semblance must be devoid of reality.”

Paradoxically, or perhaps ironically, it is the realism of Schiller’s Schein that distinguishes it from the Platonistic Symbol of the later Romantics. Schiller, as we have noted, was very much concerned with the relation of art to life, not only to das Leben in the personal sense, but also the political sense—what Henry James would call “the civic use of the imagination.” Schiller was no Paterian or Wildean aesthete—i.e., a follower
of l’art pour l’art, the reductio of Kant’s disinterested aesthetic—he sided rather with
Goethe, blending a certain skepticism about the power of art with a recognition of its
transformative potential. “There is no more certain way,” says Goethe, “of escaping the
world than through art, and there is no more certain way of connecting with it than
through art.”93 For Schiller, as well, imagination involves a healthy dose of reality—or
rather, and this is crucial—a sense of reality. The Schillerian poet is a “waking or rational
dreamer”—one able to recognize semblance as, not a representation of reality, but
rather, a presentation of reality in such a way that it is, in fact, a new reality. Moreover,
this new reality is one infused with political/communal sense—context as well as pretext.
In other words, it embodies a new sphere of attention. One could see this as the
transposition of Herder’s Besonnenheit to the aesthetic realm more generally (see below).

Yet, it is precisely Schiller’s Schein, along with the related play-impulse that has
been the greatest stumbling block to an understanding and acceptance of Weimar
aesthetics. Why? Perhaps because, caught up as we Occidentals are in the myth of the
given, we cannot escape the suspicion that Schein smacks of deception, ruse,
inauthenticity—precisely the suspicions which led Plato to banish the Poet from the City.
In the first volume of his Aesthetica, Max Bense repudiates semblance in favour of the
“richer, deeper, and more complex” sign or symbol (G. Zeichen), because “all suggestion
of ‘unworthiness’ is thereby avoided and the theme of Being more clearly and
impressively sounded.”95 In Letter XXVI, Schiller warns that “it sometimes happens that
intelligence will carry its zeal for reality to such a pitch of intolerance, that it pronounces
a disparaging judgement upon the whole art of aesthetic semblance, just because it is
semblance.”96 Indeed, two centuries after Schiller, Zeichen has fallen prey to Platonic
prejudice—the truth of masks is denied in favor of a Symbol that is little more than a Sign
in the sense of the Romantics’ allegory or fancy.97
The very point of *Schein*, contra *Zeichen*, is its translucence, or perhaps its blind(ing)ness. The truth of semblance lies not in its capacity to mimic or reproduce, but to present reality, under the auspices of perception, both individual-temporal and social-historical. In short, the Symbol as so conceived liberates perception from seeking correspondence with some pre-given reality; it involves a (willing or unwilling) suspension of *belief*, as the new world revealed by the Symbol subverts our expectations of truth. We create worlds in the act of seeing the world, but this is *not* a moment of clarity and creation that is somehow beyond time; it is rather a recognition of the temporal and cultural predicament of perception and reality. The artist, the “poet,” “re-claims” (literally, *zurücknehmen*: re-takes or takes back) *Schein* from *Sein*.

As a verb, *scheinen* revels in ambiguity: it means “to shine” as well as “to appear or seem”—and even the latter is unclear, for a thing may appear to be what it really is, or seem to be what it is not. Yet this ambiguity, the refusal to ascribe within *Schein* a realist or non-realist element, is crucial to its use—semblance can be (and has been) identified with both *Erscheinung* (appearance) and *Täuschung* (deception or illusion). Kant, not surprisingly, distinguished the two, making the latter an equivalent to his *phenomenon*—“a thing manifest in sensible experience and opposed to *noumenon*, and underlying suprasensible reality,” or, in Kant’s own words: “our perception of an object according to the forms of our mind and sense-organs, not as it is in itself.” Kant’s *Schein* for Kant is that which leads us to take a false judgment of something for truth—an error in judgment, a deception (*Betrug*).

Schiller turns Kant’s distinction around, distinguishing not between semblance as *Täuschung* and *Erscheinung*, but only between *Schein* (as both *Erscheinung* and *Täuschung*) and the kind of (debased) semblance that, in his words, belongs to the realm of actuality and truth (i.e., that which strains after univocity in mimesis). It is this latter
form that is Betrug. In short: semblance is only aesthetic when it is “honest”—that is, when it makes no claims to represent or depict the actual empirical reality of the world, whether such is sensuous or (as for Kant and Plato) supersensuous. Re-presentation in this sense is always a decoy, a ruse—a “moral prejudice” or substitute truth that relies upon a transcendent Reality for its status. At any rate, the real innovation of the Schillerian Schein is that it suggests a connection of the ideal and the real, of signifier and signified, within a temporal sequence, such that in poetic semblance the sense of reality is enhanced, heightened, and intensified. For semblance is, in the words of Wallace Stevens, a revelation of “a partial similarity between two dissimilar things” (propinquity), which “complements and reinforces that which the two dissimilar things have in common. It makes it brilliant.” This is the essence of transfigurative poetics.

Also of note here, last but by no means least, is the breadth of Schiller’s use of “aesthetic,” which he takes out of the realm of art and beauty, and applies to life (das Leben) more broadly. As such, Schein is a linguistic and epistemological category as well as an artistic one; it can, and should, apply to any phenomenon of life “when viewed after its aesthetic aspect.” In fact, Schiller consciously denies the aesthetic any reference to non-living reality. The play-impulse, for instance, “is no sooner identified as the fount of all art than it is also claimed as the foundation for the much more difficult art of living, and illustrated by an example drawn from life, from the life of personal relationship: love.” The Schillerian aesthetic is thus a mode of apprehension as much as of representation; perhaps even a mode of being or attunement/disposition (G. Stimmung). Certainly, like the linguistic realm of Herder and the historical sense of Nietzsche, the aesthetic realm of semblance is, first and foremost, an existential phenomenon.

Schiller’s aesthetic realm is pre- (or extra-) linguistic, and pre- (or extra-) conceptual, touching on what Lucien Lévy-Bruhl would call the participation mystique,
in which we are “more or less identified with the impacts the world makes upon us.”

But what Lévy-Bruhl and most like-minded moderns would call an error or an act of naïveté, Schiller sees as a fuller, aesthetic awareness, not involving the blind obedience to reality, but neither an attempt to escape from the constantly impinging world around us. Like Kant before him, Schiller was indebted to Baumgarten’s pioneering work on aesthetics (Aesthetica, 1750). As Cassirer, among others, has suggested, Baumgarten’s work has been largely misunderstood because of confusion over his use of the term “confusa” to describe the aesthetic confluence or fusion of elements of intuition and perception.

Baumgarten did not imply by this term a confusion in the sense of disorder or chaos, as has been read by most of his interpreters. Rather, this term hearkens to the roots of Romanticism in Vico’s related concepts of fantastica, imaginative universals, and poetic wisdom. As we have seen, Kant gave philosophical voice to this confusa, but was unable to work it out adequately (perhaps because of his disdain/distance from Romantic poetics), and contented himself with the very un-Romantic disinterested thesis regarding aesthetic beauty and judgment. But a disinterested aesthetic creates too much distance between observer and observed, and hypostasizes their separation, based, as it is, on a visually perceptive situation—and a corresponding transcendental subject—rather than a linguistic one. Coleridge, who was normally not one to question Kant’s philosophical integrity, asked, with Schiller, what would become of love (as spontaneously outflowing sympathy) in a purely Kantian schema.

Acting as self-proclaimed Zwittelart (poet-philosopher), Schiller sought to bridge the hypersensual Goethe and the inordinately cerebral Kant—a duality reflected in the always-perceptive Heine’s observation that: “with Schiller, thought celebrates its orgies.” Like Goethe, Schiller was wary of both the Idealists of Jena and the New School
Romantics of the younger generation. Improperly classified a Romantic, at least in the sense in which the term has come to be used, Schiller was much more of a neo-humanist, in the spirit of Vico, Herder, and Goethe. Part of this neo-humanist vision was his attempt to expand art to life. In this sense, aesthetic experience is by no means limited to the world of museums and concert halls; rather, “it can occur in any aspect of our everyday lives—whenever we take note of, or create for ourselves, new coherences that are not part of our conventionalized mode of perception or thought.”

This aspect of the aesthetic can be best understood in terms of “style.” The early Romantics, as well as the later Symbolists and Paterians (not to mention Nietzsche), were very much concerned with style as a concept. For Wordsworth, style is not mere dress, just as the Symbol is not mere mimicry. Indeed, style is nothing less than “the incarnation of thoughts.” This is style seen:

from the standpoint of producer and receiver, the recognizable, repeatable, preservable sign of an author who reckons with an audience. Even if the audience is as restricted as his self or as wide as the whole world, the author’s style is partially a phenomenon of repetition and reception. But what makes style receivable as the signature of its author’s manner is a collection of features variously called idiolect, voice, or more firmly, irreducible individuality. The paradox is that something as impersonal as a text, or a record, can nevertheless deliver an imprint or a trace of something as lively, immediate, and transitory as a “voice.”

Voice, as the manifestation of style, signifies a rebirth of presence, though not, perhaps, a univocal or real presence in the traditional religious sense. It is style that in Said’s terms neutralizes if not conceals the silence of a depersonalized text or sign. Oscar
Wilde goes further: “It is style that makes us believe in a thing—nothing but style.”\textsuperscript{109} We will explore the relation of voice, speech, and presence below.

But style is not solely a way of writing or conversing or interpreting—it is also the art of living, which “had to be acquired as a faculty for dealing with the fact that man does not have an environment that is arranged in categories and that can be perceived exclusively in its ‘relevances’ for him.”\textsuperscript{110} Once again, we must follow Schiller’s wariness, particularly after the dehumanization of twentieth-century political stylizations. But \textit{pace} José Ortega y Gasset, who claims that the will to style \textit{always} means dehumanization, there is no necessary antithesis between realism and style. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of a realistic portrayal or expression without some particular stylization. Granted, style as mere whim or fancy, the excesses of rococo without the symmetries of baroque, is not semblance but deception. \textit{Schein} has a certain amount of autonomy in being unchained to mimetic representation—yet it is not entirely disinterested. In fact it is the very distance, \textit{i.e.}, the reflective capacity provoked or instantiated by semblance, which makes it “honest” and provides its critical function. In Letter Twenty-six, Schiller says “\textit{Schein vom Verdrenste fordern}”—which seems to call for a translation of \textit{Schein} as style; and elsewhere, semblance becomes form. Thus does the line blur between \textit{Schein} and another of Schiller’s \textit{topoi}—\textit{Stimmung} (or \textit{Bestimmung}). These terms, with definite religious overtones, are rather difficult to translate into English, other than by the rather static disposition, or mood.\textsuperscript{111}

Better, because more indicative of the temporal nature of \textit{Stimmung} and reflective of its musical as well as its religious connotations, is the English word \textit{attunement}, its one drawback being a connotation of self-control. \textit{Bestimmung} implies distinction (but in terms of present potentiality and future orientation) as well as determination. Thus does Schiller succeed in expanding the realm and application of aesthetics, as well as provide a
nuanced philosophical account of the proverbial symbol-vs-allegory debate, which ties into more contemporary debates regarding the status of realism and non-realism as representational modes or styles of living in the world; i.e., not merely as perception or reception or conception, but as attunement. Before extrapolating upon the religious implications of Schein and Stimmung, we must first deal with the theory of language on which our work on symbol and myth rests.

**Romantic Expressivism**

A proper understanding of the Romantic Symbol and its effects requires an understanding of the expressive theory of language and associated mode of comprehension. Falck suggests that it may be only through such—and not by way of an objective or scientific search for laws and regulations—that we will be able to understand reality as a response to our “pre-subjective and pre-articulate desires, fears or aspirations.”112 It is from these desires, fears, and aspirations that arise the “imaginatively compelling patterns of meaning” that frame and sort—even create—the world around us.113 Thus it is language, and not vision, that reveals our reality, by giving coherence to the meanings and rhythms of life. Language expresses the truth of the world as it lies in our comprehension and apprehension as embodied beings. In order, then, to salvage the symbol as a temporal form, we must turn briefly to the father of linguistic expressivism, Herder.

I have previously alluded to Herder’s various contributions, by way of Vico and Goethe, but his most significant contribution to present-day thinking (because, unlike his historicism, vastly underdeveloped since his death) may be his extrapolation of the root meaning of the Latin verb *ex-pressus* (from *ex-premere*, “to press out”) vis-à-vis a theory of language use. While today expression is often conflated with self-expression, in this
earlier sense it involves not so much the expression from a transcendent self, as the expression of a self—a self that is itself created in the act of expression—as well as a “pressing out” of the world through the filter of one’s perception and imagination. In Suzanne Langer’s terms, spoken words are quite often expressive both as symptom of existing subjective conditions, and as symbol of a concept “that may or may not refer to factually given conditions.” Language, for Herder:

comes about as a new, ‘reflective’ stance towards things. It arises among earlier stances towards objects of desire, fear, to things which figure as obstacles, supports and the like. Our stances to these things are literally bodily attitudes or actions on or towards objects. The new state can’t be in its origins entirely unconnected with bodily posture or creation. But it can’t be an action just like the others, whose point is definable outside the linguistic dimension.

Rather, language has to be seen as expressive action—“which both actualizes this stance of reflection, and also presents it to others in public space.” In short, language, conceived expressively, manifests the situation for our relation to the world in the linguistic dimension. Language does not merely designate, show, or point to, something; it reflects back upon the user, who, once she begins to speak, is no longer a spectator or an object among objects, but is implicated in the manifestation of a world, in which meaning relies as much upon bodily gestures and movements as upon the correspondence of words to things, or the structural correspondence of words to other words.

The reflective aspect of the expressive theory is crucial. Herder places much emphasis on Besonnenheit—usually defined as level-headedness or calm, but implying for Herder the care or concern given to the thoughts and things which rush by us in the stream of time (cf. Sorge). Reflection is the “new space of attention, of distance from the
immediate instinctual significance of things.”

Thus, Herder refrains from the nihilistic abandonment we find in some late Romantics and Symbolists—the importance of the body and extra-linguistic factors in no way allows for a prioritization of instinct or feeling over thought and reflection. This moves him away from the Romanticism of synthesis, correspondence, *deréglement des senses*; away from pure presence and the cult of immediacy to the attentive present and the fleeting connection of thoughts, perception, and things, which make up our patterns of meaning. Representation occurs, but from within a speech-relationship, in the linguistic realm. Mimesis is a two-way street: like Narcissus, one gets caught up in the river of reflection, and it loses its static quality—as photograph, an attempt to capture an essence behind the presence—and becomes temporal, a looking-glass through which we see the world and ourselves, however enigmatically. Against Walter Pater’s late Romantic dictums (“Our failure is to form habits,” and “Perhaps, this is success in life, to live as a hard-edged flame” from “moment to moment”), Herder saw the imperative, for our sanity, health, and joy, not to mention our communicative ability, of what we might call “breaking frame”—interrupting, periodically, the impinging ocean of sensations. After all, “Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad.” What we call reality may in fact be the complex relation between these monads formed from self-reflection and the horizon of expectation that serves as our a priori meaning. This latter is, not a summation of facts of experience, but rather, as Bluemberg puts it: “a summary of things taken for granted in advance [*Präsumption*].” This is an important distinction—and one easy to lose sight of.

The Herderian revolution in language and poetics is based on his critique of the designative tradition of Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac—hegemonic in his time and
perhaps still so for most non-philosophers today—where language is understood primarily if not exclusively as a tool, an instrument we use to construct or control things; where signs are introduced to signify (or stand for) objects or ideas; and where the background noise—the linguistic dimension outside the text—is largely forgotten or denied. This background is incorporated into the signs themselves, a move which “has the effect of occluding it very effectively” and thus allows for its elision in what Taylor calls “those modern behaviourist and semi-behaviourist theories which try to explain thought and language strictly from the standpoint of the external observer.” For Herder, such a view denies the holism of meaning—the pretext as well as the context of the text. Whereas for Condillac, language gives us “empire sur notre imagination,” for Herder we are as much made as makers. As Heidegger would have it, language “speaks man,” as much as vice versa. Or, perhaps, we might say, “humans speak language speaking humans.” The error of the designative theory is thus akin to the error of Romanticism stuck in its first phase/face: agency unbalanced by contingency and community; text and pretext unleashed from context.

Sprachdenken

In the new thinking, the method of speech replaces the method of thinking maintained in all earlier philosophies. Thinking is timeless and wants to be timeless. With one stroke it would establish thousands of connections. It regards the last, the goal, as the first. Speech is bound to time and nourished by time, and it neither can nor wants to abandon this element.

– Franz Rosenzweig, “The New Thinking”
In the final analysis, it is *speech* that brings this new stance into being.\(^\text{122}\) Speech is not, however, a mere garb for language or simply its oral manifestation, it is rather “constitutive of reflexive, i.e., linguistic thought, of thought which deals with its objects in the linguistic domain.”\(^\text{123}\) As Taylor rightly notes, the primacy of speech has been a foil for not only conservative Cartesians and their ilk but also for poststructuralists, following Derrida’s grapho-centric lead. The conflation of vocative priority (over scripture) and the metaphysics of presence has led most poststructuralists to reject any speech-oriented praxis, be it that of Herder, Searle, or Habermas. In this regard, Taylor accuses Derrida of remaining closer to Cartesian tradition than he would be willing to admit, by virtue of his “almost obsessive attempt to deny altogether any special status whatever to speech in the human language capacity.”\(^\text{124}\)

Even accepting the Derridean thesis of writing as *différance* (i.e., both difference and deferral), one might lament the pretense of deception and disillusion in much deconstructive work. What if speech does *not* claim a real presence (in the conventional sense), and, rather the oracular dimension is conceived as constitutive rather than revelatory—or perhaps, constitutive *as well as* revelatory? Indeed, for R. G. Collingwood, a Viconian through and through, it is writing that *defers* to speech; its play of conscious elusion calls forth a voice. At a more pragmatic level, Derridean grapho-centrism may reflect a northern European elitism, against the noisy/vocal/oral cisalpine style of music, dance, and carnival.\(^\text{125}\) Very often a distinction is made between “descriptive” and “emotive” language use: one names and thereby controls the world (like prelapsarian Adam), the other expresses the emotions or feelings of the soul or self.\(^\text{126}\) These two are parlayed as opposites, and conflated into the realist/mimetic vs romantic/emotive dichotomy, which becomes “a solvent for the perennial problems of philosophy, morals, propaganda, law, and all other forms of human discourse.”\(^\text{127}\) Yet this
only perpetuates a distinction already false. Both of these ways of conceiving language (and reality)—the descriptive and the emotive—are based on the same presuppositions: a) individualism (the spectator’s stance); b) that language is separate from the world of things out there (even if it is connected with inner realities); and, c) that the aim or function of language is the imparting or dispensing of information, with such being made the criterion for linguistic success.

Herder’s two main insights—the constitutive role of expression and the holism of meaning—transform these assumptions about the connections of language of reality, and thus play a significant role in any attempt to get beyond conventional ideas of the implications of symbol and myth in (religious) understanding and language. Language, like history, is an inexhaustible web in which we are enmeshed, but within the expansive linguistic dimension all is not chaos, for in expression we construct and order our reality while reflecting upon ourselves. Language, again, like history, continues unabated, always creating new precipitate and manifesting new presences for the distillation of experience. In sum, following Herder’s lead, we can envision language as “a pattern of activity, by which we express/realize a certain way of being in the world, that which defines the linguistic dimension, but a pattern which can only be deployed against a background which we can never fully dominate.” Yet just as we can never hope to control language, we are not totally prey to the whims of language, language does not speak man without a continual reshaping and reweaving of the linguistic dimension, in every speech-relationship that we enter. “Reshaping it without dominating it, or being able to oversee it, means that we never fully know what we are doing to it”—we see, per speculum in aenigmate.

My aim here is has been to draw some parallels between the Herderian theory of language as expression and the Schillerian sense of Symbol (as both Schein and
Stimmung), in order to clarify the status of the Romantic Symbol as a temporal expressive form—the evocation of semblance in time—from which to give basis to a re-reading of demythologization in our postmodern age. What these two paradigmatic thinkers share is what Isaiah Berlin has called the “epochal explorations of what it is to belong”—to a time, a place, and a group, and the concomitant exposition of the notion of “being at home” in a social unity or community. If, indeed, “expressive language is our centrally human way of grasping life, or of acceding to the process of meaning-creation at the human level,” then language must correlate strongly with our sense of contemporaneity, as well as with religious faith. For what is religion but an expression of and feeling for the beyond in terms of the here and now—the supreme acknowledgment of the uncanny (das Unheimlich) in our midst (das Daheim)?
Chapter Four: What the Lightning Said

Here I see a poet who, like many a human being, is more attractive by virtue of his imperfections than he is by all the things that grow to completion and perfection under his hands. Indeed, he owes his advantages and fame much more to his ultimate incapacity than to his ample strength. His works never wholly express what he would like to express and what he would like to have seen: it seems as if he had the foretaste of a vision and never the vision itself; but a tremendous lust for this vision remains in his soul, and it is from this that he derives his equally tremendous eloquence of desire and craving. By virtue of this lust he lifts his listeners above his work and all mere “works” and lends them wings to soar as high as listeners had never soared.

– Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*

Romantic Modernism: The Attraction of Imperfection

T. E. Hulme, famous for his characterization of Romanticism as “spilt religion,” also spoke of literature as “a method of sudden arrangement of commonplaces” in which the *suddenness* makes us forget the commonplace.130 I have already put into question the commonplace, in the sense of the given-ness of the world “out there”; but what of the *common place*: i.e., the socio-cultural locus of communality and mutual affection? This is, in some sense, the archetypal modernist query. Franco Moretti writes of Hulme’s remark in relation to Eliot’s *The Waste Land*, the archetypal modernist poem, in which *futility* (in its fullest sense: a spilling, pouring or pressing out) becomes something of a virtue, or, at least, is no longer the prelude to despair. *The Waste Land* is a mosaic indeed, yet one which overlays “a collection of colossal commonplaces”—resacralized, as it
were, by the dazzling style of Eliot’s poem. In the last event, it is only thanks to these commonplaces that *The Waste Land* acquires any meaning at all. And it does not end with Eliot. *Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, Ulysses, A Man Without Qualities*, all these exemplary modernist works were/are decidedly “imperfect.” Why is this so? Precisely because of the modernist recognition of the failure of single-faced Faustian Romanticism. World War One destroyed the happy flights of late Romanticism in a literal bath of blood, causing would-be Romantics to either turn to the dark Romanticism spoken of by Mario Praz, or to question the utility of the Romantic quest and Romantic ideals in a world suddenly and horrifically come of age. Perfection was no longer the order of the day; what was required was rebuilding out of the rubble: *bricolage* and *refunctionalization*. This is because:

> if literature is rarely capable of perfection, it is also true that human societies almost never need perfection. Better, far better, to have *bricolage* than engineering. Because *bricolage* does not dream of unattainable (and often worse) final solutions, but accepts the heterogeneity inherent in the modern world-system. A heterogeneity of historical times, first of all: non-contemporaneity again, which in the years of modernism becomes a *formal factum*.  

The lightning rod of figuration speaks, but through the dispersal of light, not the flash of consuming fire—i.e., through *forge*, not *flame*. In a sense, structuralists like Culler and de Man are quite correct to accuse Romanticism of a longing for a world that, in structuralist eyes, is “well lost.” Yet what if this be the desire, not to unveil or reawaken a (mythical) essence or presence behind appearances, but rather to escape a self-imposed isolation caused by disillusionment, by way of a reconfiguration of presence, in the temporal as well as the spatial sense. For de Man and most
postmodernist theorists, we are asked to abandon all higher questions of truth and falsehood, self and experience, meaning and significance. The recognition (through allegory) of the “inscription of the ‘similacrity’ of a similacrum” (G. der Schein des Scheinens) compels us, so they argue, to throw off all delusions of extra-representational grandeur. “In the realm that is ours, where we have shed any belief in the ineffable and know the impossibility of unmediated truth, we are indeed back in the figural; but, more specifically, in a relation to the figural where the figural is known as figural.” Yet the linguistic realm, as we find in Herder, is not merely the space of the written word, it is also the bodily, oracular, gestural dimension in which meaning evolves. That is to say, the figural is also transfigural. What, then, is this extra-representational realm that we are to discard? It seems a straw figure. As Georges Bataille notes, occidentals have attempted to escape the isolation of a life deprived of its most visible asset in two distinct but related ways: one is Romantic poetry; the other is love. By way of these antidotes the distinction between the world and the text is made fluid, or, in the words of Marx and Engels, “melts into air.”

The standard critique of the Romantic Symbol rests on a particular reading—albeit one not without some legitimate ground—of the symbol as Zeichen, rather than Schein or Stimmung. It is to read the symbol with Georges Mounin, who in his Introduction à la sémiologie (1970) espouses the “univocal decoding” of signs—as if human language was a perfect cognate of traffic signs or Morse code. But this is to miss the multiform capacities of the Symbol as Schein—particularly its temporal, dialogical, and, moreover, expressive function. Mounin, to be sure, is an unrepentant heir to the so-called metaphysics of presence, longing “for a truth behind every sign: a moment of original plenitude when form and meaning were simultaneously present to consciousness and not to be distinguished.” Such nostalgia can be witnessed in the later Romantics,
Symbolists, and the epiphanic modernists (i.e., the heirs of Pater). It is the yearning for some sort of prelapsarian harmony, for eternal univocity; the quest for not simply coherence but correspondence.

**Lyric as Norm: The Poetics of the Moment**

The Symbolist project was nothing more than a desperate effort to reconnect the disjointed images of the subject: to recreate a unity of self jeopardized by such disintegrating forces as dreams, unconscious impulses, psychic automotions and reflex actions, as well as the new illnesses of the soul, neuroses and hysteria.

– Jean Clair, curator of the 1995 exhibit at the Montréal Musée des Beaux-Arts, *Paradis Perdu—Symbolist Europe*

We see this aspect of Romanticism most clearly in the Symbolist movement in European art and literature, closing the nineteenth century and paving the way for the modernist backlash of the new century.\(^{138}\) The Symbolists, in effect, extended Romanticism’s second face, its sense of homesickness, and fairly reveled in the darkness and despair of broken dreams and unfulfilled longings; they were cognizant, unlike past humanists and many Romantics, of *Weltenschmerz*: the pain of the world. Yet even *décadence* has its limits, and many Symbolists attempted to reestablish connections not only within the disjointed subject, but also between the fractured self (*Das weite Land*)\(^{139}\) and the forsaken landscape (*The Waste Land*). Thus, although, as Yves Kobry has argued, Symbolism has been long considered a “poisonous, degenerate leech of Romanticism”—a decadent excrescence—in fact it “opened an entirely new field of exploration by researching obscure areas of consciousness, by questioning the identity of a subject and his relationship to the world.”\(^{140}\)
Yet Symbolism’s attempt at reconnection—at closing the gaps (unseen in their fullness by the Romantics) between both self and world and art and nature—came to rely upon a privileging of the moment, the lightning flash of inspiration. In a word, Symbolism became obsessed with ecstasy and epiphany. Baudelaire’s synaesthésé and correspondences gave foundation to the poetics of Symbolist epiphany, as did Pater’s mantra of “living for the moment,” and Wilde’s remark that “[n]ot width but intensity is the true aim of modern art.”141 Besides the otherworldly solipsism to which Symbolism was prone, this headlong fall into the metaphysics of presence was a revocation of the Romantic Symbol as conceived in terms of Herderian expressivism and Schillerian semblance and attunement.142 Symbolists sought a clarity of vision not possible, and in fact potentially disastrous, as art becomes unreflecting desire for aesthetic moments of bliss, or power, and the aesthetic loses its ties to the ethical, and becomes self-sufficient, and self-justifying—i.e., disinterested.143 As Novalis, himself a wary Romantic, said of Lessing, he “saw too sharply and in so doing lost the feeling for the unclear totality, the magical view of objects together in multiple lighting and shadow.”144 Lessing, in other words, deluded himself into a belief that his prison, in which everything was so clear, was the world.

What happened is this: the search for revelation became a projection of emotive feelings and desires—i.e., a form of solipsistic sensationism.145 The expressive was thus co-opted by the emotive as the alternative to realistic (i.e., naturalistic, mimetic, designative) understandings of language and reality. Admittedly, even Goethe had his Urphänomen, a term coined to designate an irreducible phenomenon or experience that illuminates mundane experience, Rousseau his rêveries,146 and Wordsworth his “blessed moods.”147 But these do not laud an escape from time so much as, to use Gerard Manley Hopkins’s term, an inscape into time—time reconfigured—and a presence, to borrow
another Wordsworthian trope, “far more deeply interfused.” In philosophy, too, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and particularly with the birth of existentialism, we see a retrieval of Augustine’s this-worldly reply to Paul’s eschatological prediction of I Corinthians 13:12: “in the thrust of a trembling glance [in ictu trepedantis aspectus], my mind arrived at That Which Is. Then indeed I saw clearly Your invisible things which are understood by the things that are made.” Kierkegaard, picking up on Goethe’s “Der Augenblick ist Ewigkeit” developed a theory of the øiblikket—“A blink [of the eye: Øiets Blik] is a designation of time in the fateful conflict as it is touched by eternity.”

And yet it would seem as though the Epiphanics—whether Symbolist poets or existentialist philosophers—miss Augustine’s threefold division of time into “a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future.” The present, even the illuminated present, is not merely the moment—presence—but also involves memory as well as eschatological hope. As a fiction of temporality, the present is often made static, and thus confused with spatial presence, as though the present were a location rather than a fleeting temporal connection. Also missed is the fact that Augustine feels this presence of eternity “in the thrust of a trembling glance”—i.e., as a connection to God in-the-world, and not simply as self-expression. For Pater, contrariwise, experience “is ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has ever pierced,” and every impression “is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world.”

Our disinheritance, as such, leads to a retrenchment rather than a leap. It is in this Paterian sense that the Romantic Symbol came to be a touchstone for Symbolism, Imagism, and modernism. As such, however, “the Romantic object is … cut off from its context in the ordinary world and in common experience and assigned an isolated
existence in the self-limited and self-sufficing work of art.”¹⁵³ This is disinterestedness taken to its extreme as l’art pour l’art.¹⁵⁴

Corresponding with the apotheosis of the Paterian moment was the prioritization of lyric over all other literary forms—epic, dramatic or narrative—as the ultimate channel and image of expression, signification, and figuration. The seeds of Pater’s motto—“All art aspires to the condition of music”—can be seen much earlier in Romanticism’s shift in the identification of poetry away from painting and the visual arts towards music, where form and content are ostensibly fused. Commenting on Shakespeare, Pater writes:

if, in art generally, unity of impression is a note of what is perfect, then lyric poetry, which in spite of complex structure often preserves the unity of a single passionate ejaculation, would rank higher than dramatic poetry, where, especially to the reader, as distinguished from the spectator, there must always be a sense of the effort necessary to keep the various parts from flying asunder, a sense of imperfect continuity.¹⁵⁵

Thus, if all art aspires to the condition of music, it is a univocal, or harmonic chorus that is to be the condition of art. Polphony and counterpoint are denied. Drama, narrative, and epic, must aspire to lyric, that is, must strive for a “vivid single impression” left on the mind of the viewer or reader—this is its call to “imaginative unity.”¹⁵⁶

It is precisely the lyric, epiphanic, and emotive (over narrative, kairotic, and expressive) tendencies of the Romantic legacy that call forth the ire of the structuralists. As Culler rightly suggests, the primary convention governing its “possible modes of signification” is the atemporality of the poem. This is the convention that most affects the reading of the lyric genre: the attempt, or requirement, “to read any brief descriptive lyric as a moment of epiphany.”¹⁵⁷ The object or function of the lyric poem is a “moment of revelation in which form is grasped and surface becomes profundity.” As de Man notes,
the longtime favoring of (lyric) poetry over (narrative) prose in Romantic theories of language and expression, and the aspirations of all art to music in the nineteenth century, seeped into modernists like Valéry and Proust, despite their attempts to demystify the nostalgic primitivism of such a legacy. The twentieth century avant-garde, throughout Europe and Russia, was, for all its anti-Romantic posturing, the bastion of lyric poets.

The Melody of Language

The invention of melody is the supreme mystery of man.

– Claude Lévi-Strauss

Here a counterpoint must be raised; for music itself is rarely univocal, and never atemporal. Its temporality is manifest in its dynamic yet repetitive, character. Music—and figuration conceived as music—need not simply entrance; it may rather orientate. In other words, its dictation may be deiction (Gr. deiktikos, from deiktos, able to show directly; in linguistics: of or relating to a word, the determination of whose referent is dependent on the context in which it is said or written). In this regard, de Man writes of Derrida’s misreading of Rousseau in terms of the relationship between music and language (and as a prime example of a critic’s blindness and insight). Music, for Rousseau, is a “pure play of relationships”: an empty or hollow structure, which “‘means’ the negation of all presence.” It follows, says de Man, “that the musical structure obeys an entirely different principle from that of structures resting on a ‘full’ sign, regardless of whether the sign refers to sensation or to a state of consciousness. Not being grounded in any substance, the musical sign can never have any assurance of existence.”158 This bears
repeating: no “assurance of existence”—unlike the “stable, synchronic sensation of ‘painting’, the paradigm of eighteenth-century aesthetics”

For Rousseau, the “field” of music is time, while that of painting is space. Paintings, the theory goes, have a spatial duration—a “presence” which disrupts any analogy with the diachrony of music. But music’s temporality is two-sided, Janus-faced: on the one hand, it is “condemned to exist always as a moment, as a persistently frustrated intent toward meaning”; on the other hand, “this very frustration prevents it from remaining within the moment.” This is the crux: musical signs cannot coincide—“their dynamics are always oriented toward the future of their repetition, never toward the concurrence of their simultaneity.” Thus, for Rousseau, music, far from being a form of epiphany or spatial, synchronic presence, is rather “the diachronic version of the pattern of non-coincidence within the moment.” Music does not instantiate presence, but rather is the presentation of the non-contemporaneous present, or, in more familiar terms, the *simultaneity of nonidentity*.

Again, Rousseau: “if nature sometimes breaks down [the song into its harmonic components] in the modulated song of man or the song of birds, it does so sequentially, putting one sound after the other: it inspires song, not chords; it dictates melody, not harmony.” What need have we of harmonic representation, he asks, in a world so disharmonious? This is the representational fallacy pervading criticism, in which *narrative* is conceived as sequential representation of events in an outside life and *meaning* as “reflection of some external idea.” Narrative, like melody, is contrived rhythm, and has its origin in ritual, which is “a temporal sequence of acts in which the conscious meaning of significance is latent.” Melody can be built out of chaos, but harmony must pre-exist. Rousseau rejects harmony as “a mistaken illusion of consonance within the necessarily dissonant structure of the moment.” Melody, on the other hand,
does not partake of this mystification; it does not offer a resolution of the dissonance but rather its projection on a temporal axis. Moreover, it is melody that makes music an imitative art. Thus melody is the prime vehicle of realistic representation.

Rousseau goes on to draw an equivalence of music, conceived as melody, with language—language understood neither as descriptive, nor fully communicative, nor epiphanic, but rather conceived structurally as a “diachronic system of relationships, the successive sequence of a narrative,” or, one might add, of a colloquy. *Pace* Pater: “The sequential effect of discourse, as it repeats its point again and again, conveys a much stronger emotion than the presence of the object itself, where the full meaning is revealed in one single stroke.”¹⁶⁵ How does Rousseau evade the logocentric fallacy? His language is *literary*, and as such already deconstructs and demystifies the priority of speech over written language, even if, in so doing, it “remains persistently open to being misunderstood for doing the opposite.”¹⁶⁶ Derrida, says de Man, misreads Rousseau (though not unprofitably) by underestimating the figurative and self-reflexive/rhetorical capacities of Rousseau’s writing; he refuses to read Rousseau as literature or as fiction, and thus misses the expressive or melodic aspect of language that is so crucial to Romantic *style*.¹⁶⁷

The structural congruence of language and music is opposed to the misleading synchronism of visual perception, wherein a “false illusion of presence” dominates. For reality, as with music and language, is not *synchronous*, but rather “a succession of discontinuous moments that create the fiction of a repetitive temporality.”¹⁶⁸ This leads de Man back to his critique of the Rhetoric of Temporality—the Romantic Symbol’s ruse of synchronicity.¹⁶⁹ Yet while de Man re-reads Rousseau in order to save him from the grasp of Derrida’s critique, he is himself blind to the diversity of the Romantic concept of the Symbol, particularly as Semblance (*Schein*), and the Herderian conception of language as
expression and related remarks on language and music. Just as representation does not become obsolete with the demise of realism conceived as the mimesis of spatial presence, Romanticism lingers long after epiphanic modernism has burnt its hard-edged flame down to the wick (even while setting a whole continent alight in the process). Liminal Romantics like Herder and Schiller, caught between Romanticism, German Idealism, and Weimar classicism, were able to develop a clearer understanding of the Symbol as presentation, and the reception or meeting with such as understanding in time.

Janus: A Summing Up

We come back here to our original point that poetic symbolism is language and not truth, a means of expression and not a body of doctrine, not something to look at but something to look and speak through, a dramatic mask.

– Northrop Frye, *Fables of Identity*

In an essay on the “Importance of Herder,” Charles Taylor notes the main problem with most influential theories of language, be they deconstructionist or otherwise. Using Donald Davidson as an example, Taylor suggests that such theories, in the tradition of Locke and Condillac, assume an outsider’s perspective—a spectator’s or bird’s eye view of language. In Davidson’s case, this involves the assertion that understanding must be framed in terms of a successful application of the meaning of one’s utterances onto the features of the outside world; i.e., a mapping of statements onto a world of pre-existent “truth-conditions.”

Taylor counters with several scenarios: one, of a robot who can match us in correlations of utterance to world, but may not truly understand anything; and, two (and more crucial for our purposes) the scenario of exile, where we might be
able to “attribute truth-condition to parts of [a native’s] utterances, and in this way co-
ordinate our action with them and make valid predictions, while on a deeper level there
remains a profound gap between our conceptual schemas.”

In short, Taylor complains that Davidson and most language theorists lack
existential insight; that is, they lack a sense of being, not merely “in sight,” but also
receptive to presence/language as an agent or dialogical partner. They inadvertently play
the role of a mute observer, content with holding a mirror up to nature, and missing their
own reflection therein. In *Metaphors We Live By*, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson make
the same point: the two prominent occidental “myths”—of objectivism and
subjectivism—“share a common perspective: man as separate from his environment.”

Hulme’s critique of Romanticism is a misrepresentation, because it is based in the idea of
language as, essentially, a mode of communicating visual images. Hulme wanted to
demythologize the Symbol, to preserve, that is, its analogical or meaningful status, while
ridding it of the taint of magic. He did not succeed. The Romantic Symbol had, under the
Symbolists, already established too strong a connection to the magic assumption nascent
in early Romanticism but now made focal: the notion “that the human mind is so
constituted as to be able to recognize images of which it can have no perceived
knowledge.”

Expressive language, both in terms of speaker and spoken to—narrator and
narratee—involves being sensitive to the rightness of a particular style, stance, mood, or
mien: i.e., being attuned. Conceived in terms of religion, this is the essence of prayer, or
of the attitude of being prayerful. The prayer supposes that anything might happen; that
with God or the gods nothing is impossible. “Created by the creators of the future,”
prayer “tells us not so much who we ‘are’ but rather, and far more importantly, who we
are meant to be!” Prayer may be conceived as naming, in Roland Barthes’s sense,
where the Name is “a voluminous sign, a sign always pregnant and crammed full of meanings that no use can reduce or flatten”—unlike the common noun, or what the Romantics called allegory, “which never allocates more than one of its meanings for each synonym.”

To name is thus to supplicate a “semantic monstrosity,” which engages in what Barthes calls “hyper-semanticity.” To pray is neither to supplicate nor to debase, but to open up to the “as if”—to the manifest possibility of a deity’s presence in time.

M. H. Abrams suggests that the lyrocentrism of Romanticism was based on, or, at least, “strongly abetted by … the opinion that the poetry of the Bible was mostly lyrical.” But this is not an adequate representation of biblical poetry, which, as Vico and Herder knew, is, first and foremost, symbolic narrative. Very often, in the history of biblical reading, where character and plot, aspects of narrative, are interpreted mimetically—i.e., realistically—lyrical effusions are rendered either allegorical or epiphanic. Above all, lyric becomes emotive, rather than expressive-deictic. Yet, as Martin Buber says: “All living is meeting”; and Humboldt before him: “True speech [Sprechen] is colloquy [Gespräch].” The word is always dialogical; biblical God-talk stands on the knowledge of the way in which the deity meets humanity. In a meeting (giving high import to this rather denuded term) that is immediate, spiritual, physical and concrete, “God enters into the concrete actuality, the immediate physical-spiritual actuality of creation.”

One thinks of the all-too-human meeting between Yahweh and Abram, and the latter’s bartering for the Cities of the Plain. This meeting is not a one-sided supplication, but a living presence with which humans meet and confront God or the gods, always cognizant, again, of the “as if.”

Coleridge fully understood the powers of narrative as an expressive mode, its capacity to “make those events, which in real or imagined History move in a straight line, assume to our understandings a circular motion.” Novalis, as well, astutely perceived
that while “lyric is for heroes […] narrative poetry is for human beings.”

We have seen that the Romantic–Symbolist Moment, typified in Pater’s illumination in the arrest of time, became something of a modernist staple. Yet this did not happen without deviations; deviations that lead a path back to the earlier Romanticism based on the Symbol and Herderian expressivism. Whereas for Pater, there is only one form of present—the present of the present—Gerard Manley Hopkins, fusing the pagan Pater with his own priestly pater Duns Scotus, developed the notion of inscape, where the trivial is redeemed by a single event in past time. In other words, for Hopkins, the present is always simultaneously non-contemporaneous. Another chief proponent of the magical element of Symbolist poetics Arthur Symons, whose Symbolist Movement in Art (1899) established the burgeoning French movement on British soil. For Symons, Symbolism was a revolution against “the contemplation and rearrangement of material things” considered as normal art, and against (Kantian) disinterestedness as the mood of art reception. He cites Carlyle’s notion of the Symbol as “an embodiment and revelation of the infinite,” and “concealment yet revelation.”

Symbolism, transmuted into Modernism, becomes “an attempt to spiritualise literature, to evade the old bondage of rhetoric, the old bondage of exteriority…. Description is banished that beautiful things may be evoked, magically.” While reacting, with the Romantics, against the scientific realism or naturalism of the day, and yet moving away from the personality-driven late Romantics towards the heralding of epiphanic moments and the pure art of non-discursive revelation, Symbolism, at its best, sought not so much representational immediacy as the structural engendering or displacement of mood, “giving a sense of a growing richness of meaning unlimited by denotation.” In T. S. Eliot, a disciple of Symons, we see a rejection of the Paterian atemporal moment. Eliot follows Augustine’s understanding of the moment as “the point
of intersection of the timeless with time”—i.e., a disruption of the present moment by an infusion of past and future, not a flight from time into eternity.

While other Modernists sought epiphany in and through the Symbol, the later Joyce, realizing the limits of such a path (by virtue, some would argue, of the structural failure of his own *Portrait*), let the details speak themselves, not as eternal presences but as having meaning in their temporal sequence. Joyce’s success lay in investing time into the new techniques of lyrical Modernism, moving, in the process, from *polyphony*—the self-construction, *ex nihilo*, of the necessary sign—to *polysemy*—the refunctionalization of signs out of already existing ones: i.e., *bricolage*. Not a single lightning flash of one great revelation but rather, as per Virginia Woolf, the “little daily miracles, illuminations, matches struck unexpectantly in the dark […] these were] of the nature of a revelation.”

Writing of modern critical misreadings of *Ulysses*, Moretti claims that what is missed is the fact that interaction is not coherence: “Organization and homogeneity … are by no means synonyms.” Moreover, the quest for such coherence belies a latent Romanticism of the lyrical sort, whether in Coleridge, I. A. Richards, Cleanth Brooks, or, for that matter, in Colin Falck. “In the midst of chaos,” concludes Woolf, “there was shape.”

According to Roland Barthes, the hyper-semanticity invoked in naming is present in the poetic sign or Symbol. Both are infused with the magic of semantic richness, coupled with a strong core of situational meaning. Literature, and the poetic symbol more particularly, connects with religious language, and prayer, in another sense: both fall somewhere between music and painting. Neither purely descriptive, nor purely epiphanic (with form and content ineluctably fused), these speak epiphanically of the commonplace of the world, suffused in a new sense of time. As in a melody, *rhythm* is a key component to this transfiguration, conceived as “the preparation of a new event by the ending of a previous one.” Repetition is not an eternal recurrence of the same, but
rather variations on a theme—an \textit{aria}, or better, a \textit{sonata} of refunctionalization.\footnote{190}

“Rhythm is the setting up of new tensions by the resolution of former ones.”\footnote{191}

Though a poststructuralist critique of the metaphysics of presence may be an appropriate appraisal of realism—conceived as pictorial \textit{mimesis}, and linguistic \textit{designation}; framed, that is, by coherence and harmony—the “chronic Romanticism” typified by expressivism and the symbol as semblance falls less easily before this flashing sword. Nor need an alternative to mimetic/designative realism become pure emotivism, or the solipsistic sensationism of epiphanic Modernism. In short, the valorization of the Symbol at the expense of allegory does not have to coincide with the growth of an aesthetics that \textit{refuses to distinguish between experience and the representation of such}.\footnote{192}

Representation does not die with the death of mimetic realism or emotivist projectionism—representation can be reconceived, not as copy, but as \textit{transfiguration}. To throw out all representation with mimetic realism is to give the victory over to the central realist premise—that representation is exhausted by realism. As Northrop Frye says of literature: “its words form rhythms which approach a musical sequence of sounds at one of its boundaries, and form patterns which approach the hieroglyphic or pictoral image at the other.”\footnote{193} The element that allows for this Janus-faced status in religious and poetic language is \textit{myth}. Myth, rather than being some sort of timeless ritual, is, like music—in its diachronic repetition—temporally informing.\footnote{194} As such, myth gives archetypal significance to the moment of presence, which is otherwise open to the danger of extratemporality. In short: Myth is not history’s foe, myth is history’s keeper.

I began this section with an invocation of negativity: the modernist \textit{Waste Land}. I will end it with some more positive remarks on the modernist \textit{Metamorphosis}. Though his work is by no means theological—in the strict sense, of being concerned with religious issues and themes—Kafka, who believed that “all writing is prayer,” gave birth
to several of the seminal sacred texts of modernity. As Camus once said: “the whole of Kafka’s art consists in compelling the reader to re-read him.” Indeed, no other modern writer (save, perhaps, Joyce) demands that we redip into his words, searching for their significance. Paul de Man draws a distinction between two historical notions of reading, and of linguistic/literary expression: a) the Platonic dualist model, in which the hidden is gradually revealed behind the apparent; and b) the mystical monist model, where there is “a perfect congruence between the expression and that which is expressed.” What this second model accomplishes is a certain form of Entrealisierung: “a tension within the language that can no longer be modeled on the subject-object relationships deriving from experiences of perception, or from theories of perception.” But there may be a tertium via, in which derealization need not mean an abandonment of realism; where we are not led to mistake the lightning itself for what the lightning reveals—to alter a famous Zen trope. Kafka’s writing, like music and scripture, draws meaning forth through an invitation to the dance of diachronic repetition—as well, perhaps, a recognition of the ruse of the simultaneous given-ness of presence. Melody replaces harmony; mimesis gives way to semblance; designation and emotivism to expression, “critical” realism to … myth?
Excursus Two: Realism in the Balance

Suzanne Langer, in her opus *Feeling and Form* (1953), names six pertinent *Leitwörter* (a term coined by Buber and Rosenzweig in the process of their German translation of the Hebrew Bible, meaning guiding words that function similarly to leitmotifs in music and opera) for any discussion of aesthetics: *Taste, Emotion, Form, Representation, Immediacy,* and *Illusion.* The present study deals with these in reverse order of importance. I speak very little, if at all, about Taste and Emotion, a bit about Form, and very much about Representation, Immediacy, and Illusion. The last, as Langer suggests, “is generally coupled with its opposite, reality, and serves rather to raise difficulties than to solve them.” Often, indeed, “it is the bête noir to be explained away.”¹⁹⁷ No longer, Ms. Langer: it is precisely the difficult nexus of reality and illusion that forms the basis of this project, involving a re-assessment of Immediacy or Presence in terms of the Romantic Symbol, the expressive theory of language, and postmodern religious understanding.

First, however, to give these issues a more comprehensive form, I must turn briefly to the so-called “problem of representation.” Since as far back as Plato, at least, the capacity of the human mind and human works (i.e., art, drama, music, literature) to mirror the world has been a topic of heated debate. Despite counter-movements, such as mystical neo-Platonism and Occamite nominalism, the realistic legacy of Plato was for centuries the hegemonic paradigm for art, language, and epistemology. Representation and realism were virtually synonymous—the closer to a mimetic depiction of reality, the closer to Truth, Beauty, and the Good. In the past two centuries, the dominance of realism has been challenged, most explicitly by the Romantic movement of the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which called into question, not only the mimetic function of art, but also the designative function of language and the empiricist theory of
knowledge. Representation—as a mirroring of the world out there—became transfused with mystical-Böhmenist, Neoplatonic and Idealist notions, wherein the mind of the poet, or some external force, such as Nature, comes to play a vital role in the creation and expression of reality. The Romantics, angered by the unholy trinity of Cartesian rationalism, Voltaireian materialism and skepticism, and the Lockeian tabula rasa of sensation, sought to rescue human creative activity from its derivative (and thereby secondary, or in Plato, tertiary) status.

As I have shown, Vico and Herder were instrumental figures in this shift, as were, in less direct ways, Rousseau and, of course, Kant, for whom “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself.”\footnote{198} While the empiricists had realized the extent to which our knowledge, our concepts, are dictated by our sense perceptions, the post-Kantians insisted that these perceptions are themselves affected (if not created) by the imagination—i.e., by elements that go beyond language and experience. In the twentieth century, the debate between realist and non-realist modes of creation, and ultimately, of understanding, waxed strongly in the realm of critical theory—i.e., the conversations of the German Frankfurt School—where the implications of representation generally, and realism in particular, in terms of politics and ideology were heatedly discussed.

Since the Frankfurt debates, the problem of representation has been largely shunted aside, though, as Langer and Hilary Putnam protest, it still has a gadfly mission to perform in the intellectual world. Indeed, “the philosophical issue that is usually conceived in terms of image and object is really concerned with the nature of images as such and their essential difference from actualities.”\footnote{199} In Renewing Philosophy, Putnam allows for the arguments (by Nelson Goodman and sundry deconstructionists, among others) that the metaphysical realism so long the pivot of the problematique of representation has indeed collapsed. Yet the demise of the traditional version of realism—
where “the notions of an object and a property have just one philosophically serious ‘meaning’, and the world divides itself up into objects and properties in one definite unique way”—does not, Putnam argues, abolish representation as a valid category or object of study. “To identify the collapse of one philosophical picture of representation with the collapse of the idea that we represent things that we did not bring into existence is, quite simply, dotty.”

Within the study of religion, this debate has taken longer to emerge, due perhaps to a wariness on the part of scholars of religion to delve into the realm of literature and the imagination. Yet, according to John Hick, its continued marginality is a serious lacuna, given that it “exposes the most fundamental of all issues in the philosophy of religion today.” Since Luther—perhaps, one might argue, since the Marburg Impasse—and particularly since the nineteenth century, religion in the West has largely followed the progressive desupernaturalization of the modern world. Falck is correct, in this regard. And save, perhaps, the eighteenth-century French *philosophes*, no one has spoken more forcefully of, and to, this desupernaturalization than Ludwig Feuerbach. And yet it was precisely the realism of Christian believers that provoked Feuerbach’s ire. The claims of religious language to description or designation, in short, to mimesis—of a God out there—are for him grievous errors, and must be assiduously countermanded. The subtleties of the Feuerbachian analysis of religion remain of more than historical interest; like the writings of Nietzsche, they retain a provocative edge, even when ostensibly superseded (in Feuerbach’s case, by Marx and Freud, and, to some extent, by Nietzsche himself). Feuerbachian criticism provides an impetus to rethink “realism” in terms of religious discourse, expression, and understanding. As Marx once remarked in one of his more playful moods, perhaps we must walk through a river of fire (G. Feuerbach) before emerging onto the shores of truth.
Briefly, Feuerbach’s argument goes like this: in religion, unlike perception: “consciousness of object and self-consciousness coincide.”\textsuperscript{202} Since, according to Feuerbach’s proposition, “the object of any subject is nothing else than the subject’s own nature taken objectively,” God becomes “the manifested inward nature” of the human being. Yet, this is more than simply a Tolstoyan matter of having the Kingdom of God within you. Rather, God, far from being Otto’s \textit{totaliter aliter}, is \textit{solus interius}: a projection of one’s desires and the positive qualities of human living; and religion is “the solemn unveiling of a man’s hidden treasures, the revelation of his intimate thoughts, the open-confession of his love-secrets.”\textsuperscript{203} Yet, in case this last remark sounds too positive, Feuerbach anticipates Freud, Marx and Foucault by suggesting further that this confession is anything but cathartic, for religion is not just an \textit{illusion}, but a \textit{delusion}, the earliest and most subtle and indirect form of such: what Freud (and Lenin) might call an infantile neurosis.

With his \textit{Disputed Questions} (1993), theologian John Hick reopened the debate between realist and non-realists. In answering Feuerbach’s critique of realism as internalization and anthropomorphism, Hick cites the Kantian idea of the “creative” aspect of perception. After characterizing Feuerbach’s position as non-realist, that is, interpreting religious language “not as referring to a transcendent reality or realities, but as expressing our emotions, or our basic moral insights and intentions, or our way of seeing the world, or as referring to our moral and spiritual ideals.”\textsuperscript{204} Hick proceeds to divide realism into two sorts: a) \textit{naive realism}, where the world is exactly as it is perceived—in religious terms “the divine reality is just as spoken about in the language of some one tradition”; and b) \textit{critical realism}, where, following Kant, we make “an important contribution to our perceiving, distinctively human construction arising from
the impacts of a real environment upon our sense organs, but conceptualized in consciousness and language in culturally developed forms.”

Though he has attempted to nuance the meaning of realism in terms of the Kantian shift, Hick has, in fact, merely sidestepped the real issue—the conflation of representation and realism—by continuing to accept, naively, as it were, the myth of the given; i.e., the assumption that there exists a single, univocal reality, or world, to which our visions are but variations. It seems, in his desire to undermine “fundamentalist” (i.e., naïve realist) forms of religious interpretation, Hick takes to beating a fallen horse. Very few people accept the absolute one-to-one correspondence of their senses with reality—however much they might agree that it makes sense to do so in the run of daily life. More important, I think, is that even fewer people are naïve realists when it comes to language use (and particularly poetic and religious language use), assuming a purely designative or mimetic expression. Rather, in a post-Kantian age, most people are already critical realists in Hick’s sense; most folks see the world with at least a modicum of a sense of the relativity of their particular (or cultural) perceptions and conceptions. Hick may be blinded, as he all but admits, by his true motive, which is more Herderian than Kantian: the well-intentioned but philosophically problematic quest for a pluralistic religious understanding, a “universal theology of religions” based on a denuded, reality-centric approach to religious faith and to discourse between traditions.

Yet this plea for pluralism only takes us so far in understanding the problems of a realist conception of religion. For Hick, we see different realities because of our cultural, religious, and environmental differences. We are blinded by our culture-specific veils, and can only peer, now, through a glass, darkly. Only as reality-centric critical realists will we come to see things face to face. Though Hick suggests, pragmatically, that one can be a realist with regard to some issues while remaining a non-realistic with others, at
the end of his article he appears to rethink his earlier tolerance, suggesting that, in terms of religion, there can be no middle-ground—one cannot straddle the abyss of faith—because in the end all variations “will fall on one or the other side of the distinction between naturalistic and supra-naturalistic understandings of the universe.”[^206] “There are in fact probably no pan-realists,” he admits, “believing in the reality of fairies and snarks as well as of tables and electrons, and likewise few if any omni-non-realists, denying the objective reality of a material world and of other people as well as of gravity and God.”[^207]

Quite right. But what does this suggest? Precisely, as I have argued, that there really are no naïve realists, but only critical realists more or less naïve. How then, it must be asked, do we quantify naïveté? Is it less naïve to believe in, say, electrons than snarks, God or gods than fairies, orcs than leprechauns, the self than the world? Are there criteria by which we might judge the validity of realism or non-realism in particular discourses? Even looking at these various discourses or types of language: “perceptual, ethical, aesthetic, poetic, scientific, religious”—is it possible any longer to draw and maintain such lines, without inevitable (and necessary) slippage? Can we not be realist and non-realist within the same language game? Moreover, are these types of language, or merely subjects of discourse—the types being but two: realist and non-realist?

Hick falls directly into Feuerbach’s hands, playing Pascal to Feuerbach’s anti-skeptical Luther. Hick considers all post-axial faiths cosmically optimistic and worldly pessimistic (in itself, a questionable hypothesis); moreover, the cosmic optimism of all the great faiths, he suggests, requires a realist reading of their language. “For it is only if this universe is the creation or expression of an overarching benign reality,” he suggests, such that the “spiritual project of our existence” extends beyond this mortal coil, that it is possible to justify our present suffering. In the face of Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, for whom God’s existence is refuted by a child’s tears, Hick invokes the ghost of Pascal (the
infamous wager) and Kierkegaard (the leap), charging non-realists with apathy, with “abandoning hope for humankind.” What, he poses, do you have to lose but your chains? You have an (after-) world to win! This, like Anselm’s infamous ontological proof, requires little in the way of rebuttal today—for what is it but another, very non-subtle, form of internalization? In Hick the plea for pluralism masks the real dangers of religious realism, i.e., the assumption of the univocity of a Real Presence beneath the veil of language, myth, and metaphor.

Hick might have dealt with this issue with more circumspection, had he acknowledged Feuerbach’s explicit avowal that religion, and the issue of religious representation, is a quite different case from that of sense perception, given that the object of religion has no material existence per se (or, acknowledging the Incarnation, does not have an obvious materiality in the here and now). The out-thereness of the religious object is denied, less because it is not perceptible than because it is not necessary—and may even be harmful, delusive, when used as justification for faith. The bias, common in classical aesthetics, towards (usually visual) sense perception distorts an analysis of religious symbolism, which is at least, if not more, linguistic than iconic—or perhaps, something of both—i.e., melodic. Feuerbach recognized this, transferring Hegel’s concept of Bildlichkeit (used by Hegel to critique the Greek pantheon) against Christianity. That is, in Christianity, as well, we find the spiritualizing illusions that enchain, or to use a Feuerbachian concept of some repute, alienate all anthropomorphizing, projecting believers. Thus, a more pertinent analogy to the problem of representation in religious language may be the problem of language more generally; for language, like religion, has no external existence, no guaranteed “out there.” Yet, also like religion, it somehow connects subjects with the world. This I have tried to show in discussing Herderian
expressivism as an alternative way of conceiving language and literary and religious expression.

Feuerbach’s argument is flawed, but not for want of a recognition of critical realism. Rather, Feuerbach, for one, assumes projection as a given, then goes on to “prove” it. This may be a masterful piece of rhetoric, but remains problematic as analysis. *Pace* Feuerbach, Greek religion *did not* endow gods with the highest in morality; these deities were, as Nietzsche and Euripides (and Plato, for that matter) knew, all-too human in their foibles, petty jealousies, and cruel and selfish ways. Besides, the objectification of our subjective being may be “the most intimate ‘Reality’ that we know.”²⁰⁹ Moreover, Feuerbach argues that to know God, and yet *not oneself to be God*, “is a state of disunity, of unhappiness” which “higher beings” [*Übervemenschen?*] do not share, having “no conception of what they are not.”²¹⁰ One might ask Feuerbach whether happiness can exist without a certain amount of distance, without a measure of sorrow, pain, suffering, as well as pleasure and joy—without, perhaps, a certain naïveté? “Another ideal runs ahead of us […] the ideal of a spirit who plays naïvely—that is, not deliberately but from overflowing power and abundance—with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine.”²¹¹ *Here*, against Feuerbach, Nietzsche attempts to reclaim naïveté as a pristine quality, one necessary to “forgetting” and the child-like aspect of the *Übermenschen*.²¹² This overflowing abundance affects not only the words of the Romantics, but also of Jesus himself, in his admonition for his followers to “become like little children” (Matt. 18:3).

Ultimately, both Hick and Feuerbach are demythologizers: Hick in his existentialist reality-centric religious pluralism, Feuerbach in his critique of the delusions of a realist understanding of religion. Yet, while Hick (like Tolstoy and George Eliot before him) attacks the mythological substrate of particular faiths, Feuerbach takes aim at
a higher foe, the “myth of the given”—not so much to reject it by interiorization (as in Berkeleyan idealism) as to render problematic its univocity: i.e., the assumption/presumption of one-to-one referentiality in the midst of disunity. Hick claims that the “ordinary, unsophisticated religious person”—the naïve realist—understands religious language literally, by which he means “straightforwardly, rather than as metaphor or myth.” Whatever the truth of this claim, which is of course impossible to verify, Hick’s wording is suggestive. The naïve realist does not truly understand myth; does not recognize metaphor for what it is—a veil. Yet, Hick’s critical realist understands myth as myth, metaphor as metaphor, i.e., non-realistically. But without taking this further, without some commitment to work on myth and figurative language, that is, without putting into question the myth of the given that stands at the root of realism and naturalism alike, myth and metaphor—figuration—remains a second-order or derivative form of representation, never more than a re-presentation. If critical realism is a Kantian alternative to the Scylla and Charybdis of naïve realism and non-or anti-realism, perhaps a post-Kantian appraisal of critical realism will reveal a different path, a route not so besieged, as the Kantian-Kierkegaardian one, by the specters of internalization, where the doctrine of God becomes “an encoded set of spiritual directives.” And the imagination, for all its potential, is left somewhere beneath the waves.
PART TWO: WORK ON MYTH

In so far as religions themselves—and in particular Christianity—have increasingly tended to “internalize” or “de-mythologize” themselves and to abandon their claims to be descriptive forms of truth about the world, a way is in fact conveniently open whereby our spiritual awareness can begin to be “re-mythologized” through the imaginative insights of poetry or literature. The only religious “scriptures” that can now be authentic for us may be the poetry or literature to which our own culture gives us access.

– Colin Falck, *Myth, Truth and Literature*
Chapter Five: Understanding in Time

Why is the truth so woefully
Removed? To depths of secret banned?
None understands in time! If we
But understand betimes, how bland
The truth would be, how fair to see!
How near and ready to our hand!
– Goethe

Romanticism and Religion: A Fearful Symmetry

Now that the Romantic-Symbolist aesthetic has been delineated, I will now begin to establish the connection between such an understanding of art, language and literature, and a theory of myth. Myth, I will argue, is the manifestation of semblance in history, or in time/duration. A mythical hermeneutic is a mode of understanding based on the expressivist principles outlined above, and one that, in our day, corresponds with a writing style or genre called “magic realism.” Colin Falck charges religion, especially Christianity, with self-demythologization, and argues that religious language in the West has forsaken all claims to description and representation. But if demythologization is re-read under the auspices of a magic realist hermeneutic, then this charge founders upon the rocks. A magic or mythical realist understanding enlivens not only the Romantic-expressivist aesthetic but also, in terms of religious understanding, opens up a tertium via between the twin poles of critical and naïve realism—without at the same time giving way to an anti-realistic stance, as found in Feuerbach and his twentieth-century epigones. Only magic realism gives temporality an axial position in critical interpretation and
epistemology—by focusing, not on static things or objects out there, nor on internal mental states or feelings that fashion the world, but on the atmosphere of reception and the convening arena as transfigurative loci. Put otherwise, mythical realism is concerned primarily with the creation of mood.76

It is with the development of Modernism in aesthetics that questions of time and eternity, dormant for some time, returned to the philosophical agenda, not as mere abstruse speculations along the way but as part and parcel of a larger critique of values. Amid the “inescapable flux,” of “mere anarchy loos’d,” Modernists wondered whether human beings could find and hold onto anything that abides. Fascism exploited this sense, and countless succumbed to its chorus—its distorted Gesamtkunstwerk. When the smoke cleared, a new query arose out of the rubble: Can myth be redeemed? The connections between poetry and religion are obvious and have a long pedigree, whether one cites the Ramayana, Daodejing, Psalms, or the Song of Songs. Yet, as with the marriage of philosophy and theology, or philosophy and poetry, the relationship between poetry and religion is not without its tensions. “Between religion’s ‘this is’ and poetry’s ‘but suppose this is’, there must always be some kind of tension, until the possible and the actual meet at infinity.”215 This is an image bot beautiful and apt: poetry and religion being parallel lines, running a similar course, but never becoming a single line, until infinity—or eternity.

During the 1780s, while Goethe was concocting his literary-alchemical experiments in Weimar and Wordsworth and Coleridge still in their halcyon days, William Blake was creating his own eternity in time and creating his own scriptures. A prophet of the imagination, Blake was perhaps the first to explore the Bible as a Great Code of art—as the source not only Truth and Goodness but also of Beauty. As with Coleridge, for Blake the Bible’s contents “present to us the stream of time continuous as
like Goethe and Coleridge, Blake saw allegory—as “art the meaning of which points away from itself toward something else which is not art”—as a “profane abomination.” He likewise disdained the kind of symbolism found in the simile as a “correspondence of abstraction,” one which arises only out of our laziness—our inability or unwillingness to keep our eye on the image itself—and ultimately results in our regarding qualities, whether moral or intellectual, as more real than living things.

The Bible for Blake is “not Allegory, but Eternal Vision or Imagination of All that Exists.” The allegorical tale, such as those of Aesop, which is merely a set of moral doctrines or historical facts ornamented to be made easier for simple minds, is neither amenable to morality, religion, or art—save, perhaps, in their degenerate forms. The truth of religion can be presented only in its essential form, which is that of imaginative vision. The truth of religion can only show itself through a poetic recreation of the original myths. Colin Falck lauds the Blakeian conception of religion as Imaginative Vision: “In this and other ideas,” he says, Blake “leaves most of modern theology trailing behind him, although there are affinities between his ideas and those of his near-contemporary Schleiermacher.”

Friedrich Schleiermacher is often considered the father of modern theology, yet his Speeches to the Cultured Despisers of Religion (1800) is also very much a Romantic manifesto, evoking, in its very lack of systematic rigor, a freshness and richness lacking in later works like the Doctrine of Faith (Glaubenslehre, 1822). Though known for his conception of absolute dependence on God, in his early work Schleiermacher is more concerned with the attempt to show (i.e., not prove, or justify) that if a person experiences the world in a state of deep emotion (i.e., Goethe’s “living way”), she experiences the world as it is (Blake: “infinite and holy”). In short, if a person is profoundly affected (i.e.,
awed) by her relation to the particularities of creation such an affective state, or *attunement*, is worth more than knowledge and action put together—as it connects and transcends both. An immanentist like Blake and Goethe, the “goal of the religious life” is for Schleiermacher:

> not the immortality that is outside of time, behind it, or rather after it, and which still is in time. It is the immortality which we can now have in this temporal life; it is the problem in the solution of which we are ever to be engaged. In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal is the immortality of religion.²¹⁹

Together, Blake and Schleiermacher alert us to the connection between Romantic aesthetics (the Symbol in particular) and a “truer” religious apprehension. Though Romanticism is usually connected with the birth of so-called Liberal Theology, the connections between these two movements, though indubitably present, are not as causal as they are often made to seem. The Romantics—those, at any rate, concerned with the fate of the Christian faith—sought a way of reading the world and the Scriptures in a symbolic sense, where we are not left grasping after hidden correspondences and Realities behind the appearances, but where the appearances, the images themselves, situate us into a transfigured mode of reception and awareness. As noted above, in his *Critique of Judgment* Kant gives some indication of what it means to apprehend the divine in terms of the symbolic: “If a mere way of presenting [something] may ever be called cognition”—which Kant thinks it may; and if “this cognition is a principle not for determining the object theoretically, as to what it is in itself, but for determining it practically, as to what the idea of the object ought to become for us and for our purposive employment of it”—then “all our cognition of God is … symbolic.”²²⁰ In short, our
religious apprehension involves the *presentation of God in relation to us*. Thus, religious reading is fundamentally akin to conversation (apprehension, attunement, response). It is an exchange of embodied voices.

Again, what is hinted at here is not merely a simple conversation but rather an *engagement in transfigurative cognition*; a truly “momentous” event. The term normally used, in poetics, to describe the affective phenomenon of words and symbols is *deictics* (from Greek *deiktikos: deiktos* = capable of proof, verbal form *deiknynai* = to show; therefore, showing or pointing out directly). The deictic capacity of symbols and expressive language is the capacity (latent, presumably, in the word or the linguistic act) to transfigure the reader or hearer in the act of reading or hearing. For our purposes, a more useful term may be the lesser-known *elenctic* (from Greek *elegkhos*: pointing out or refuting a position indirectly, often by a short question and answer). In reading elenctically, we appeal not to the linguistic act itself, but to the *semblance* of the linguistic act; “we appeal to models of human personality and human behaviour in order to construct referents for the pronouns, but we are aware that our interest … depends on the fact that it is something other than the record of an empirical speech act.” Deictics and elenctics are orientational features of language, “which relate to the situation of utterance.”

According to Culler, the verb tense that applies here is the *non-timeless present*. Deictics and elenctics, as direct and indirect forms of refutation, refer not to *context* but rather to *pretext*—they force us to construct a fictional situation of utterance, “to bring into being a voice and a force addressed.” As with the invocational-prophetic mode of religious utterance (familiar to Blake, who makes a strong correlation between “the Poetic and the Prophetic”), these poetic forms serve to place actual discourse in a temporal present. In addition, deictics and elenctics are multiivocal—“the plethora of deictics prevents us from constructing a discourse situation and determining which are its
prime constituents.” As such, we must never assume a stasis of situation, in place or time. Ultimately, deictics “provoke a more rewarding exploration of one’s modes of ordering than is usual, and of course such exploration would not begin were it not for the initial conventions that enable us to construct fictive personae to satisfy the demands of internal coherence and relevance.”

This analysis presents a challenge to poststructuralist proclamations about the death of the author or subject. Deictics and elenctics reveal that it may be more fruitful to speak of “the meaning that is produced by the attempt to construct a fictional persona” than to drone on about the death of the subject (or, as per Foucault, the death of man). Semblance acts as a mirror that reflects back upon the reader/subject, and calls forth an equally fictitious response, in the form of a persona, the fictional semblance of the reading subject. The self is constructed in the speech-relationship, but it is a self subject to the situation itself, without any transcendent reality above and beyond the particular situation. Perhaps we can think of this, mutatis mutandis, as the resurrection of the old notion of the “soul,” which Falck longs for, to combat the lack of “a notion of the subject which defines it in its relationship to apprehensible truth or reality.”

Deictics and elenctics thus function to indicate a displacement of identity and meaning. One effective deictic or elenctic tool is propinquity: the bringing together of things normally disparate into points of contact (G. Anknüpfungspunkten).

This stance, and the corresponding work on myth I am proposing in this study, goes hand in hand with an anti-foundationalist (and incidentally, Buddhist) philosophical anthropology, whereby the meaning or definition of the human being lies not in some (hidden or revealed) essence, but rather in the work she does in order to come to terms with the problem of what she is. That is to say, the human being is neither zoon politikon (Aristotle), nor homo ludens (Huizinga), nor animal symbolicum (Cassirer). All these too-
readily hypostasize humanity. Essences inevitably throw a backward glance to some distanced ideality of origins; questions of what the human being *is* will always speak of what she *was* once upon a time. At the same time, with regard to myth, origins are presumed to be historical, a lost history upon which, for whatever reason, has developed a mythological substrate—obscuring the forgotten truth.

**Kairos and Chronos**

The search for origins or temporal foundations rests upon the assumption of chronological time. But myth, being semblance in time, works in time conceived non-chronologically—i.e., time as *kairos*, where the stream of time appears at once discontinuous and as a symbol of eternity, “inasmuch as the past and the future are virtually contained in the present.” The present, conceived kairotically, is a virtual reality—in that the present moment contains the present of things past, the present of things present, and the present of things future. Thus, every act, every thought, has immediate cross-temporal implications and ramifications. In the Scriptures, says Coleridge, “both facts and persons must of necessity have a twofold significance, a past and a future, a temporary and a perpetual, a particular and a universal application. *They must be at once portents and ideals.*”

Gerard Manley Hopkins, following Hamann and Wordsworth, saw the Incarnation—the *skandalon* of the “incredible condescension” of the Ideal made Real—as the Event which, for Christians refigures time, doing away in the process with the trivialness of life in its chronological (i.e., continually escaping) aspect. Such an event acts as a dérèglement du temps perdu. Yet kairotic time need not rest upon the Incarnation or the Resurrection, or the *Hijrah*, for that matter; it also involves a “reading”
of the present that chronological time does not allow for. A kairotic reading of the historical now “opens the horizon for past as well as for future.” It renders the indifferent instant of chronological time not merely significant, but narratively significant, that is, part and parcel of a larger story or frame.

For Aquinas it is the aevum—the time of the angels—that stands betwixt the temporal and the eternal as a “third order of duration” in which the Absolute is implicated in but does not exhaust or co-opt the Contingent, as is the case in most understandings of epiphany (whether religious or secular-modernist) or ecstasy (again, whether divine, erotic, or as is often the case in religious mysticism—both). Angels, for the Angelic Doctor, are liminal creatures: “they have an unchangeable being as far as concerns their nature and they have the possibility of change as regards their choice, their acts of intelligence, their affections and local movements.” Thus the time of angels cannot be measured as ordinary time (i.e., chronologically) because it is not subject to nor does it consist in change; rather, it has “change joined with it, either actually or as a possibility.” Chronos has a before and an after; kairos has no before and after, though these can be coadjunated with it. This does not mean that angels exist in an eternal present, but rather that they are not bound by the ruthless causal and progressive line of past-present-future.

In the period leading up to and immediately following the Second World War, the issue of time became all the rage in theological thinking. Several works dealt specifically with the “problem” of time in Christianity, and with the meaning of kairotic time in particular. One such work is that of Frank Herbert Brabant, entitled Time and Eternity in Christian Thought (1937). Brabant discusses the aevum and kairos, but provides a necessary caveat: While, he suggests:
It is usual to repeat such phrases as ‘The eternal as seen in the temporal,’ ‘God as known in the world’ […] I think such words must be used very cautiously; as we have seen, a great deal of this immanentist language comes from the Romantic movement and is excellent poetry, if not always good philosophy.  

Leaving aside, for the moment, Brabant’s questionable distinction between “good poetry” and “good philosophy,” and his corresponding judgment as to which is more useful to religious thinking, his point is well taken, and reflects back upon the warnings of Romantics like Goethe, Coleridge, and Schiller; i.e., that we must be wary of the slippery slope from incarnationalism to pure immanentism, where fusion is atemporal, ecstatic, epiphanic, but perhaps not transfigurative. For Brabant, Christians have no need for “a God in [or of] the gaps,” that is, a transcendent Ideal that glues together those fragmentations of our worldly reality.

A normal Christian consciousness has always felt the mystery of what is known as well as the assurance of what is not known. It has had moods of strangeness and exile in the midst of what is familiar as well as the sense of being at home in the spiritual world beyond.  

Symbols, myths, kairotic time; these are not effectives balms against present uncertainties; they cannot function as escapes from mystery, or even from burgeoning reality. Rather, they act as figurative (and thus, as descriptive) and transfigurative elements, providing a mode of perception or of vision, an attunement, rather than a mode of explanation or verification.  

Myth as Symbolic History
Myth may be re-conceived, then, not as deficient history (just as poetry is not deficient philosophy), nor as anti-history, forsaking all claims to descriptive truth about the world, but rather as the expressive revelation of historical semblance. In other words, history understood as symbol (Schein and Stimmung), in which chronological procession (or progression) is subverted by kairos. In myth, we are not led to wonder about origins, or the temporal distance between past and present. We are rather enjoined to contemplate our own non-contemporaneity, our distance from a real present that is continually impinging upon us. Above all, myth is concrete, and “realistic” in the sense that it is not embodied in abstract philosophical syllogisms or rationalist logic nor in mystical effusions of epiphany but rather in fictional stories of concrete personalities actively confronting the problems of what and who they are. These stories must be read kairotically, whereby there is a radical tension between the present and future—between the “already” and the “not-yet”—latent in the stories themselves; coupled with a tension between the past of the story and the present of the reader’s reception of the story. In a more concrete sense, this tension is played out in ritual, which is the active principle that “affirms the social body and gives to each individual within it a sense of being in which social and individual reality are one.” Ritual is the space in which history gains reality—in Faust’s words, where heritage becomes task.

Within Roman Catholic theology, the Real Presence of the Eucharist points to the cross-temporal connection of the believer’s experience (individual and communal) with the historical events that constitute her redemption. The Eucharist is thus, as for Zwingli and Oecolampadius at Marburg, a symbol, but not in the sense that they (in Luther’s more mystical/proto-Romantic eyes, at any rate) seemed to assume. It is a ritual, like all rituals, whereby “the past event is itself manifested in the present act.” Perhaps Luther was the
only one who truly understood the significance of such: i.e., Real Presence not as an ineffable mystery to be left aside, nor as simple allegory, but rather as Symbol in the most concrete, embodied sense.\textsuperscript{241}

John Marsh, in his work \textit{The Fulness of Time} (1952), augments Brabant’s distinction between kairotic and chronatic time by suggesting that the kairotic rendering is realistic. Though virtually bereft of chronatic renderings of temporality, Judeo-christian scriptures abound in realistic ones: “Times, that is to say, are known and distinguished not so much by their place in some temporal sequence as by their content; i.e., they are known realistically rather than chronologically.”\textsuperscript{242} That is to say, chronatic or chronological understandings of time do not do justice to reality, which in actual human conception is never so stratified as in such a processive rendering. \textit{Chronos} is, like \textit{kairos}, an ordering principle, but one that allows for much less latitude in terms of the meaning of events (as events are always leading to other events).\textsuperscript{243} In chronatic time, the content of the events themselves has significance only in a linear temporal fashion, and can have little forward (and no backward) effect. In contrast, mythological or kairotic time, being connected to ritual, is based of the biblical adage that “to every thing there is a season”—the Greek \textit{kairos} means “season” and more specifically, “due season.” Thus, history (as myth) may be thought of “as made up of a number of \textit{kairoi}—the opportunities offered to men, and of men’s response (or lack of response) to them.”\textsuperscript{244} But the concept of seasonal history must not be confused with (Buddhistic?) history as impermanence, because in the Christian understanding of history, the eternal itself, in becoming incarnate, gave permanence to all contingent events, reconceived kairotically. Moreover, we make a mistake in assuming that the temporal-eternal relationship is in itself a temporal one. Eternity neither succeeds nor precedes time, nor is it contemporaneous or contained
within it. Rather, the temporal gains real temporality, a “fulness of time,” which projects backwards upon the past and forward to the future.

The demonstration that a myth is not historical does not imply that the happening whose account it preserves is not temporal—or, to take this a step further, it is not to say that it is not real or concrete. It may be, in fact, more realistic than history as usually conceived (as both Aristotle and Oscar Wilde suggest of fiction more generally). Yet, as already not noted, myth is not to be opposed to history. As Coleridge inquired, with Augustine before him: Why not both?

Why not at once symbol and history? Or rather should it be otherwise? Must not of necessity the first man be a symbol of mankind in the fullest force of the word symbol, rightly defined;—a sign included in the idea which it represents;—that is, an actual part chosen to represent the whole?245

Myth is fictive,90 a semblance of history. Or better: myth is semblance in time. Kairotic or mythical time is also concrete in the sense that I have discussed above with regard Schillerian semblance. There is no call, in kairos, to escape the ravages of impermanence, the restless drift of contingency, by distancing oneself from all sensible particulars and temporal realities. On the contrary, thanks to the content of the transfigurative event, it is only through the things of the world, of time and sense, that we can have experience of the eternal. This seems to align, once again, with particular interpretations of Mahayana Buddhism—the East Asian Tendai and Kegon schools in particular. This comparative connection will not be pursued here, but it may be a line worth pursuing.

The Melody of History
“In a sense,” writes Inkling Charles Williams, “history is itself a myth, to the imaginative man, engaged in considering these things, all is equally myth.” The distinction between history and myth is a fluid one, at best. All history, even the most seemingly objective account of past events, will be symbolic in some fashion. They will be, in other words, a semblance or refuguration of the reality of a particular moment. For Nikolai Berdiaev, all history is myth, and myth is a reality, though a reality of a different sort than empirical fact. “Myth is the story preserved in popular memory of a past event and transcends the limits of the external objective world, revealing an ideal world, a subject-object world of facts.” It is also, he suggests: “an expression of the primordial confusion of celestial and terrestrial,” and thus, the primary mode of (i.e., the expression of) incarnation. Myth, often instantiated in ritual, makes history a part of the everyday—in Nietzsche’s terms, it is Existenz in the midst of history; the past, present, and future become part and parcel of the self—even constructing the “self.”

It is worth noting that the German language has two distinct words for the English “history”: Geschichte refers to a particular realm of being, historical existence, and Historie to the “scientific” study of the past. Given our postmodern skepticism regarding scientific claims to historical study, the former appears a more useful term, applying, perhaps, to the study of history conceived in symbolic, or mythical terms, as well as to “the sphere of reality … in which we take part.” Perhaps, as George Grant argues: “What is fundamental about all human behaviour (including our understanding of it itself as a behaviour) is its historicity.” Similarly, for theologian Rudolf Bultmann, the decisions made by the human being towards “authentic existence” can be made “only as a consequence of an encounter which takes place at the level of a man’s own personal history.” To put this another way: whatever is merely historical has to become historic in order to confront the human with the necessity of decision and of action. Bultmann
distinguishes between history as Historie, with the corresponding adverb historisch, and history as story or Geschichte (along with its adverb geschichtlich). This distinction is crucial to an understanding of Bultmann’s Entmythologisierung, and must be fleshed out further. Even if an objective study of the past were possible, such would be inadequate to any investigation of faith. No matter how well documented, Historie cannot serve as a basis for faith. Besides the fact that historical knowledge is always somewhat ambiguous and relative, “factual” history cannot account for the irruption of kairos. Even Nietzsche had an antidote for a surplus of the historical sense, which he termed the “suprahistorical,” defined as “the powers which lead the eye away from becoming towards that which bestows upon existence the character of the eternal and stable.”

This pastor’s son from Röcken wrote his first work, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), in an attempt to evoke what he saw as the true spirit of Goethe—the tempering of Dionysian revelry and spirit with Apollonian form and ordered grace. In Nietzsche’s young eyes, the “carnival of gods and myths” concocted by the Romantics was dangerous and in need of repudiation. Whereas this first work focused on the function of myth, two years later an essay “On the Use and Disadvantages of History for Life” discussed the function of history in the terms noted above. These were not mere abstruse speculations, but play a pivotal role in Nietzsche’s critique of values—the main concern of his life’s work, from the effusions of Tragedy to the rants of the autobiographical summa Ecce Homo. The eternal and stable: this is the legacy of Apollo, ordering, stabilizing, and circumscribing the Dionysian chaos of pure events and meaninglessness. Nietzsche seeks pathways that lead us not back to the dead arbiters of morals (i.e., God, Reason), nor to a “weak nihilism” where, just because the center has not held, mere anarchy is loos’d (Yeats), and everything is permitted (Dostoevsky). “Against ‘meaninglessness’ on the one hand, against moral value judgments on the other…” De Man does some disservice to
Nietzsche by suggesting that his concept of “ruthless forgetting”—“the blindness with which he throws himself into an action lightened of all previous experience”—“captures the authentic spirit of modernity.” *Das Leben* is, for Nietzsche, “a temporal experience of human mutability, historical in the deepest sense of the term in that it implies the necessary experience of any present as a passing experience that makes the past irrevocable and unforgettable, because it is inseparable form any present or future.”

Art and religion, along with all figurative phenomena, are suprahistorical not in being universal, eternal, beyond duration and time, or “true” in the traditional sense, but in their ability to focus our perspective, giving style to the events of time—being the loom, as it were, upon which the reweaving of past events is accomplished. Perhaps history can be best approached through a “certain spiritual relation to the ‘historical’ within the sphere of historical knowledge which, as a result, becomes unworldly transfigured and transformed.” But does history, as Berdiaev insists, really demand faith? If so, faithless, and therefore timeless is the dwarf who pesters Zarathustra and sees only two infinite paths leading from the moment—one extending into the past, the other into the future. He fails to see their Zusammentoss in the moment. As Augustine noted, there are not three times—past, present, and future—but rather, three presences: the present of the past (memory); the present of the present (intuition); and the present of the future (expectancy). Heidegger comments that it is only “he who does not remain an observer,” but rather “himself is the moment [selbst der Augenblick ist], who acts into the future and thereby does not allow the past to fall away, but rather at the same time overtakes and affirms it.” Only for him, Janus, do past and future run against one another (G. gegeneinander).
Chapter Six: Partial Magic

The metaphor is perhaps one of man’s most fruitful potentialities. Its efficacy verges on magic, and it seems a tool for creation which God forgot inside one of His creatures when He made him.

– José Ortega y Gasset, *The Dehumanization of Art*

Perhaps universal history is the history of the diverse intonation of a few metaphors.

– Jorge Luis Borges, “Pascal’s Sphere,” *Other Inquisitions*

Myth, Metaphor, Meaning

In symbolic terms, Franz Rosenzweig gives the corresponding formula for the circular process of the world as $B = A$, which is an equation of two unequals: “The content of the world and its form.”\(^{260}\) Importantly, this backwards-looking formula asserts the passivity of form and the activity of content; “to the concept it attributes a self-evident character, but the thing appears to it as a miracle.” Thereby the world becomes self-contained in it, “a vessel filled to saturation, a cosmos abounding in configurations.” We can conceive of metaphor, in similar fashion, as a “unit of relationship” making a statement of “$B$ is $A$” or, as Frye suggests—in order to evoke the hypothetical aspect of metaphor—“let $x$ be $y$.” This is contrary to ordinary logical common sense or descriptive reasoning, in which “$A$ is $B$” (or “$B$ is $A$”) is a statement of identity. Contrariwise, in the metaphor “two things are identified while each retains its own form.”\(^{261}\) The identification *with* is as crucial as the identification *as*. This is metaphor in its original, nonallegorical sense of *metapherein*: “to transfer” (related in turn to the originary meaning of symbol as *symbolon*: “a token of exchange”). “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of
thing in terms of another.”262 We are back to Schein, but now Schein has become Dasein, or perhaps in-die-Welt-Sein (“being-there; being-with-the-world”).

There is an irreducible connection between metaphor and myth, which can be described as a structuration, over time, of compressed meanings. That is, any myth, or mythological tale, can bear manifold readings, “because the peoples who have lived and used the story have, over time, joined all those meanings into it.”263 We can say that it is the wealth or surplus of meaning that is the secret of the power of myth, and is what distinguishes myth from dogma.

Against the dogmatic mode of thought, with its claim to homogeneous validity in universal space and universal time – in other words, with precisely what Platonism had invented, by virtue of its introduction of the ‘Ideas’ as timeless and placeless validities, and as the imitation of which, as far as the claim to rigorous truth is concerned, one can regard the dogmatic mode of thought – against this mode of thought, the characteristic differentiation of the mythical ‘significances’ stands out as a structuring that is opposed to the intolerable indifference of space and time.264

Of course, like history, myths can be and have been interpreted dogmatically, and often allegorically, by referring to a single voice or truth “behind the veil.” Frye counters traditional work on myth, suggesting that “because myths are stories,”

what they ‘mean’ is inside them, in the implications of their incidents. No rendering of any myth into conceptual language can serve as a full equivalent of its meaning. A myth may be told and retold: it may be modified or elaborated, or different patterns may be discovered in it; and its life is always the poetic life of a story, not the homiletic life of some illustrated truism.265
Frye’s concept of displacement helps us to rethink the meaning of myth in terms of metaphor, fiction, and figuration more generally. Aristotle defined mythos as dianoia in movement, and, correspondingly, dianoia as mythos in stasis. Dianoia is “the secondary imitation of thought,” or a mimesis logou, concerned with typical thought—“with the images, metaphors, diagrams, and verbal ambiguities out of which specific ideas develop.” Thus, what Vico would call poetic truth is dianoetic. Myth takes dianoia into the river of time, but this aspect is often missed, leading to a focus on the (static) meaning of a myth or symbol, rather than the meaning of a “moving body of imagery.” In “Mimesis and Representation,” Paul Ricouer musters up the polysemic resources of mimesis in a full-scale critique of the anti-representational turn of the present day. Focusing particularly on the connotations of creative imitation, Ricouer connects mimesis with mythos—a pre-Platonic term used by Aristotle to refer to the act of bringing together the incidents into a unique and complete action: synthesis tôn pragmátōn. This echoes the magic realist trope of propinquity, as well as anthropologist Victor Turner’s Borgesian definition of metaphor as: “a mode of effecting instantaneous fusion of two separated realms of experience into one illuminating, iconic, encapsulating image.”

Frye uses the term “displacement” to refer to the devices used in coming to terms with “the presence of a mythical structure in realistic fiction”—or, to put it another way, in reading history in terms of semblance. According to Frye’s typology, myth and naturalism are extremes of literary design. They can be bridged only through what he calls romance—meaning, not so much the historical mode, as “the tendency to displace myth in a human direction”; a tendency that can be found in love as well as Romantic poetry. Yet, in contrast to realism, which seeks to overcome myth in toto, the romantic tendency, while displacing the structure of myth, “conventionalizes content in an
idealized direction.” In displacement, allegorization and dogmatization give way to analogy, significant association, and “incidental accompanying imagery.” Salman Rushdie speaks of metaphor in terms of migration, again hearkening back to its Greek root as a mode of “transference” or “bearing across”: metaphors bespeak migration, the crossing of frontiers, where the view is, as Coleridge intuited, anything but clear.

Symbolists and modernists know something of this tendency: the metaphysics (Poggioli) or algebra (Ortega) of the metaphor, where the metaphor involves a new image: metaphor, image, and symbol being synonymous concepts. The analogy upon which it is based “is a hermetic and occult affinity […] in which] every interior link is eliminated by means of a fantastic process tending to confound dimensions and categories.” In the course of this process, the image aims at making itself “an emblem or hieroglyphic, cipher or seal […] it] tends to divorce the idea and the figure, to annul in the last-mentioned any reference to a reality other than its own self.” This is to destroy, in some fashion, Plato’s water-jug, so diligently balanced on our heads for so long. Rimbaud, in praise of Quixote, the Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance, says: “I have habituated myself to simple hallucination; I have clearly seen a mosque in place of a gasworks,” while Mallarmé “cancel[s] the word ‘like’ from the dictionary.” And for Russian Imagist Vadim Shershenevich: “the image ought to devour meaning”; in the overturning of the word, “there ought to gush forth new imagery.” Poggioli sums up these effusions: “Ideas like this come from a metaphorical conception of language, considered not as the figuration, but as the transfiguration, of the real.” This is ultimately a search for new or transrational languages, “especially for a speech which aspires to make itself the verbal equivalent of music, which attempts to elevate metaphor to symbol and myth,” and one that is, for Poggioli, “perhaps the most striking inheritance left to modern poetry by French symbolism and its numerous offshoots”
But Poggioli and company may have overstated the effect of this rupture, thereby reaffirming the designative function of language and poetry. For metaphors create worlds—they are as constructive as disruptive—by virtue of the fact that: a) rather than being mere accretions or deviant aspects of language, they are “omnipresent principle and constitutive form” (I. A. Richards), and b) as primary elements of structuration, they structure our conceptual system(s) itself, which in turn feeds back into, or transfers, our old metaphors, reconfiguring them. Though metaphors-as-words may not change reality, metaphors-as-conceptual-buttresses and catalysts do change what is real for us, affecting “how we perceive the world and act upon those perception.”

In short, the magic of the metaphor is what might be called a partial magic. It does not involve simultaneous transfiguration. Instead, the meaning in a metaphor is always temporal and fluid. It is meaning that, with the passage of time, serves to enlarge logical and imaginative space within language games and social discourses. Metaphors can be lyrical, but they need not be interpreted on a lyrical basis. In fact, a lyrical, or synchronic-epiphanic reading of metaphor does not uncover the potential power of such. Rather, metaphors can be seen as existential or phenomenological. As such, imagery expressed does not aspire to (visual) similitude of a presence, but to existential evocation of an event—or rather, a situation. Accepting metaphor as a vital source of belief is to abandon the point of view of the distanced spectator, as well as the ideal of the mimetic mirror; i.e., to break speculum as well as specula. As in myth, in metaphor we are confronted with unreal images, new configurations, and diverse intonations, which point away from correspondence with the world “as it is,” but do more than just gesture meaninglessly. Rather, myths—metaphors become ritual stories—subvert the designative assumption of language, and invoke particular instances as having potential universal (or typical) significance. Myths are not, as they are often conceived, preliminary movements.
towards a lost unity or harmony; myths act as melody, reconfiguring our rigidified
concepts about the world. Their temporal aspect is kairotic and repetitive, not organic and
progressive. There is no longing for an ending in myth; myth revels in the disclosure of
the “imminence of a revelation not yet produced”—which is what Borges called the
“aesthetic reality.” Meaning is deferred in metaphor, and in myth (as in music); static
closure gives way to unconcealment—not as a progressive disrobing of truth, but through
a continually varying repetition—of a reconfigured sense of reality.
Thus is the
assumed reality brought into question; i.e., through being mythologized.

Paul de Man reads in allegory and irony a “common demystification of an organic
world postulated in a symbolic mode of analogical correspondences or in a mimetic mode
of representation in which fiction and reality could coincide.” But this is to miss the
(partial) magic of the metaphor, and of myth. As in the Romantic Symbol, the
myth/metaphor is the message. This does not mean that conceptual thought is to be
eschewed, as for Heidegger and many poststructuralist thinkers and Zen Buddhists.
Though the Platonic legacy has placed an inordinate amount of importance on the
concept vis-à-vis metaphor, conceptualization is an inevitable aspect of the “hardening”
of metaphors into meaning, and cannot be easily done away with. As Sarah Kofman
writes, “It seems to me more Nietzschean [i.e., more philosophically perspicuous] to
write conceptually in the knowledge that a concept has no greater value than a metaphor
and is itself a condensate of metaphors… than to write metaphorically while denigrating
the concept and proposing metaphor as the norm.” Heidegger erred in making
Nietzsche a precursor in terms of the overcoming of conceptual thinking. Concepts may
be simplistic, and often useless, but they can, as hardened metaphors, contribute to life—
just as history can contribute to das Leben. Concepts are “symbols [not Schein but
Bildzeichen] for impressions that often recur and arise when people live a long time under
similar conditions [i.e., within specific language games].” They may not be “true,” but we should not therefore seek some truer (i.e., prelapsarian) preconceptual thinking, as does Heidegger. The falsity of truth and conceptual representation (i.e., mimetic or designative representation) does not mean the collapse of conceptual meaning (or metaphorical “magic”). For: “reality can have metaphorical content; that does not make it less real.” Nor, we might add, less open to conceptualization. Some, such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, have argued that the very conceptual systems by which we live (and by which our lives are made meaningful) are, in fact, largely metaphorical. According to Rorty’s reading of Donald Davidson’s view of language, it is precisely the condensation, the cooling and hardening of fluid metaphors, which allows for the enlarging of logical space.

**Supreme Fictions: The Truth of Masks**

There is, in fact, a world of poetry indistinguishable from the world in which we live, or I ought to say, no doubt, from the world in which we shall come to live, since what makes the poet the potent figure that he is, or was, or ought to be, is that he creates the world to which we turn incessantly and without knowing it and that he gives to life the supreme fictions without which we are unable to conceive of it.

– Wallace Stevens, *The Necessary Angel*

According to the American poet Wallace Stevens, the central problem of poetry, and, by extension, of all art, is the problem of reality itself. The fragility of *Weltbilder*, or world-pictures, reflects an unsurety about the truth; or rather, an uncertainty as to the links between the imagination and what we often call “reality.” For Stevens, their interdependence is essential: “It is not only that the imagination adheres to reality, but,
also, that reality adheres to the imagination.\textsuperscript{287} As we know (and as Rushdie’s Saleem Sinai reminds us): “What’s real and what’s true aren’t necessarily the same.” In fact, perhaps the “truth” of art lies, not in its capacity for reflection or mimesis, but precisely in its power to break the monopoly of established reality. That is to say, the aim of art is not to \textit{reflect}, but to \textit{define} what is real.\textsuperscript{288} The “disappearance” of reality, lamented by many today, is perhaps better viewed as a maladjustment to the decline of a mode of representation, whereby imagination is, at best, considered a “second-order” reality.

Thus, with Oscar Wilde, we might speak of “the truth of masks”—or, to avoid confusion, the “reality” of masks. Art, particularly Occidental figuration, revels in the reality of masks: “To give the imaginary the formal guarantee of the real, while leaving this sign [or symbol] the ambiguity of a double object, at once verisimilar and false, is a constant operation in all Western art. In the West… there is no art that does not point a finger to its own mask.”\textsuperscript{289} This process, which relates to the so-called “anagogic perspective” in literature, occurs when the speaker or poet attempts to speak from the circumference rather than from the center of reality.\textsuperscript{290} Anagogic criticism is the \textit{dianoia} of figuration breaking away from the \textit{mimesis logou} and towards \textit{Logos}, the “shaping word” (or words) that is both “descriptive” reason and “creative act”—i.e., the work of \textit{supreme fictions}. It “is usually found in direct connection with religion, and is to be discovered chiefly in the more uninhibited utterances of poets themselves.”\textsuperscript{291}

Transforming the philosopher Vaihinger’s “reunion with reality,” Kermode calls this process, if not “making reality,” then quite simply “making sense,” or “making human sense.”\textsuperscript{292}

We may not want to go so far as Santayana, when he proclaims that, in fact, “[p]oetry raised to its highest power is then identical with religion grasped in its inmost truth”\textsuperscript{293}—or even Nietzsche, who suggests the same congruence, even while intending
something quite different than Santayana: The world of Christianity, Nietzsche declaims, is: “a purely fictional world [and] neither its morality nor religion has any point of contact with reality.”294 Earlier in his writings, before his increasingly bitter turn against religion (and fiction) this could be read as a justification for both Christianity and fiction.295 Again, though we might not choose to take this connection quite so far, the parallels between fiction and religion should be obvious enough to allow for a fruitful interchange between the two oft-disparate realms. That is to say that, following Wallace Stevens’s notion of “supreme fictions,” we may begin to apply particular hermeneutical tools and strategies normally reserved to aesthetics or poetics to an investigation of the meaning and truth of religious language—and to the problem of religious realism in particular. If myth is indeed a structuration of history—“the unconceptualized undertrussing or complement supporting bodies of human statement and conveyed in them precisely in so far as this undertrussing remains an unconceptualized but somehow intrinsically coherent whole”296—and is, at the same time (by way of illusion) the structural element in literature, “literature as a whole [being] a ‘displaced’ mythology”297—then we can affirm that any attempt to disconnect myth from “historical reality” is a denial of the displacement already taken place in the language of myth and symbol, and thus takes myth away from the world of human being and into an ideality of origins without human significance.

Colin Falck concurs, but privileges less particular modes of reading and reception than particular works themselves, and those that we deem to be “idealistically credible or real,” rather than “those which our better judgement enables us to see to be superficial, sentimental, frivolous or fantastic.”298 In The Sense of an Ending, Frank Kermode finds it incredible that no one has thus far attempted to relate a theory of literary fictions to a theory of fictions in a more general sense. This is particularly odd, given the Nietzschean
development of certain Kantian premises and Romantic insights, and the former’s “aesthetics of truth,” by which we postmoderns are left saying, with Wallace Stevens, that “the final belief must be in a fiction.” Of course, there is danger inherent in any attempt to disengage “truth” from “reality” per se; but then, what is required is an investigation of the meaning of “fiction” in terms of language and belief. What is required is work on myth. In the next section, I briefly discuss the tenets of one particular literary style—and its capacity as epistemological theory and hermeneutical tool—that has risen alongside of (though out of a greatly dissimilar context to) poststructuralist and deconstructionist temporizing on the collapse of “reality” and “truth” in a world of fading modernist dreams.

The Alchemist in the City

There is a necessary relation between the fictions by which we order our world and the increasing complexity of what we take to be the ‘real’ history of that world. It is worth remembering that the rise of what we call literary fiction happened at a time when the revealed, authenticated account of the beginning was losing its authority.

– Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending

“The Alchemist in the City” (1865) was the title of an early poem by Gerard Manley Hopkins. Since Plato’s banishment of the artists from his ideal Republic, “the Poet and the City” has come to signify the tension between aesthetics and ethics, or poetry and philosophy, or poetry and politics. Goethe let the Poet return to the City, but under the guise of the magus, or alchemist; with the progressive “objectification” of natural science (and its consequent sundering from religion) language—the poetic word—became the material of the Romantic alchemists to follow in his wake. Part of the alchemical task is,
as we have seen, a retrieval of the fecundity of the imagination in general, and myth,
symbol and metaphor in particular. According to Mary Hesse, the worlds of metaphor
are: “imaginative symbolic worlds that have relations with natural reality other than those
of predictive interest... utopias, fictional exposés of the moral features of the world by
caricature and other means, and all kinds of myths symbolic of our understandings of
nature, society and the gods.” We act on the basis of metaphors and myths as much, if
not more, than we act on the basis of concepts: both structure our beliefs, conceptions and
perceptions, and thus create—or crystallize—our reality. Metaphors and myths are thus
quite literal, in the sense that they are very much in and of the world.

At the same time, as I argued above, there is a magic to symbols and metaphors
that cannot be gainsaid. This magic is, in fact, the basis of the power of both myth and
symbol to capture our attention and imagination. The “poet as magician” has a long
pedigree in literature and poetics; Goethe’s Faust praises the “bold magician” who “seeks
out others; with open-handed generosity he enables all of them to see whatever miracles
they wish.” Pater in turn writes of the romantic spirit in terms of the necessary
“strangeness” of creation, and the Romantic “desire... for a beauty born of unlikely
elements, by a profound alchemy, by a difficult initiation, by the charm which wrings it
even out of terrible things; and a trace of distortion, of the grotesque, may perhaps linger,
as an additional element of expression, about its ultimate grace.” And Hopkins, in turn,
lauds the response to all that is “counter, original, spare, strange.”

Alchemy is indeed a useful image, as it hearkens to an age before the final
sundering of magic from reality, and of religion from science and rationality. The word
“magic” itself derives from the Old Persian magus: a Zoroastrian priest or “priest-
scientist.” For a paradigm priest-scientist like Paracelsus, magic was above all a method
for gaining insight into heavenly and earthly things, not by way of sorcery but by an
intuitive or extra-linguistic knowledge gained by the grace of God and the results of concentrated contemplation, revealing “the great hidden inter-relationships between God, the world, and man.”

Faust himself becomes disillusioned with his purely rational attempts at supreme knowledge. His disillusionment, and corresponding lament—“Nature, filled with mystery even in the light of day, will not let her veil be snatched away”—is what sets the plot of Goethe’s epic drama in motion. To borrow from the *Upanishads*, Faust wants to snatch the veil of *maya* (illusion) from the world, in order to “get an insight into many a mystery.”

Faust’s failure is thus the failure of epiphanic Romanticism, soaked through with Enlightenment hubris: mystery, myth, and illusion become veils which may (or must) be “snatched away” to uncover a Real Presence, a piece of Eternity in Time. Magic is thus, like science, albeit of a second-order status; it is a mode of conquering mystery, of deconstructing illusion. Magic, so conceived, is the balm for disillusion. But what if magic is in fact a more effective mode of apprehending “reality”—not by virtue of drawing back the veil, but by presenting a multiplicity of veils, so that we are not beguiled by the ruse of a single Real Presence, but focus rather on the relativity of the reality we perceive and create in the act of perceiving? Such magic is not merely adjectival but active, directing or crystallizing reality itself. Suchwise, to be magical is not merely to be mysterious—it is the creation of a new reality from the diachronic conjoining of disparate elements. Magic is not intrinsic *within* reality, but is *work on the world*, through the art of vertiginous combinations; the recognition of infinite ambiguities in every word, phrase and line of text—and all this in temporal perspective.

Paul de Man, together with many contemporary critics, laments the decline of the novel, from the days of Cervantes, Rabelais, Sterne and Swift to the (degenerate) realism of the nineteenth century. But what these critics miss is that, whereas writers like James
and Conrad excluded the supernatural from their works because such would be a denial of the marvel of the everyday, the tack of early “realists” like Cervantes was quite different. Cervantes’s was a partial magic, a critical magic, as it were. The Quixote is a supremely realistic work, but it is also a work full of irrealism—a subtle and insinuated (elenctic, one might say) distortion of reality. In the Quixote we are faced with a disillusioned world emerging from the comfort of chivalry and myths, in which a “mad” knight does battle against a dying era, gaining at once our laughter and our tears. Cervantes the author engages in partial magic, whereby the text, by impinging on, and disrupting (extratextual) categories—of the poetic and the real, the reader and the read, fiction and life—acts very much upon the world in which it is unleashed.

Descending from the Quixote, magic realism places the alchemist squarely within the walls of the City: the worldliness of texts is a guiding principle of the magic realist aesthetic. If Surrealism was the last gasp—the hangover, as it were—of Romanticism (Herbert Read) then magic realism is Surrealism with a human (or “post-colonial”) face. “For the first time in modern history, the centre of gravity of formal creation leaves Europe, and a truly worldwide literary system—the Weltliteratur dreamed of by the aged Goethe—replaces the narrower European circuit.” As Carlos Fuentes puts it: “The Empire writes back!” Though André Breton tried to move his movement away from the “happy nihilism” of Tristan Tzara’s Dada, Surrealists remained uncompromisingly European (largely French), and, with few exceptions, were quite unconcerned with the migrancy of displaced, colonized, or so-called “developing” peoples. The Shock of the New may have been revelatory to jaded Europeans, but to those already shattered by centuries of imposed “newness,” it could provide little, either by way of disruption or comfort. Akin to Romanticism, magic realism is not a poetics so much as a state of affairs: an attempt to describe a reality
already disrupted—already maravilloso—rather than an attempt, through art, to disrupt a stable reality.

To proclaim the worldliness of texts is to temper the hermeticism, not only of European Surrealists, but also of those postmodern alchemists who assume, and seem to want to uphold, a dramatic opposition between speech and text—a distinction which is “misleading and grossly simplified.” Rather, as Edward Said argues, “[t]exts have ways of existing, both theoretical and practical, that even in their most rarefied form are always enmeshed in circumstances, time, place, and society—in short, they are in the world, and hence are worldly.” Said wonders whether it is not possible to grapple with the problems of literary language without cutting such off from “the more plainly urgent [problems] of everyday worldly language?” Is it possible, in other words, to heal the “great divide” (Adorno) opened up in our century between a modernist aesthetic and mass culture, while remaining worldly enough to sustain a critical capacity in the face of both? Said’s approach is thoroughly Wittgensteinian: language, even written language, is regulated by its worldly use, not by “abstract prescription” or “speculative freedom.” Above all, he concludes: “language stands between man and a vast indefiniteness; if the world is a gigantic system of correspondences, then it is verbal form—language in actual grammatical use—that allows us to isolate from among these correspondences the denominated object.” In this way, like memory, language becomes at once aesthesis and askesis, a limiting and ordering phenomenon—and thus truly expressive in the Herderian sense.

Texts themselves, particularly in times of political or socio-cultural unrest, never appear in a vacuum: “the way they operate in a society can be cannot be separated from politics, from history.” Indeed, for every text, there is not only a pretext but a context. Wallace Stevens: “Reality is life and life is society and the imagination and reality; that is
to say, the imagination and society are inseparable.” Said points to the Zaharite theory of the medieval Islamic scholar Ibn Hazm as one “considerably articulated thesis” on dealing with a text as an event in the world—as a significant form in which “worldliness, circumstantiality… sensuous particularity as well as historical contingency, are incorporated in the text, and are an infrangible part of its capacity for conveying and producing meaning.” Signification exists not below or behind the text, as some sort of mystery, but rather takes place at the level of the textual object—the significant form itself. The text’s reality (what Said calls its “situation”) is the placing of itself in the world, with the corresponding interplay of speech and reception, and between verbality and textuality; in short, in the essential tension between truth and fiction/semblance.

In writing of his “recreation” of India from a distance—his own “imaginary homeland”—Salman Rushdie notes that he tried to make it as “imaginatively true” as possible, knowing that imaginative truth is “simultaneously honourable and suspect.” Rushdie’s theory of fiction is based on a trope of broken mirrors—of fragmentation—in which it is the shards themselves that best reflect our situation in the world. This conclusion is based on a correlation between virtual or imaginative history (i.e., fiction) and human memory, whose fragments acquire greater status precisely because they are remains: “fragmentation [makes] trivial things seem like symbols, and the mundane [acquire] numerous qualities.” But Rushdie prompts us to go even further, for the broken glass functions not simply as a vanity mirror, like the unbroken one, for purposes of nostalgia and winsome reminiscence. It is also, also more significantly, a “useful tool with which to work in the present.” We do not need a mirror to “reflect” our world(s) back to us. We do not need clear sight. We do not need harmony. For we, as human beings, do not “receive things whole.” We are “not gods but wounded creatures, cracked lenses, capable only of fractured perceptions.” Per speculum in aenigmate. We are
“partial beings,” in all the senses this term connotes (i.e., fractured as well as “non-objective” or “politicized” or ideologically motivated). In short:

Meaning is a shaky edifice we build out of scraps, dogmas, childhood injuries, newspaper articles, chance remarks, old films, small victories, people hated, people loved; perhaps it is because our sense of what is the case is constructed from such inadequate materials that we defend it so fiercely, even to the death.\textsuperscript{320}

Against Marx—who insisted that philosophers have been intent on interpreting the world, when the point is to change it—description, interpretation, or representation is itself a political act; and, as any ideologist or imagologist knows, a necessary first step towards changing the world. One route this redescription takes is in the disconfirmation of our sense of time and history, as chronos—a progressive and causal succession of discrete events. Fiction’s task, and myth’s bounty, is the representation of a “strange present.” Rushdie evokes this instance with another metaphor, this time of a movie screen (or a Rivera or Izquierdo mural, perhaps), where the closer one gets to the screen “reality,” the more fragmented and disunified one’s vision becomes: “tiny details assume grotesque proportions [until] it becomes clear that the illusion itself is reality.”\textsuperscript{321} Proximity begets, then, not clarity but rather approximation. In fiction as figuration, the narration of the present appears at times grotesque, as it is a fragmentation of a larger (diachronic, or kairotic) reality.

Jens Kruse found in Goethe’s Faust a present in which “past and future participate simultaneously”—a present (like the pressant of Finnegans Wake) that is compressed, and always on the verge of disintegration. Ernst Bloch, who defended the expressionist and post-expressionist aesthetic against Georg Lukács in the Frankfurt
School debates, developed a thesis regarding a similar phenomenon, what he called the *non-contemporaneity* (*Ungleichzeitigkeit*) of certain moments, certain presences—in which the distance between peoples and the subsequent rift in communication is based on a different sense of the present moment or season (*kairos*). Bloch’s thesis provides for the possibility of situations of non-contemporaneous or non-synchronous present, where in Foucault’s words, “the masks of previous epochs return”: a present made more *real* through dilation, distillation, diachrony. “Not all people exist in the same Now,”322 Bloch notes, even if, and increasingly so, they are living in the same Here.

**Kairotic Love**

> Love… is intermediate between the divine and the mortal… and interprets between gods and man, conveying and taking across [*metapherein*] to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, to men the commands [*kerygma*] and replies of the gods; [Love] is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them.

– Diotima to Socrates, in Plato’s *Symposium*

The power in texts resides not so much in authorial authority as in the fact that texts draw or force our attention away from the world, while drawing attention to the gap the text creates in the very act of sundering. That is to say, the rhetoric of semblance undoes, or subverts the divide between *retention* and *representation*, confusing the two, and thus playing them off against one another. As Vico would have it: *verum et factum convertuntur*. Fiction is the primary mode of the transformation of *chronos* to *kairos*; i.e., of mere successiveness to what has been described by various writers as a state similar to the experience of love: “the erotic consciousness which makes divinely satisfactory sense out of the commonplace person.”323 *Kairos* establishes concord not only with the past—
with “origins”; but also with the future—with “ends.” The connection of fiction with love is not a gratuitous one, but is based on a particular understanding of art, where care (Sorge) and cortesia play a significant role. For Falck, all art, and specifically all literature, can be defined by its capacity to hold our attentiveness “for its expressive qualities alone.” As Walter Benjamin once said of Kafka, even if he did not pray, “he still possessed in the highest degree what Malebranche called ‘the natural prayer of the soul’: attentiveness.” And for Heidegger, as we have seen, that which is most questionable (fragwürdigste) may be just what is most worthy of thought and careful attention (frag-würdigste).

Falck laments religion’s tendency to emphasize the negatives—the world-denying and joyless, renunciatory, ascetic, aspect of Sorge (concern) over the more positive, and alacritic aspect of awareness, wonder, and awe (care), which “has no difficulty in accommodating the notion of play [an element that] has been noticeably absent from almost all traditional religions.” He posits literature as a counterpoise to this negativism. Fictional awareness disturbs those practical “fixities and definites” (i.e., dogmas) that inhibit our apprehension. While fiction is the primary mode of expressive language, it is not exhausted by what we call “literature”—as G. K. Chesterton would have it: “Literature is a luxury, fiction a necessity.” Yet Falck falls into the trap that beguiles so many post and neo-Romantics: he privileges the lyric over the epic or novel. Following the lead of Frye and Langer, but bypassing the insights of magic realism, Falck sees in lyric poetry “the most essential of our linguistic modes of apprehension of reality.” The novel, he proclaims, smacks of didacticism; like religion, it is for him too political—or perhaps too realistic.

But it is the novel that is primarily concerned with the expression of kairos, and thence is intrinsically connected with love. And love, as contemporary feminism has
called to our attention, even the most seemingly personal sort, is always already political. It is in the novel and not the lyric poem that love, in its temporality and communality, is most effectively disclosed/revealed. Indeed, if in so-called “primitive” culture, the Word is magical—exerting substantial power over the physical world; and in the biblical tradition, sacred—instinct with unfathomable divine meaning; in the novelistic tradition “the Word simultaneously resonates with its old magical quality and turns back on itself, exposing its own emptiness as an arbitrary or conventional construct.”

What Marthe Robert has called—in deference to what many consider the first European novel—“the quixotic Word [la verbe donquichottesque],” is at once “invocation and critique, conjuration and radical probing both one and the other with their risks and perils.”

The Quixote, as the prototypical self-conscious fictional text, flaunts naïve narrative devices and styles—“rescuing their usability by exposing their contrivance [or semblance], working them into a highly patterned narration which reminds us that all representations of reality are, necessarily, stylizations.”

Fiction—and figuration more generally—is, like love, always face-to-face. Also, like love, it is always tempted by an impossibility (i.e., of perfect union). In fiction, this is the temptation and impossibility of mimesis. Just as, in love, the lover needs to occupy all points in space and time occupied by the beloved, in past, present and future, fiction, in creating, describing or presenting a world, also attempts to occupy all points in space and time. Fiction and love are realms of over-ambition and subversion, not, as Proust knew well, of “success.”

Through love we steal from the time that kills us a few hours which we turn now into paradise and now into hell. In both ways time expands and arises to be a measure… it
does not give us eternity but life, that second in which the doors of time and space open just a crack: here is there and now is always.  

Love, via *kairos*, confronts history (as *chronos*) and the martial inevitability of successive time. Though, as Julian Barnes admits, love, or myth, or *kairos*, might not “change the history of the world,” it may do something more important: it may “teach us to stand up to history, to ignore its chin-out strut.” Love is thus more akin to human (i.e., partial, not objective and incomplete) “truth,” because it involves *imaginative sympathy*; i.e., the attempt to see the world from another point-of-view, from another point on the circumference of reality, perhaps non-contemporaneous with our own. Like Falck, Barnes dismisses contemporary religion (“[it] has become either wimpishly workaday, or terminally crazy, or merely businesslike—conflating spirituality with charitable donation”) but he also goes far beyond Falck to disown art itself. Art, Barnes suggests, “picking up confidence from the decline of religion, announces its transcendence of the world… but this announcement isn’t accessible to all, or where accessible isn’t always inspiring or welcome.” As such, both religion and art must yield to the claims of love: only love gives us our humanity and our mysticism.

Though I appreciate Barnes’s argument, particularly for the *reductio* it performs on Falck, it has its own share of problems. In order to set up his own ideal of love, the novelist must caricature religion (either wishy-washy or fanatical) as well as art (snooty highbrow stuff or kitsch); only love remains unsullied—“unblinded” as it were. But is not the aesthetic root of love—its uncertainty, its radical energization, its transfiguration by way of *kairos*—also, in some fundamental way, the root of figuration, and perhaps of the religious impulse? Barnes, with Kundera and other love-apologists, considers it epiphanically: love as, first and foremost as *ecstasy*, or *intensity*. But what if love:
is not altogether a Delirium[, though] it has many points in common therewith[?] I call it rather a discerning of the Infinite in the Finite, of the Ideal made Real; which discerning again may be either true or false, either seraphic or demoniac, Inspiration or Insanity. But in the former case, too, as in common Madness, it is Fantasy that superadds itself to Sight; on the so petty domain of the Actual, plants its Archimede-lever, whereby to move at will the infinite Spiritual.338

Though, as Falck and Kermode suggest, literary fictions may be our most useful “concord-fictions”—that is, the most effective avenues by which we “find out about the changing world on our behalf” and “arrange our complementarities [and our commonplaces]”—precisely because of the failings of religion, we must also be conscious of the similar failings of art, and even, I would submit, of love, at least when treated in isolation. All of these modes of meaning-creation, of coming to terms with reality and our present/presence in the world, manifest problematic particularities. Thus, the way to understand their development is not to treat each in isolation, privileging one or the other, but rather “to see how they are related to those other fictional systems.”339 Theories of fiction may have greater implications than such have been traditionally granted; implications beyond pure aesthetics, extending to epistemology and belief.

**Magic Realism: A Third Face**

‘Realism’ contains within itself the seeds of its own dissolution[; if it draws] some strength from using life as rough material, it [draws] all its weakness from using life as an artistic method…. Art finds her own perfection within, and not outside of, herself. She
is not to be judged by any external standard of resemblance. She is a veil, rather than a mirror.

– Oscar Wilde, “The Critic as Artist”

The incoherent and delusive nature of realism as it comes down to us through Romantic and Modernist streams is a founding principle of postmodernist criticism. However, as Falck suggests, what this premise obscures is “the fact that a genuine realism of the imagination has always been a defining characteristic of literature whether before, during, or after the modernist period.” That is to say, within the Western literary tradition—and particularly the novelistic tradition since Don Quixote—realism has been undermined not by its opposite but rather by itself, not least by its tendency toward pseudo-objectivity against a more human reality. For Falck, a true postmodernism can now be defined “only in terms of a head-on rejection of the nihilism which would reduce literature to the status of a game with itself or with language, on the illusory ground that there is ‘nothing outside the text’ for it to relate to.” A “false” postmodernism of the deconstructionist sort, railing against the so-called metaphysics of presence, fails in its non-recognition of the necessity of presence (even if “strange” or “non-contemporaneous”) for experiencing the world; and in its failure to provide us with an account of language and signs (or symbol) in which presence is even a possibility. It fails by neglecting the insights of both realism and Romanticism, particularly their convergent aspects.

Though Falck recognizes the “necessity of realism,” he makes little mention of magic realism, which, it can be argued, is the postmodern embodiment of the Romantic realism he lionizes. This is not surprising. Until very recently there has been a critical lacuna vis-à-vis the kind of literary work which, while aware of its status as semblance, seeks, by virtue of artifice, “ways of going beyond words to the experiences words seek
to indicate"—experiences like religious awareness and love. Magic realism is not the creation of Alejo Carpentier or Gabriel García Márquez—nor even of Franz Roh. From Cervantes through Gogol, Kafka, Bely, Bulgakov and Borges; from Renaissance Spain to postcolonial Nigeria, writers have complicated and qualified the realistic enterprise without abandoning its premises, or concern for extra-textual reality or presence.

In *Flaubert’s Parrot* (1984), Julian Barnes calls magic realism “a Latin American disease” of “package-tour baroque and heavy irony”—“the propinquity of cheap life and expensive principles…, surprising beauty and random cruelty.” Of course, as Mark Twain woul surely have agreed, these words can apply to many of the world’s sacred texts, including the Judeo-Christian Bible. More to the point, Barnes underestimates the scope—aesthetic as well as geographical—of magic realism, to which he is himself obviously indebted, in, for example, *Flaubert’s Parrot* and *A History of the World in 10 1/2 Chapters*. The latter novel is where Barnes develops his thesis on the tension and battle between history and love, accepting, in so doing, the epiphanic atemporal vision of love (eros as *ek-stasis*), which magic realism explicitly and implicitly deconstructs.

The most important aspect of magic realism is *propinquity*, derived from the Latin *propinquitat* (kinship, proximity) and signifying: 1) nearness of blood: kinship; 2a) nearness in place: proximity; 2b) nearness in time; 3) archaic: closeness in nature, disposition, or interests. Against New Critics like Cleanth Brooks or William Empson, magic realists seek “a whole that is formed in extreme contrasts, rather than in their resolution…. Interaction here is *polarization*: a productive conflict of the contradictory elements.” For complexity requires not homogeneity (i.e., harmony, the elimination of discord) but rather interaction (i.e., melody).
Magic realist propinquity involves the “fusion of dream and reality” so lauded by the Surrealists, or what Kundera calls the “density of imagination, density of unexpected encounters.”\textsuperscript{353} As such, aspects of reality are brought together not only in space but also in time, which no longer obeys the hegemony of chronology. Yet, for all this, the magic realist aesthetic attempts to re-establish contact with the literary realism prior to the mimetic constraints of the nineteenth-century novel. Where nineteenth-century realism intends its vision as a singular one, i.e., “the way things are,” magic realism, without relinquishing ideology (an impossibility), shuns dogma. Its program is not centralizing but rather \textit{eccentric} (or, to re-evoke an earlier image, circumferentia); it “creates space for interactions of diversity.” In magic realist texts, “ontological disruption serves the purpose of political and cultural disruptions: magic is often given as a cultural corrective, requiring readers to scrutinize accepted realistic conventions of causality, materiality, motivation.”\textsuperscript{354}

**Magic Realism as Work on Myth**

Before, people were not at all devoted to the object: they took the exterior world which art molds and shapes for granted. In making what was formerly accepted as obvious into a “problem” for the first time, we enter a much deeper realm, even though some of the results may seem inadequate to us. This calm admiration of the magic of being, of the discovery that things already have their own faces, means that the ground in which the most diverse ideas in the world can take root has been reconquered—albeit in new ways.

– Franz Roh, “Magical Realism: Post-expressionism”

“‘Magical realism’? As if we did not know that contradictions in terms are quite meaningless.”\textsuperscript{355} Like Moretti, Lois P. Zamora and Wendy B. Faris, in their compendium
Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community (1995), question the very term “magical realism.” It creates, they suggest, a greater dichotomy between the magic or marvelous and the “real” than exists in the texts, which might more properly be called “metaphoric” or “mythic” realism. One could argue—especially if one follows Irene Guenther’s diagnosis—that the “magic” qualifies, renders or works upon the “realism”; that is, it is the active force upon which the “really” real is revealed/disclosed. At any rate, it is undeniable that magical realist texts have as their primary narrative investment myths, legends, stories, and rituals—those “collective (sometimes oral and performative, as well as written) practices that bind communities together.”

Magic realism is thus, to use Blumenberg’s terms: “high-carat work on myth.” It is a mode that facilitates “the fusion, or coexistence of possible worlds, spaces, systems that would be irreconcilable in other modes of fiction.” In its assault on the basic structures of realism and rationalism—extending beyond the “merely” aesthetic realm to our ontological, epistemological, linguistic, and existential understandings—magic realism encourages resistance to “monologic political and cultural structures.” Moreover, it is the kairotic dimension of magic realism that justifies its kinship to myth and metaphor. “History is inscribed, often in detail, but in such a way that actual events and existing institutions are not always privileged and are not limiting: historical narrative is no longer chronicle but clairvoyance.” Seeking the roads not taken—the diverted paths, as it were, of history—it is thus the most complex form of non-contemporaneity, where “Bloch’s paradox invades the actual figurative texture of the work, and forces meanings from different epochs to cohabit in the same sign.” Like myths, melody, and metaphor, magic realism (re-)constructs alterior reality at the same time as it deconstructs the certainties of what we hold to be the case. It is at once discursive askesis and non-discursive affect. As Franz Roh puts it: “The clash of true reality and apparent
reality [semblance] has always had an elemental attraction. This enchantment is enjoyed now in a new way. Such a juxtaposition of reality and appearance was not possible until the recuperation of the objective world, which was largely lacking in Expressionism." 

Whatever label we may choose to give it, magic, mythic, or metaphoric realism thus provides an instance of what the alchemists call *égérâge*—a third term distilled from two apparent (but not actual) contradictory elements: “truth” and “fiction.” As a fully-fledged hermeneutic—i.e., a style of reading, interpreting, and understanding—magic realism enjoins a person who “without losing anything of his constructivist ideals, nonetheless knows how to reconcile that desire with a greater respect for reality, with a closer knowledge of what exists, of the objects he transforms and exults.” Indeed, the damage done to reality in Ibero-America, and most postcolonial contexts is at least as much political as cultural. That is to say, “truth has been controlled to the point at which it has ceased to be possible to find out what it is” and “fiction has spread and contaminated [or illuminated] everything: history, religion, poetry, science, art, speeches, journalism, and the daily habits of people.” Magic realism is a way of reading or apprehending reality that attempts to reunite Romanticism with its realist roots—and with its political roots. As I have noted above, it is, in some respects a democratization of post-Romantic Modernism: Surrealism with a post-colonial face.

Unlike fantasy literature, magic realist texts do not exhibit closed, bound and self-referential universes; they exist with the extra-textual world, acting upon such, by virtue of their re-readings of the world at large—this is their “magic.” Alejo Carpentier’s vision does not imply a conscious assault on conventionally depicted reality so much as “an amplification of perceived reality required by and inherent in Latin American nature and culture [where] the fantastic… inheres in the natural and human realities of time and place.” Thus, it is through a faithful depiction of the absurd and horrific disjuncture of
social, cultural, and political reality in specific communities that the magic realist writer and reader apprehend the situation at hand, bearing witness, at the same time, to the stultifying effects of the mask of objectivity, rationalism, and realism. Magic realism is literary, linguistic, and political iconoclasm. It is *fiction as critique*—a phrase employed by Salman Rushdie to describe Barnes’s *History of the World*. The Nazis, who conflated misomusy with genocide, declared magic realism (and expressionism) “degenerate art” (*Entartete Kunst*). Labelled a “cultural bolshevist,” magic realist founding father Franz Roh was imprisoned for a period at Dachau. This critical realist element is well-expressed by Zamora and Faris:

> The propensity of magical realist texts to admit a plurality of worlds means that they often situate themselves in liminal territory between or among those worlds—in phenomenal and spiritual region where transformation, metamorphosis, dissolution are common, where magic is a branch of naturalism or pragmatism. So magical realism may be considered an extension of realism in its concern with the nature of reality, and its representation, at the same time that it resists the basic assumption of post-Enlightenment rationalism and literary realism.\(^{368}\)

Though Marx may have erred in assuming that interpreting or describing the world and transforming or changing it are entirely different things, he recognized that the cognitive function of art is more than representational reflection (i.e., *showing that*). It is always also a *showing how*; mirror as well as lamp, reflector as well as reflection. Such, for Marx—as for Schiller and Nietzsche—involves a return to the “naïve” (as opposed to the “sentimental,” which is merely nostalgic, or the “critical,” which tends to be atemporal).\(^{369}\) The cursory dismissal of the naïve over the critical reflects a very modern (and no less postmodern) inability or unwillingness to see in fiction, even in non-realist
fiction, anything other than comment (or, to use postmodern lingo: “gloss”). But “[t]he use of that model has obscured the most distinctive characteristic of art—that its import is not separable form the form that expresses it.”  

370 Figuration, whether in myth, literature, or religion, is not merely, or even primarily, an art of saying. It is at least as much an art of showing; showing the appearance of human existence “in a perceptible symbolic projection.”  

371 “The effect of this symbolization is to offer the beholder a way of conceiving emotion; and that is something more elemental than making judgments about it”—the disclosure/revelation of the world seen from a circumferential perspective. Art is reflection in every sense of the term: a mirroring as well as a re-thinking.
Chapter Seven: Between Barth and Barthes, Calvin and Calvino

The Sound(ness) of *Theological Science*

In 1968, Roland Barthes proclaimed a distinction between literature and science in the way they use language: whereas literature is aware that language *is* language, science, he argued, is prone to use language as a “neutral utensil” to say something else; i.e., to convey a meaning, fact, thought, or truth. Barthes maintains that, in fact, literature is *more* scientific than science, because literature “knows that language is never naïve, and knows that in writing we cannot say anything extraneous to writing, or express any truth that is not a truth having to do with the art of writing.” In other words, science, in adopting a container theory of language, blinds itself to the way this particular utensil really works; that is, in multiform and often palpably “unscientific” ways. Barthes’s thesis strikes a remarkable parallel with that of Thomas F. Torrance, whose masterwork, *Theological Science*, was published a year after Barthes’s “Literature and Science” appeared in the *Times Literary Supplement*. Torrance suggests, like Barthes, that science, while holding the keys to the kingdom of knowledge has been led astray, and that theology, in this case, can show science what it really means to be “scientific.”

In this chapter, I argue that while Torrance’s argument in *Theological Science* is internally consistent and unfailingly logical, it can be questioned in terms of its ultimate applicability, in contrast to, for instance, a comparable thesis extolling a theological aesthetics. In other words, I will show that while Torrance’s argument is valid, it may not be sound. The impetus for such a meta-critique emerges from within the text itself, where the author argues the limits of a purely *formal* logic and points towards the possibility of a more fully *divine* (and thus, more fully *human*) logic. I argue that Torrance’s argument
stands or falls on a particular use and understanding of certain key terms (certain “tropes,” to use the language of literary criticism) like “reason,” “objectivity,” and most crucially, “realism.” Furthermore, when these terms are clarified and the assumptions behind them unmasked, his project is opened up to critique from the sphere of aesthetics and literary theory. It is my contention that, in fact, a literary-aesthetic approach to the problem of understanding and apprehension in theology is more truly “scientific”—more fitted to its object—than Torrance’s “scientific theology.” This analysis will help to clarify the preceding argument regarding a critical approach to religious realism via literary theory and the aesthetics of magic realism.

Regarding “Literature and Science,” Italo Calvino notes the irony of a rigorous and scientific writer like Barthes proclaiming himself the enemy of science. But Calvino misses the point: Barthes and his fellow semiologists, for all their talk of jouissance and plaisir, felt no small amount of what can be called, after Bloom, the “anxiety of scientific influence.” That is, Barthes’s criticism of science is also a none-too-subtle recognition of the power of scientific rigor and method, and the hold of such over the popular (as well as scholarly) imagination. Reading Torrance’s work, one feels the same pull, a kind of attraction-repulsion towards science, which is at once extolled as a model and bracketed as an ideal fallen from its noble origins, and thus limited for contemporary purposes. It is my task in this chapter to clarify this anxiety and its repercussions, or Wirkungsgeschichte. Again, this analysis will not question the validity of Theological Science, but rather its implications for contemporary society. In short, this is an examination of the soundness of Torrance’s project. The trope of “soundness” itself will be examined on several levels, in relation to historical or present effects, as well as the “sound” of the theological text as a work of literature.
The oft-invoked “war” between science and religion, which reached its apogee between *The Origin of Species* and the Scopes Trial, is largely over, without a real victor being proclaimed. Both sides have largely realized that they have been talking past each other, and so have largely agreed to disagree, or agreed that their disagreements were due to differing goals and irreconcilable perspectives. Yet in terms of the popular imagination (at least, in most of the West; the United States being an exception) the winner was clear, and that was science—or, to be more accurate, *scientism*—the conception that science not only has all the answers but also asks the only relevant questions for we “modern” people. The irony, which is (implicitly) elucidated in Torrance’s writings, is that, since Einstein, Heisenberg, and Gödel, and especially since Kuhn, Polanyi, and Feyerband, “real” science no longer accepts the certainties and the absolute truth-claims it once held with such aplomb. Late nineteenth-century bombast is largely missing in twentieth-century science (again, with some exceptions, such as Richard Dawkins).

Thus Calvino is right, in one sense, to criticize Barthes’s stereotyped view of science. This is an important issue, in terms of *Wirkungsgeschichte*: what do terms like “science,” “objectivity,” and “rationality” mean today, particularly within so-called communities of faith? More specifically, what is the pragmatic meaning of *theological objectivity*? Despite Calvino, Barthes reminds us of the lingering power of science as a world-view, not just a method or discipline of knowledge, while at the same time pointing to an alternative model or analogy from which to build a “cultivated theology” (Karl Barth) for our times.

Again, Torrance insists that he is building upon a foundation that is more truly scientific that the popular understanding of science, in order to develop a more truly theological theology. The lynchpin in this tower is a *new objectivity*. Yet Torrance, like his contemporary Barthes, clearly feels the pull of science—the prestige of its surplus of
meaning is certainly not lost on him. Indeed, upon reading the author’s insistence that his project is not in any way meant to be an “apology” for theology in a world (especially in 1969) dominated by the scientific world-view, one feels that “the gentleman doth protest too much.” Torrance wants to preserve theology against “impurities” (presumably meaning non-scientific elements like Tillich’s aestheticism, as well as the encroachments of philosophy of religion). Yet the almost obsessive attempt to see theology regain its status as “a science in its own right”—or even as was once proclaimed: “queen of the sciences”—evokes nothing less than Freud’s desire to push his theories of psychoanalysis through the same forbidding portal. Of course, Freud’s ambitions were nothing new. The war of science and religion is a mere skirmish compared to the long battle between philosophy and art, or reason and inspiration. At the end of the Republic, Plato resorts to an incantation in order to rid the Ideal City of the danger of poetry—which, despite the divinely inspired power of Reason, cannot be combated successfully on Reason’s own ground. It is not the weakness of poetry (as “third-order imitation” of the Ideal forms) but rather its strength, its potential transfigurative capacity and awe-ful primordiality, which renders it anathema to a virtuous life, both private and public. Philosophy, along with philosophical theology, felt compelled to distinguish itself from the corrupting power of inspiration (whether poetic or mystical) at the moment of its inception in the classical world. In Christian times, Augustine and Aquinas both warned of the uncontrolled use of music in the mass. As for the Reformers, we have a lot to be silent about on that issue, but will only note that theirs is a legacy that lingers.

Despite Torrance’s debt to the work of Michael Polanyi, he could be charged with lapsing into what Polanyi calls “pseudo-substitution”: the use of certain key terms like “order,” “simplicity,” and “objectivity” to “play down man’s real and indispensable intellectual powers for the sake of maintaining an ‘objectivist’ framework which in fact
cannot account for them.” For Polanyi, this is the attempt to deny the “passionate” or “personal” aspects of knowledge; but his argument could be extended to include the “non-rational” or “aesthetic” aspects of knowledge as well. Torrance uses terms borrowed from a rationalist-scientific discourse, and while expanding these terms beyond their usual scope, does not allow for the full surplus of meaning that they may in fact engender, or which remain latent and unexplored. Is personal knowledge still scientific? If so, then where does the boundary of science end and the boundary of art begin? Or are there boundaries at all?

The Problem of Subjectivity

A premise underlying Theological Science is the (Karl) Barthian attempt to get rid of “subjectivity” in religious understanding and theology especially. The connection between the specifically religious and the scientific drive for a containment of subjectivity is alluded to by Charles Taylor, who remarks that the scientific ideal of objectivity is really a new variant of the “aspiration to rise above the merely human, to step outside the prison of the peculiarly human emotions, and to be free of the cares and the demands they make on us”—“a novel variant of this very old aspiration to spiritual freedom.” Of course, Torrance is quite clear that his objectivity is not the objectivity of, say, Ignatius of Loyola, nor the mythical objectivity of pre-modern science in which the subject is not at all implicated in the encounter with the object of investigation. Torrance searches rather for what we might call New Objectivity, albeit one that, he insists, has precedents both in the Reformation (and more specifically, Calvin’s Institutes) and in the origins of Western science. Before going further, we must get a better sense of what
Torrance’s project entails. This is laid out quite explicitly in the Preface to *Theological Science*.

Scientific theology is not passive contemplation, but “active engagement in that cognitive relation to God in obedience to the demands of His reality and self-giving.”

It is, in short, a matter of opening up of the mind to allow “God’s own eloquent self-evidence” to shine through. Of course, Torrance admits, human beings cannot communicate God directly to others—that is not the way human language works. Yet we can use language to refer others to something that is beyond ourselves; that is, not to *express* but to *show*. The limits of language are not absolute, reducing us to silence; communication can (and must) take place, but only indirectly, through a “triadic relationship” of reference. Torrance, who it seems has little time for mystical apophatism, favours a pragmatic or kataphatic appreciation of human language. Thus, for communication to work, we must presuppose that the things of which we speak are capable of “rational apprehension and semantic designation.”

In order to properly know things, argues Torrance, our inquiry must be reflexive; that is, our presuppositions must be brought into question (or, in Husserlian terms, “bracketed”). Our interpretive framework itself must be constantly realigned to more properly fit with the nature of the object of our inquiry. Though this is a difficult and unceasing task, we must continue refining and elaborating methods (as Heidegger might say, “along the way”) that will carry within themselves self-correcting devices even as they lead us onwards and upwards. In this sense, says Torrance, the project of theological science is committed to dialogue with the other sciences, as well as philosophy and ordinary experience. Torrance concludes his preface by suggesting that this project is, indeed, “the great story of modern thought”: humanity’s attempt to find a balance
between the pursuit of knowledge and the requisite fidelity towards the object of pursuit. This balance is, for Torrance, genuine objectivity.

Torrance’s authorial intrusion in the Preface is significant in revealing some of the assumptions and presuppositions underlying Theological Science. One question that can be raised is Torrance’s use of the term “rationality.” Why, exactly, does “the presence and being of God” convince the author of God’s “rationality”? Does this mean that God’s reality is so evident that God must be rational to disclose Godself so plainly? Or rather does it mean that belief in God is rational because of God’s overwhelming presence? There seems to be some confusion here, over what would appear to be a key term in such a work. It would seem that, for the author, God is the ultimate arbiter, or even the ground, of Reason itself. Yet, as he goes on to say, in terms suspiciously like those of mystics of via negativa: all knowledge of God is flawed, because it is ultimately human—i.e., the limited self gets in the way. While this connects with his call for a genuine objectivity, it seems to run against any attempt to gain knowledge about God. At what point, one might ask, does one come to the realization of one’s in-the-wayness?

Along similar lines, a mystic or poet might question Torrance’s seeming conflation of reason/rationality and presence/reality. “If the nature of things were not somehow inherently rational they would remain incomprehensible and opaque and indeed we ourselves would not be able to engage into the light of rationality.” Even allowing for the archaic note of any and all talk of the “nature” of things, to locate rationality in the nature of things seems a strange turn indeed. What about nominalism, or the linguistic turn in philosophical thinking? Couldn’t we rather say that rationality resides in 1) the human mind, or 2) language? Torrance continues in what appears to be a Buberian vein, emphasizing the relationality of God-talk.
Scientific theology is active engagement in that cognitive relation to God in obedience to the demands of His reality and self-giving… [it] is that in which we bring the inherent rationality of things to light and expression, as we let the realities we investigate disclose themselves to us under our questioning and we on our part submit our minds to their intrinsic connections and order.\textsuperscript{378}

Incidentally, this last point parallels Heidegger’s conception of truth as \textit{aletheia}:
unconcealedness.

In the final part of the Preface, Torrance makes the bold assertion that not only modern theology, but modern science and indeed, the whole modern project, can be seen as an attempt to work out three revolutionary seeds planted by John Calvin in his \textit{Institutes}. Briefly stated, these three criteria were: 1) we must start with the question: “what is the nature of the thing”; i.e., with \textit{actuality}, not \textit{possibility}; 2) we must recognize that the knowledge relation between God and humans is inescapably “mutual”—i.e., that knowledge of the Object and the human subject cannot be separated; 3) given the last, we must strive to distinguish knowledge of God from knowledge of ourselves, by way of methods like \textit{analogia fidei}: i.e., the movement of thought in which we trace our thought back to its “ground,” thus testing its “fidelity.”\textsuperscript{379} The problem of modern theology, Torrance concludes, is that the second theme of Calvin’s project has gotten out of hand, allowing “gross personalism” to take over, and with it the slippery slide from theology to anthropology. This, one might conclude (particularly given Torrance’s debt to Barth), is a reference to Schleiermacher and his legacy, from Liberal Theology down to the work of Paul Tillich. However, theology is not alone with its problems: modern science as well has had to face Calvin’s three principles. In science, the problem is that the third of these has been over-emphasized, culminating in the quest for pure objectivity.
Since the revolutions of the early twentieth century, science has had to rethink the place of the subject, which has become something of a stumbling-block in the objective quest. Of course, for Torrance this is the wrong way to react to these paradigm shifts—what they presage is rather a necessary readjustment to the mutuality of the Subject-Object encounter. Indeed, it is the Subject-Object relationship that is the only forum for a “genuine” objectivity. Once again, at issue here for both theology and science is balance: “how to refer our thoughts and statements genuinely beyond ourselves, how to reach knowledge of reality in which we do not intrude ourselves distortingly into the picture, and yet how to retain the full and integral place of the human subject in it all.”

Torrance’s New Objectivity walks a fine tightrope between the pitfalls of pure subjectivity (typified by post-Schleiermacherian theology, or rather, anthropology) and pure objectivity (where the ganz Andere becomes an Object without incarnation or presence—a danger mitigated by a return to christology). In the following sections, I examine whether or not this tightrope act can be sustained, and later, whether an entirely different act may be more relevant, entertaining and safe.

**Rationalism, Realism and Language**

In the first chapter of *Theological Science*, Torrance brings out one of his key theses: Barth’s re-examination of theology—his bypassing of the philosophical tools of the scholastic, Reformation, and early modern periods—was, at least in part, spurred by the revolutions in both philosophical and scientific thought of the early twentieth century. In fact, Barth’s positive and dynamic theology is remarkably parallel to quantum physics, not least in its criticism of the old antinomies and their handling. This thesis—in my estimation a valid one—raises a number of important questions.
One involves the point made by Torrance's about criticism of Barth’s “anti-rationalism.” It is a pity, he writes, that Barth’s attack on rationalism (understood here as “abstract reason”) should be misunderstood as a critique of rationality proper. Like the existentialist misreading of Kierkegaard, this is ironic, given Barth’s attempt to “restore to reason its true rationality through overcoming Cartesian dualism and romantic irrationality.” What is at stake is Barth’s “realism” against the “idealism”/“subjectivism” of his critics. But how does Torrance slide so deftly from the quest for a genuine rationality/objectivity to “realism”? Is the author’s concern over these terms related to their popular connotations (i.e., one must be both rational and realistic in order to be of any worth)? Or is he using them in more specific ways? If so, they call for clarification. Moreover, this raises the question, once again, about God’s rationality. Torrance’s first “preliminary observation” (i.e., presupposition) about the knowledge of God is that it is a rational event. It is not concerned with anything that is sub-rational or irrational. This bold assertion seems to stand in the way of a substantial tradition within Christian thought, dating back at least to Tertullian’s Credo quia impossibile, and progressing through the mystics (including Luther) and Pascal to Otto and Eliade in the twentieth century. With one bold stroke, a significant body of theological insight is thus rendered invaluable and irretrievable.

At this point we must raise the issue of language and more specifically the theory of language that underlies Theological Science, turning back to Barthes’s critique of the “container theory of language.” Theology means, quite literally, “God-talk.” But for Torrance God-talk seems to be “rational talk”—a conflation of language and reason that effectively eliminates expressive, poetic or symbolic theories of language discussed in preceding chapters. In a footnote, Torrance says that it does not seem to him “helpful” to speak of God as “supra-rational,” for such a statement is senseless, given that we can
have no rational knowledge of such. But this is faulty logic: to make a claim—i.e., to express something—in language does not necessarily entail a rational understanding of what such a claim might mean. For Torrance, “to know God is to know that He is more fully rational than we are.” But how can we possibly know this? Moreover, what is the point of extending the concept of rationality in such a way? Reason, Torrance goes on to argue, “is our ability to recognize and assent to what is beyond it.”

But isn’t this what Tertullian called “faith,” restated so as to raise the position of reason, while ostensibly admitting its limits? To posit, with John Macmurray, that “[r]eason is the capacity to behave consciously in terms of what is not ourselves” is to make reason into a very different thing from the way it is normally understood. This might not be a concern, were it not so important to Torrance’s thesis in *Theological Science*. Again, Torrance’s use of language, and the theory of language which underlies such, seems to be so pivotal to his argument that to put these into question is to render the entire work unsound—or at least on shaky ground.

My main concern, however, is Torrance’s argument about “genuine” rationality or objectivity, which arises from the appropriate collision of Subject and Object. What this very important trope hinges on is the term “appropriate” and the criteria for demarcating such (we are, after all, accepting nothing less than “rigorous, exact thinking”). But what are such criteria? Can they be conceptualized at all? Moreover, is science, even a purified or renewed scientific method, the most adequate form by which to proclaim this encounter?

In chapter six, while remarking on the similarities between theology and other “special sciences,” Torrance seems to undermine his own argument in a footnote. (Clearly Torrance is too honest a scholar in his footnotes, to the extent that they begin to sound like a conscience in dispute with the narrator of the text itself). His point here is
that theological science, like the other special sciences, does not operate with a “preconceived metaphysics.” Though he notes that theology, by virtue of being embedded in (a) language and (a) culture, will be laden with such, scientific procedure must strive to eliminate all preconceptions, in order that “authentic metaphysical thinking” may arise as we engage with new conception “thrust upon us” by objective reality.\(^{383}\) As German poet and critic Hans Enzensberger insists: reason/rationality must remain topological—a constantly changing facsimile of the world, not metaphysical, a static and immovable blueprint. Only as such will rationality or science be open to the refashioning (or, to invoke Thomas Kuhn, paradigm-shifting capacity) that is required of it.\(^{384}\)

And yet, however well intentioned, this whole issue strikes me as rather naïve—as Max Weber and Nietzsche before him realized. Where will this “authentic metaphysics” come from? From what, other than our language, culture, traditions, even idiolects, will these new concepts and conceptions arise? From the side of the object, is, of course, Torrance’s answer, but it may not be a sufficient one. For whatever impulse or vision we may have thrust upon us must be translated into communicable words and concepts—i.e., must be made “human.” Moreover, any new metaphysics will have preconceptions, lingering biases and human prejudices, of its own. Again, the question of the possibility of a “pure” science of theology may be raised. Here Torrance’s citation of A. D. Ritchie is instructive: “if the scientific man thinks he can [escape from metaphysics] he is simply repressing it.”\(^{385}\) Simply replacing one metaphysic with another will not solve the problem of the obstruction of our reasoning and our apprehension of things. Such a singularly progressive mentality has been questioned within the world of science, and is just as questionable in theology. Thus it is too simple to say that science must be topological rather than metaphysical; rather, as Calvino might insist, science—or
scientific discourse—must be aware of its *tropological* character as well; i.e., its status as “literature.”

The twin Reformed doctrines of *accommodation* and *election* uphold both sides of human knowledge: object and subject. According to Calvin, to know the Truth is to be an active participant in it, so that our activity in knowing the Truth is part of its content. But it was the other side—conformity of divine to human—that led to the kenotic christologies of the nineteenth century, and was transferred into scientific knowledge. In his Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant writes: “We must… make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.”386 Torrance replies: “while Kant sought to give firm philosophical expression to the objectivity upon which the whole of science rests, he also sought to do justice to the spontaneity and productive activity of the reason in wresting objective knowledge from nature.”387

Kant’s revolution, in Torrance’s eyes, lies in his assertion that we do not know the object except insofar “as it conforms to the power of the reason in knowing it.”388 Though this sounds like Bacon’s *activa inquisitio*, Kant placed emphasis on the *conforming of the object*—i.e., on the a priori element that allow for its knowing. Kant’s *Ding an sich* is fundamental to his understanding of scientific knowledge. It is, in a sense, a *via media* between a total lack of given reality and a reality that is “transparent”—i.e., completely knowable. The object is, in Kant’s formulation, at once opaque and hidden, and can only be known through “coercive questioning and experimental inquisition.”389 While giving pride of place to the productive powers of reason, Kant also sought to show the limitations of reason in his distinction between what reason can know (real appearance) and what it cannot (the thing in itself). This is Kant’s “Great Boundary.”
Torrance has a twofold reaction to Kant. On a purely theological level, he cannot accept Kant’s identification of the categorical imperative with the “self-legislating ego” (earlier Torrance had stated that this was merely a displacement of the Lutheran sense of the authoritative Word of God). More important for Torrance’s thesis, however, is his concern with Kant’s “sloppiness” in allowing for the Ding an sich to wither away to the point where it is discounted as a “mythological projection” of little relevance. Such a turn presages the loss of genuine objectivity, and has ramifications in both post-Kantian science and theology. Once again, for Torrance it is a matter of balance—here stated neatly in terms of the Reformation ideal of humility and the Renaissance ideal of autonomy. Torrance explains the degeneration of the Kantian synthesis by suggesting that the anthropocentrism and individualism of the Renaissance latched on to the Kantian principle of the conformity of the object of knowledge and distorted this into a form of subjective idealism, which was far from Kant’s intention, yet which is nonetheless understandable given his emphasis on “coercive inquisition.”

The author of Theological Science admits that “scientific laws are expressions of our modes of cognition as well as realities in themselves”\(^390\)—and that this twofold aspect muddies any distinctions made in the subject-object relation. He goes on to say that we cannot project our formulations of nature onto nature itself. “Rather are they to be understood as noetic constructions that reflect and point to ontic structures in nature, and as such they are both like and unlike these structures.”\(^391\) Torrance warns against abandoning the “noetic constructions,” for it is only through these that we come to “know” the “ontic structures” of nature. But if we cannot step out of our thought framework, how are we to speak meaningfully about “actual laws inhering in nature”? What does it mean to make such a conceptual distinction, only to admit it is virtually unsustainable?
Perhaps Kant’s answer can be found in the third Critique. Torrance’s noetic pointers act like symbols in the Kantian-Romantic sense. Kant distinguishes between *symbolic* and *schematic* a priori concepts: the former contain indirect, the latter direct, “exhibitions” of the concept. Symbolic hypotyposes “transfer... our reflection on an object of intuition to an entirely different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond.” Particularly significant is Kant’s next assertion:

If a mere way of presenting [something] may ever be called cognition (which I think is permissible if this cognition is a principle not for determining the object theoretically, as to what it is in itself, but for determining it practically, as to what the idea of the concept ought to become for us and for our purposive employment of it), then all our cognition of God is merely symbolic. Whoever regards it as schematic—while including in it the properties of understanding, will, etc., whose objective reality is proved only in worldly beings—falls into anthropomorphism, just as anyone who omits everything intuitive falls into deism, which allows us to cognize nothing whatsoever, not even from a practical point of view.\(^\text{392}\)

Kant’s notion of symbolic a priori concepts is suspiciously akin to Torrance’s “genuine objectivity.” It seems that Kant here will allow for nothing other than symbolic relations to God. How would Torrance react to this, given his mistrust of romanticism and of any discussion of symbolic activity? What if we were to play role of devil’s advocate/gadfly, crossing out the “n” in noetic and substituting a “p”? After all, the Greek *noetikos* comes from *noeo*, “to apprehend”—which does not immediately connote the intellect or abstraction, but rather *awareness* or *meeting*. This leads us to the question of alternative modes of knowing, besides the rational/scientific/objective. I grant that Torrance redefines these latter terms, and in quite prodigious fashion. But there are still
lines to be drawn between Torrance’s approach and others more influenced and driven by “aesthetic” concerns. Is there any place in Torrance schema for such, or is he, like Kant before him, in danger of succumbing to dogmatic rigidity, to the point where only a revolution can break the self-imposed chains of the system? In his remarks on the similarities between theological science and the other special sciences, Torrance speaks of the difference between theology in se and in nobis, where the former is the “pure science” and the latter is the “human understanding” of the substance of truth. In the formulation of Christian dogmas, he writes, we must not identify them with the “transcendent form and being” of divine Truth. This much we may readily grant (though it is difficult to conceive of what “pure science” of theological thinking may be). Torrance goes further, to deny the equally grave error of treating dogmas as “symbolic expressions of our encounter with reality.” Why this is an error is not altogether clear, though it follows necessarily from the author’s past remarks on Tillich, and relies on a particular (and, I will show, limited) conception of the meaning of “symbol.”

Torrance is quite right to note that we can never completely disentangle the two aspects of form (i.e., “systematic” and “empirical”), as our conceiving and expressing are enmeshed in the web of language. The reduction of all forms to linguistic forms is, he says, a mistake, for it assumes “that we can state in statements how statements are related to what is stated, and so reduces all relations to linguistic relations.” But to deny Tillich’s attempt to overcome the “cleavage between subject and object” through the development of an aesthetic or symbolic relation in which the conceptual distortion of reality is eliminated and wisdom (sapienta) is substituted for knowledge (scientia) is to reach a conclusion neither necessary nor warranted. Torrance notes, quite rightly, that Tillich’s turn involves an “expressionistic” notion of language which seems to deny any sort of referential relation and which bypasses the problem of logical relation. Yet this
aesthetic stratagem of Tillich, which has precedents in the work of Schleiermacher, Jakob Fries, and Rudolf Otto, not to mention the Critique of Judgment, is not necessarily a-referential. This is a gross simplification of the effects of symbols and expression.

In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer speaks at some length of the misuse of expression by the Romantics and Dilthey, who transmuted it into something more subjective and less rhetorical (i.e., “self-expression”). A proper understanding of expression and the symbol actually reveals them to be in harmony with Torrance’s own “perspicuous forms”—i.e., the working of analogues or models as “transparent mediums” of revelation. As Tillich writes:

the Spirit-determined language of theonomy does not dispense with the language which is determined by the cleavage between subject and object, so Spirit-determined cognition does not contradict the knowledge which is gained within the subject-object structure of encountering reality.

This is not a mystical flight into irrationality, but rather a recognition, as in Torrance’s own work, that all talk and knowing in theology is ultimately (over-)determined by the presence and power of the object, such that, while it may be useful, it is restricted. Yet theology is both more and less dependent upon language and expression than science. Less in that, as stated above, human language will always be limited in “speaking of” the divine; while there is less of a gap between words and the objects of scientific understanding. But also more in that theology cannot point to a prior “level” of reality (as scientific discourse can point to scientific “work”) and thus must rely on its lalia to present its logos. This is where kataphatic wariness about language must open up
to the aesthetic aspect of all literature. This is where, we might say, Barth meets Barthes and Calvin, Calvino.

Gadamer argues that the imitation in proper mimesis “has nothing whatever to do with the relation between copy and original, or indeed with any theory for which art is supposed to be an imitation of ‘nature’, that is, of that which exists in its own right.” Rather, mimetic relation involves showing or presentation of the “object,” in which the showing “points away from itself.”

We cannot show anything to the person who looks at the act of showing itself, like the dog that looks at the pointing hand. On the contrary, showing something means that the one to whom something is shown sees it correctly for himself. It is in this sense that imitation is a showing. For imitation enables us to see more than so-called reality… It is no longer just this or that thing that we can see, but it is now shown and designated as something. An act of identification and, consequently, of recognition occurs whenever we see what it is that we are being shown.

This understanding of representation is akin to what contemporary critics would call magic realism—or, in the artistic tradition, New Objectivity (*neue Sachlichkeit*).

In an article entitled “Realism and Faith,” Tillich develops the concept of “beliefful” or “self-transcending realism” (STR), and relates this “style” to the birth of *neue Sachlichkeit* out of the ashes of expressionism in Europe. Expressionism, along with Cubism and Futurism, was a necessary rebellion against the naturalistic-critical, as well as against the idealistic-conventional wing of realism, and it also went beyond the limits of the subjective-impressionistic realism from which it came. “Things were interpreted by the expressionistic painters in their cosmic setting and their immeasurable depth. Their natural forms were broken so that their spiritual significance could become
Expressionism in art was “confirmed” by developments in other realms, including science. Yet by the third decade of the new century, during the tumultuous interwar period, expressionism was challenged by a “new objectivity.” This was not a return to pre-expressionistic style, but rather a repudiation of the Romantic subjectivism of the preceding period without giving up its depth and cosmic symbolism. In short, the post-expressionistic new realism was not so concerned with the “natural” form of things as their “power of expressing the profounder levels and the universal significance of things.” Rather than turn expressionism (or the earlier realism) on its head, the new “belief-ful” realism tried to point to the spiritual meaning of the real by using its given forms.

Tillich attempts to universalize his notion of STR by insisting that it is neither a merely theoretical view of the world nor simply a practical discipline for life; rather it is a form of praxis—and one that expresses itself “in the shaping of every realm.” Essentially, STR combines two elements: 1) emphasis on the real; and 2) the transcending power of faith. Thus it maintains the tension otherwise dissolved into rationalism (or “self-limiting realism”) and mysticism (“idealism”). Reality under the eyes of STR has become something new. It is no longer merely “self-subsistent” as it once may have seemed, but has become, in Tillich’s terms, theonomous. Of course, Tillich is aware that this is not an event in nature, “although—as always in spiritual matters—words and pictures have to be used which are taken from the spatial sphere.” Most important is the fact that this is a relation or encounter of faith, in which we are grasped by: “the unapproachable holy which is the ground of our being and breaks into our existence and which judges and heals us.”

Tillich’s use of the symbol and his exposition of self-transcending realism are part of an attempt to understand theological knowledge and apprehension in terms of the
discourse of aesthetics, a program which, while clearly antithetical to Torrance’s own, clearly intrigues him. Moreover, it is an attempt which has much to say to the Torranceian program itself, if not by way of a direct critique, then in terms of a necessary nuancing—i.e., a sounding (lit., “testing of depth by dropping a weighted line”).

Theological Literature, Art, Music

What exactly is theology? Is it really, as the term literally implies: “God-talk”? Or does this more aptly refer to sermons and public addresses? Theology, the bulk of it at any rate, is the written word. As such it partakes of all the pleasures and the pitfalls of any written text, i.e., of literature. This is a crucial point, and one from which we can draw an important distinction between theology and science, a difference which makes a difference in terms of method as well as content. Science is not primarily the written description of hypotheses, but rather the work itself (whether experimental or calculational). Scientific writing certainly is literature in the broad sense, even if it is often unaware of itself as such. Theology, like literature in the strict sense (i.e., fiction) is not a representation of something more fundamental or primary—neither God, nor personal revelation nor Gefühl, nor even the revelation of Jesus Christ in scripture or sacrament. There is no prior “experimentation” or “encounter”—the encounter is in the doing (and doing here may be both the writing and the reading/reception) of theology; in the word (lalia) making the Word (logos) flesh.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer once remarked: “In every theological statement we cannot but use certain forms of thinking. Theology has these forms in common with philosophy.” T. F. Torrance would no doubt disagree with Bonhoeffer’s easy conflation, and would rather charge that theological statements have more in common
with scientific than philosophical utterances. It is my contention that both Bonhoeffer and Torrance miss what Barth (and Tillich in communion with him) realized: ultimately, theological language reflects the language of art.

It may of course be countered that art has no method to speak of, and thus is hardly a valuable paradigm for theology. But Torrance has simplified “method” to its barest minimum: an openness to the self-revelation of the truth of the Object, with correspondent openness to mediation in the process of knowledge itself by virtue of the object. Suchwise, art has as much claim to method as science or theology; and a claim more familiar to the latter because of the transformational capacity of the object—and also because of its non-corporeal presence. As Polanyi puts it:

Religion, understood as an act of worship, is an indwelling rather than an affirmation.

God cannot be observed, any more than truth or beauty can be observed. He exists in the sense that He is to be worshipped and obeyed, but not otherwise; not as a fact—any more than truth, beauty or justice exist as facts. All these, like God, are things which can be apprehended only in serving them.404

Truth, Beauty, God: All things which can be apprehended only in service; i.e., in an openness to the truth of their being.

In one of his writings on Schleiermacher, Barth speaks of the school of eighteenth-century theologians known as “orthodox rationalists,” who, in the wake of the Enlightenment, were convinced that much could be known through reason, and that even those revealed truths that were beyond reason were not necessarily contrary to reason. This school, which was in combat with the pietist spiritualists, was eventually displaced by a “new rationalism” in which the rational the non-rational were divided into separate spheres; thus establishing the Kantian Great Divide. Count Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy,
novelist, theologian, and social reformer, stands firmly within the orthodox rationalist tradition, and exemplifies the “blessed rage for order” that persists among many religious spirits to this day. Tolstoy countered the “supernatural” and “mystical” tendencies of Christianity, insisting that Christ’s message was a (or rather the) Theory of Life—and above all, that it was rational. Tolstoy, like T. F. Torrance, sought a new sense of reason which would conform to the old faith, but he never fully succeeded in establishing such on rational grounds, and remained haunted by the spectre of his arch-rival and nemesis Dostoevsky, who revelled in the paradoxes and mysteries of Christian revelation. Instructive here are the differing images of the sacred held by the two Russian novelists. Tolstoy’s image of Jesus was a Blakeian-rationalist one: Jesus as the great ethical teacher and moral sage; Dostoevsky gloried in the Suffering Servant Christ, as depicted the art of Hans Holbein and, most explicitly, the Crucifixion of Matthias Grünewald.

Not incidentally, on a third wall of Karl Barth’s study, perpendicular to the parallel portraits of Calvin and Mozart, hung a reproduction of Grünewald’s Crucifixion. This portrait was Barth’s favourite, and could be said to express, just as Mozart expressed the eternal Yeal!, the inescapable Maybe that, according to Pascal, Tillich, and Polanyi, is essential to Christian faith. “Take away doubt, sin and anguish and Christian faith turns into a caricature of itself. It becomes a set of false and largely meaningless statements, accompanied by conventional gestures and complacent moralizing. This is the forbidden endpoint of all Christian endeavours: its relapse into emptiness.”405 Here we have an image of the emptiness of certainty. The Isenheim Crucifixion is an offense, a scandal, not only to reason but also to faith itself. Clifford Green comments that this painting points to “the central theme of Barth’s theology: the God who encounters us in Jesus Christ is ‘the One who loves in freedom’.”406 Repeating Barth’s comment, “Revelation means the giving of signs,” Green suggests: “Most notably these signs and forms are human
language and speech… Like the elongated figure of John the Baptist [in Grünewald’s painting], these signs, which do not lose their human, earthly character, point beyond themselves—just as in Gadamer’s and Tillich’s “new realism.”

The connection with Dostoevsky is also evocative, as Barth had by the 1930s recognized the danger of merely “standing Schleiermacher on his head” and thus allowing renaissance rationalism in the back door. This is a real danger, because rationalism (or the style of scientism) can reside in the subtle but pervasive extirpation of linguistic meaning. Moreover, it is a danger very much present in Theological Science, despite the author’s attempt to establish a New Objectivity and a new realism on the foundations of reason and faith. Torrance’s project is by no means undermined by a subtler recognition of the way language works, and more specifically, the way literature works. One could say, in fact, that it is made stronger by such, even if the term science in the title and the text must wither away.

The Third Person of the Trinity does not get much airtime in Theological Science, but makes a rather surprising entrance near the end of Torrance’s work. “The direct and personal action of the divine Being upon through the Holy Spirit” is an inescapable part of the Christian encounter, yet, “[t]he Holy Spirit does not take us out of the subject-object relations; He does not make us ecstatic.” Torrance uses “ecstatic” in its literal sense—i.e., to “stand outside of”—but there is no doubt a double entendre here; this remark is a pre-emptory attack on the mystics or aesthetes who would disturb Torrance’s grand vision by bringing up terms like “ecstasy” and “mystery.”

For Tillich, who dwells upon the idea of ecstasy at some length in the third volume of his Systematic Theology, ecstasy is a kind of necessary escape valve from the rigidity of life’s structures, be they rational, moral or ecclesiastical. It is “another way of formulating ‘self-transcendence’… the drive toward the infinite or ‘ultimate concern’ that
is immanent to all being and process." The Spirit thrives only where structure and ecstasy are united. In addition, it is Tillich’s contention that the notion of the Holy Spirit is absolutely central to Barth’s theological project, even though it was (for Barth) an “impossible possibility,” for reasons similar to the Kantian agony over the Great Divide between God and the world. But as we have seen, perhaps this paradox is not so pronounced as Tillich suggests; perhaps the Kantian’s agony is assuaged, if not absolved, by an ecstatic-aesthetic understanding of the workings of the Holy Spirit.

Barth himself makes a rather surprising admission with regard to the Holy Spirit in his “Concluding Unscientific Postscript of Schleiermacher.” “I would like to reckon,” he says, “with the possibility of a theology of the Holy Spirit, a theology of which Schleiermacher was scarcely conscious, but which might actually have been the legitimate concern dominating even his theological activity.” This in itself is enough to give a good Barthian pause, but Barth goes even further to suggest that the Holy Spirit might exonerate not only Schleiermacher but also the pietists, enthusiasts, mystics and spiritualists who preceded him.

Could it not be that so many things which for us were said in an unacceptable way about the church and about Mary in Eastern and Western Catholicism might be vindicated to the extent that they actually intended the reality, the coming, the work of the Holy Spirit, and that on that basis they might emerge in a positive-critical light?

This incredible supposition, this seemingly impossible possibility, is, Barth quickly admits, only a “dream.” But it may be a dream worth pursuing.

Finally, by way of another concrete example of the use of art in theology or the power of art to express theological truth, one need again look no further than Karl Barth’s
study, where, on an eye-to-eye level with a portrait of Calvin, hung a portrait of Mozart. Mozart was Barth’s favourite composer—his favourite artist—and much more. He was, for Barth, one of the greatest theologians to have ever graced God’s green earth:

It is possible to give him this position because he knew something about creation in its total goodness that neither the real fathers of the church nor our Reformers, neither the orthodox nor liberals, neither the exponents of natural theology nor those heavily armed with the ‘Word of God’ and certainly not the existentialists, nor indeed any other musician before and after him either knew of can express and maintain as he did.\(^{412}\)

It seems as though Mozart and only Mozart was able to present or proclaim God’s resounding “Ja!” to correspond with Calvin and Barth’s “Nein!” But Mozart works for Barth at another level as well. In juxtaposing the three giants of classical composition, Barth suggests that whereas Bach exudes exemplary adherence to divine order and ecclesiastical structure, and Beethoven embodies personal confession or Gefühl, Mozart is the only one to successfully merge the two in a truly “free play”—a musical opening-up to the Logos. Mozart’s proclamation is, for the kerygmatic Barth, superior to Bach’s structured greatness and Beethoven’s Dionysian fury because it is a proclamation under no strictures, whether ecclesiastical or personal. The Catholic and Freemason Mozart once said (and Barth quotes him approvingly) that Protestants had their religion stuck “in their heads.” With this in mind, we might see the kerygmatic note of theology as a warning against logical or rational (or linguistic) strictures of any sort. And is it is true, as Walter Pater proclaimed, that all art aspires to the condition of music, then literature itself is, in a sense, always on-the-way to ineffability, not in a simplication of language but rather in its explosion of signification.
Chapter Eight: Remythologization

We must… retain the documentary veracity, the precision of detail, the compact and sinewy language of realism, but we must also dig down into the soul and cease trying to explain mystery in terms of our sick senses.

– Joris-Karl Huysmans, Là-bas

Euhemeros Redux

A century ago, Oscar Wilde, in an essay on “The Rise of Historical Criticism,” wrote of one reaction to the Aufklärung of the Greek Classical period (6th-4th centuries BCE). Euhemerism, says Wilde, under the auspices of a certain Euhemeros, claimed that the gods and heroes of ancient Greece were “mere ordinary mortals, whose achievements had been a good deal misrepresented.” The task of Euhemerism was “to rationalize the incredible, and to present the plausible residuum or actual truth.” Wilde’s response:

Now that under the glamour of myth and legend some substratum of historical fact may lie, is a proposition rendered extremely probable by the modern investigations into the workings of the mythopoetic spirit in post-Christian times, [and yet] to rob a mythical narrative of its kernel of supernatural elements, and to present the dry husk thus obtained as a historical fact, is, as has been well said, to mistake entirely the true method of investigation and to identify plausibility with truth.

In short, “between a poet’s deliberate creation and historical accuracy, there is a wide field of the mythopoetic faculty.” Euhemerism is thus an early, and, according to Wilde, prominent mode of demythologization, which characterized ancient thinking.
about mythology up to Augustine and Mincius Felix, who wielded it against the dying flame of paganism. Ironically, many centuries later during the European Enlightenment it was Christianity itself that was pushed to the defense, against very similar charges: “The Enlightenment, which did not want to be the Renaissance again and considered the contest between ancient and modern to have been decided, did not forgive myth its frivolities any more than it forgave Christian theology the seriousness of its dogmatism.”

The question to be raised: Does a magical or mythic/metaphoric realism, applied to religious texts and the language of religion more generally, deny the twentieth century theological program, instigated by Rudolf Bultmann, of demythologization? In this final chapter, it is my task to show that Bultmann’s project, while limited somewhat by its connection with the hegemonic existentialist philosophy and rhetoric of the day, remains a valuable method and mode of understanding the use and abuse of myth in postmodern religion, and in “post-Christian” Christianity more particularly. It is my contention that, rather than subverting demythologization, magic realism helps us towards a better understanding of Bultmann’s project, and of the place of myth, symbol, and metaphor in Western religious understanding. In *Myth, Truth and Literature*, Colin Falck laments the turn, taken by modern theology and the study (and practice) of religion more generally, away from Schleiermacher (who “opened a more aesthetic road”) and towards the religious existentialism of Kierkegaard, which begat the “internalization” and “demythologization” of religion. Falck selects Don Cupitt as a primary foil for his attacks: Cupitt's post-Kierkegaardian emphasis on the “doctrine of God” as “an encoded set of spiritual directives,” and on fundamental religious reality as “a ceaseless struggle after self-transcendence” may have some value as “a corrective to worldly possessiveness or manipulativeness,” but “to construe it as the very essence of religious awareness itself
can only be to confuse spiritual means with spiritual meanings.”418 Which is to say: “It is in the meanings of aesthetically significant [i.e., “supreme”] fictions that the essence of religion lies—as well as of course in the ways in which such meanings may be ‘applied’ to practical life.”419

**Demystification and Demythologization**

Today, in so far as this message [of God’s salvation] is set forth in mythological phraseology, it has become incredible to the man of our time, since he is convinced that this way of looking at the world is obsolete.


Before delving into the writings of Rudolf Bultmann, let us set the context of his work. Like Barth, Bonhoeffer, Heidegger, Walter Benjamin, and others, Bultmann lived and wrote in a Germany of furious tensions and political uncertainties, uncertainties that infiltrated all aspects of life, even (or especially) within the ivory towers of scholarship. The Nazi regime experimented with myths and selective cultural memories, instigating a vast program of “antidotes” to secular humanist disillusionment, and in moving, within a few short years (as Heinrich Heine had foreseen), from book-burning to genocide, perpetuated the greatest “forgetting of being” of the modern age.

Bultmann, like Nietzsche before him, was suspicious of cosmologies; he realized that Christianity, in his day, was holding on to forms that were no longer “tasteful,” no longer relevant to modern humans, and sought, by “demythologizing,” to re-interpret the Christian faith for a modern era. Bultmann put into question what, in his day, was the questionable use/abuse of myths, history, and symbols in the name of politics, religion,
and philosophy. Much has changed since Bultmann’s era, and his project of
demythologization rings somewhat false in our postmodern ears, as perhaps another facile
attempt at Wilde’s Euhemerism: “modernizing” the primitive world of myth and symbol
and clearing the decks for a rational, ethical, humanist faith.

But this was never Bultmann’s intent; and his work, to this day, has relevance for
a Christian epistemology and aesthetics of reception. It was in 1941, at the highpoint of
Nazi success, that Bultmann published his “Neues Testament und Mythologie” in a
volume entitled *Revelation and the Event of Redemption*. This was a issue of great
practical concern for Bultmann, involving not only the care of souls but the contact
between Christianity and culture; and, moreover, the responsibility of Christian faith in
relation to the world at large.\textsuperscript{420} Although he steadfastly rejected cosmological visions,
Bultmann sought a new (existential) cosmology—a new Christian *Weltbild* (or
*Weltbilder*), not as a totalizing world-view (*Weltanschauung*) but rather as a lens, a filter,
a frame with which to come to terms with one’s existence and the impinging (religious)
reality—as meeting (Buber) and response (Rosenzweig). For Bultmann, the purpose of
myth is not to provide an objective picture of the world but to give expression to “man’s
understanding of his own being in the world.” It is in myth that human beings confront
the “uncanny” [*unheimlich*] powers which are at once the “source” and “limit” of the
known and tangible reality.\textsuperscript{421}

Colin Falck sees in demythologization the return an iconoclastic (i.e., anti-
aesthetic) puritanism, done up in existentialist dress; a program which, for all its use
against the secularizing tendencies of post-Schleiermachian Liberal Theology, does
injustice to the mythopoetic roots of religion, roots which cannot be exhumed without
doing grave damage to religion’s truth. Bultmann, in Falck’s eyes, instigated “a
renunciation not merely of worldly desires or possessions but also of the greater part of
worldly experience itself—in a way which might precisely help to equip us for living in an actual (as opposed to merely a metaphorical) desert landscape.” This is demythologization as *de-allegorization*: the search for some sort of extractable core or essence—one that is pristine yet separately expressible and usually moral—beyond or behind the texts and words of religious utterance. But this is to misread the true nature of myth, which, as I have tried to show, is akin to the Romantic Symbol, metaphor, and melody, and not a form of allegory to be interpreted or explained away. Falck posits a choice facing religionists, both theologians and lay believers: either religious faith must a) *de-mystify* itself completely, and be reborn as ethics (a trend that has been going on in the mainline churches for some time now); or b) abandon all claims to a descriptive relationship vis-à-vis reality, re-envisioning itself in terms of a symbolic-revelatory relationship with reality instead. Falck’s own leanings are clear; given, he concludes, the ineradicable transcendence in our lives, we must choose door number two.

Against demythologization Falck posits a *remythologization* of our spiritual landscape, whereby we might well discover, with the help of anthropology, history, and psychology, exactly “which myths do in fact have a hold on our imagination.” Yet Falck’s proposed work on myth does myth injustice. While it is true that “the great absolute myths” may have caused much harm by way of their dogmatic claims and univocal interpretations, this could be the result of a *misreading* of myth and symbol, rather than something inherent in the so-called “mythic mode.” Hans Blumenberg raises some important questions that we can and should ask of Falck:

Does it facilitate the sense of truth if one expects to possess only a little truth? Is conceptual thought [der Begriff] equal to the task of rooting out the stocks of images, or is it only the monopoly of the management of images that must be attacked, and the
indestructible need—‘position’ reoccupied by something else, by humanized myth? Or is every offer of myth finally drawn into the vortex of the vague needs of a self-definition that was conceived at some time, and unhesitatingly placed in the service of the corresponding renunciations?  

The structural and figurative capacity of myth is its foremost critical component. A magic or mythic realist hermeneutic provides a counter-structure or counter-narrative to the solidified structures of the (mimetic and designative) realism that remains the hegemonic mode of understanding and interpreting—i.e., reading—the world. Demythologization may in fact be a way of pushing enshrined myths—including the myth of the given, central to mimetic realism—off the pedestals of dogma without wiping away the mythological substrate; a means of establishing new patterns of meaning, of retrieving myths and allowing their kairotic and transfigurative aspects to dislodge our conceptions of history, time, and present/ce.

Bultmann employs a classic Nietzschean (with Christianity) or Marxian (with capitalism) trick—he turns myth against itself: the “special aim” of myth, which is “to speak of a transcendent power to which the world and man alike are subject” is impeded and clouded, blurred by the “character and the imagery it uses.” In other words, there is a form and content within myth itself—the former being the dusty jacket (or many-coloured cloak, depending on your perspective) that hides, and at the same time lures, the truth of myth. It is not myth itself that hides a non-mythical (i.e., “real”) truth. Rather, the problem is that certain myths, if they are disconnected from communal understanding, serve as inadequate devices of structuration. Granted, for Bultmann there does exist an existential core to the Christian faith, but since this core is, in terms of logic and rationality, a “fiction,” a recognition of such does not undermine the connection of demythologization and magic realism, which offers us “the image of something …
minutely formed, opposing it to our eternally fragmented and ragged lives as an archetype of integral structuring, down to the smallest detail.\textsuperscript{427}

Bultmann utilized the distinction in German between \textit{Historie} and \textit{Geschichte}, which can be translated, with some loss, into English as “history” and “story”—or, as George Grant suggests, the “study of history” and “that particular realm of being, historical existence.”\textsuperscript{428} For Bultmann, these two terms have particular qualitative overtones: \textit{historisch} describes the things that merely happen and lie buried in the past, while \textit{geschichtlich} refers to that which both happens and is “significant” or \textit{worthy of questioning}.\textsuperscript{429} Therefore, the \textit{historisch} is, in the sense of the English slang, “history,” while the \textit{geschichtlich} is eternally present or \textit{contemporaneous}. Bultmann’s argument, in short, is that, while Christian faith is, as the phrase has it, a mystery wrapped in an enigma, it is not above or beyond reason, and its representation is not \textit{non}-realistic; rather its reality and its reason are only perceivable and understood in terms of the call of God: the \textit{kerygma}.\textsuperscript{430}

The importance of this particular term for Bultmann can hardly be overstated. \textit{Kerygma} is a Greek term whose simple meaning of “communication” belies its imperative and notificatory element—\textit{kerygma} connotes a \textit{communiqué}. As such, it acts in similar fashion with the Romantic Symbol, as \textit{deictic}, or \textit{elenctic} signification—i.e., fully expressive in being both discursive and affective. For Bultmann \textit{kerygma} is not epiphanic, a pure event or pure presence. It is nothing less an expression of the fundamental theological principle “that God’s word or revelation never appears in a pure or direct form.”\textsuperscript{431} Moreover, and this is the crux for our discussion: “We can know such a word or revelation \textit{only} through the mediation of human language, and that language, in turn, is always shaped by the thought forms and imagery of a particular culture.”\textsuperscript{432}—
including, it would seem, a particular culture’s understanding of myth, truth, and representation.

In modern times, Bultmann argues in his writings, the *kerygma* is somewhat muffled, if not entirely drowned out, by an obsolete mythology; but this does not mean that we must strip the Christian religion of all “myth,” even if such were possible. What is the problem with our inherited mythology? Not its ambiguity, nor its plenitude, but rather the opposite—its “objectifying” aspect. Indeed, Bultmann once admitted that by demythologization what he really meant was “de-objectification”—i.e., the attempt to eliminate the univocal and static pictures which our myths, *vis-à-vis* their traditional interpretation, have engrained in our psyches. As a particular way of thinking about the world—what Ernst Cassirer calls “mythological consciousness”—mythology frequently aspires to science, and offers us pseudo-scientific explanations of the events of history. One hears in this judgment a distinct echo of I. A. Richards’s infamous remark about the “pseudo-statements” of poetry. The equivalence is significant: both interpretations miss the magic realist capabilities of figuration—i.e., understanding myth and the poetic word as metaphor and symbol. These are neither second-rate attempts at designation nor purely affective or emotive. In short, Bultmann’s failure was not in the intent of his program, but in his misunderstanding of myth and religious representation. He criticizes mythology for what is precisely its most useful feature, *vis-à-vis* religious expression: the confusion of the earthly with the spiritual. If this confusion, according to incarnationalist Christians or Vaishnavite Hindus, is not beneath God or the Vishnu, why should it be beneath humanity?

Rethinking the Coy “de”
Christ has been demythified and secularized into a very human Jesus while institutional Christianity is regarded with suspicious hostility.

– Goethe

Bultmann, like Kierkegaard and Pascal before him, sought to rid institutional, cultural Christianity of its impurities, and did so by discoursing upon the existential aspect of faith over the doctrinal or mythical aspects. Perhaps, as Giovanni Miegge suggests, it is only the *frankness* of Bultmann that is new; perhaps we should accept his claim to be fulfilling the work of Luther. On the face of things, given his existential focus (I avoid, with Bultmann himself, the term “existentialism”), Luther is truly a forebear to *Entmythologisierung*. Yet the connection, and the disparity, as I see it, goes even further than this. Luther’s mystical sensibility, however much it may have hampered his ability to confront the dawning modern world, opened him up to a mode of understanding, a style of knowing, that baffled many of his peers—and which may very well have baffled Bultmann in his most anti-mystical moments. Luther’s phrase “it stands written” (*Es steht geschrieben*)—used frequently in his translation of the New Testament as a variation on the biblical phrase “it is written”—applies to a particular kind of speech, and speech-reception, that Gadamer calls a “pledge” (*Zusage*). A pledge, however, “is more than just a communication: it is rather a binding word that presupposes mutual validity”\(^{434}\); and as such it is somewhat different from a “proclamation” (*Ansage*), which is how *kerygma* is usually understood.

It is just this mystical element, as it emerges in the sense of the pledge of Gadamer’s “privileged texts”—which we might also call “supreme fictions”—that corrects demythologization. The magic realist aesthetic, prefigured in the birth of the novel in the century after Luther, and remaining an undercurrent, a sublated post-
Romantic mysticism, as it were, gives a different look to the project of Bultmann. Bultmann himself touches upon this when he speaks of love. To speak of love—and to speak of God or friendship—is, he suggests, not the same as the *attunement* of beings—which is greater than mere “saying.” But Bultmann extends this disjunction so far that it begins to collapse on itself. Love and faith, it seems, are not entirely ineffable: “one cannot speak *about* love at all *unless* the speaking about it is itself an act of love.”

Speech as creative-response, as, to use Searle’s term “performative utterance,” or perhaps, to employ once again the term we have been using, *attunement*, may have more worth than Bultmann is willing to allow, despite his caveat. Again, Bultmann acknowledges, but ultimately underestimates the transfigurative capacity of speech, image, and melody.

A way to move towards this reinterpretation is to retranslate the prefix “de”, that nasty English negative, into the German *Ent–*, which can mean the more subtle “dis,” or even, by adding an “e” (*Ent(e)*): duck, hoax, false report, or decoy. *Ent(e)*–mythologization is not a giving way to rationalism, empiricism, or objectivity, but a re-examination of symbols and myths, away from a neo-Platonic and essentialist to a more constructivist and existential conception of understanding and reality. *De*-mythologization is actually not a proper name for this process: such implies the denial of mythology in favor of something else, such as history, authenticity or truth. Yet, as Oscar Cullmann has argued against Bultmann, the latter’s concession of the oneness of the historical events of Jesus of Nazareth and the nonhistorical accounts of primal beginnings and eschatological end-times implies, not that Christianity possesses no historical sense, but that it contains “a positive theological [or, one might say, aesthetic] outlook which transcends the contrast between history and myth.”

History in the New Testament is not simply history, but *Geschichte*: i.e., history viewed from the prophetic or oracular point-of-view. And myth
is always to be related to the historical process of redemptive or kairotic time. In short, prophecy is the catalyst that subsumes myth and history. The grotesque reality of particular events works with the larger mythical structure of reality, and these are connected by prophecy, which is, in a strong sense, kairotic speech.

*Ent(e)-mythologisierung*, reconceived as both de- and re-mythologization, points toward a mythic understanding of reality, which is itself, in our fractured postmodern and post-colonial worlds, largely *mythical*. It also hints at a more realistic understanding of myth and symbolism, falling neither into the interpretation of myth and symbol as second-order forms of designation/mimesis, nor into the other extreme of denying the discursive and political impact of mythical stories, texts, and ideas. *Entmythologisierung* can act as a disruption of the standard sense of myth, symbol, illusion, truth, meaning; a project of accepting the lure of language, as conceived expressively, in religious and poetic discourse, in order to question the reality of the “lure” in terms of a single source and/or voice. Paraphrasing Derrida, it is truly an attempt to “think the decoy;” not only the decoy of “myth” but also of the “awakening” from myth—the decoy, that is, of *disillusion*. (For to think the *decoy* also means to rethink the coy “de” in deconstruction.)

The term demythologization, it might be argued, could just as well be dropped, as having outlived its usefulness. Yet there is unarguable power in the appropriation of terms that have been used either derisively or as labels for a package of ideas no longer widely accepted, if subliminally acknowledged. The reconceptualization of powerful terms can perhaps channel that power into other (even contrary) directions. And, as is the case here, appropriation of terms is not always a complete reversal, but an opening up of possible alternatives latent—or misremembered—within concepts. Demythologization does not mean exposing myths as false history, as veils of a naked concept that lies behind, one that can and must be sought. Rather it must mean a questioning of the
historical effects—*the use and abuse of particular myths and metaphors*—and the concepts into which these have become solidified, in our times; and a reweaving of these, a re-distillation of concepts into metaphors, without necessarily privileging the latter over the former. In short, a re-creation of reality out of the myths and metaphors embedded and peripheral to our cultural and religious traditions. This is nothing less than a new version of reality; a religious aesthetics that is not betrayed by the decoys of realism or the disillusion of anti-realism, but is instead lured by the temptations of melody, metaphor, and myth.
Conclusion

Waking as well as sleeping, our response to the world is essentially imaginative: that is, picture-making. We live in our pictures, our ideas. I mean this literally. We first construct pictures of the world and then we step inside the frames. We come to equate the picture with the world, so that, in certain circumstances, we will even go to war because we find someone else’s pictures less pleasing than our own.

– Salman Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands*

The War Over the Nature of Reality: Imagination vs. Imagoguery

A recurring theme of this book has been my attempt to underscore the significance of a theory of representation and understanding to ethics and religious faith. Not exactly “epistemology,” and certainly not “ontology,” a theory of understanding borrows as much from aesthetics and poetics as from philosophy or theology. It has been my contention, developed in chapter one with respect to the formative literary and critical ideas of our modern age, that there is much to be gained in exhuming early (if not originary) instances of particular ideas, such as those of Romanticism, which have been either neglected, buried under misreadings and emendations, or absorbed into our cultural and intellectual atmosphere so as to be virtually invisible.

In his *Myth, Truth and Literature*, Colin Falck takes up the sword of Romanticism against the so-called poststructuralists of our times. In doing so, he provides a necessary counterweight to this paradigm of interpretation and criticism, once radical but of late become almost conventional. Yet Falck’s blade turns out to be double-edged, and he is blinded, in his rage against the post-Saussurean machine, to the failings of Romantic and neo-Romantic visions of the world—particularly the Faustian tendency of a Romanticism
negligent of its realistic face. I argue, contra Falck, that there might be a tertium via, a third door between these two options he sets forth (Romanticism or poststructuralism); and that this third option has its roots in the Romantic aesthetic of the Symbol, in the expressive theory of language, and even, to some degree, in the twentieth century theological work of Thomas Torrance and Rudolf Bultmann. When Falck dismisses religious faith, except where it is virtually identical with poetic affect, he neglects the propinquitous element of religion—its confusion of earthly and the terrestrial—and the transformative power latent in this tension. Religion, in terms of representation, calls for a magic or mythic reading; one that steers clear of either the purely referential or the purely epiphanic/ineffable. It is precisely the mythical or mythological element in religious faith that sustains its claims to description at the same time as being symbolic/revelatory.

The War over the Nature of Reality is essentially a battle over the status of the Image. It is a renewal of submerged iconoclastic controversies that once beleaguered the Occidental landscape. Erasmus, the first true “European,” set down the gauntlet against the already encroaching rationalists—those who were to burn Don Quixote’s library in order to wake him from his “mad” slumber—by warning that “[h]e who takes the imagery out of life deprives it of its highest pleasure… we often discern more in images than we conceive from the written word.” Though at all times a dedicated Christian, Erasmus was unwilling to let the imminent crackdowns in religious observance threaten the image-making element—the aesthetic—of his faith. It was, and is, much more than a question of saving a few paintings from the bonfires of Cromwellians or Inquisitors. “Through images we seek to comprehend our world,” says Rushdie; and Hegel: “Indeed, far from mere appearances being purely illusory, the forms of art comprise more reality and truth than the phenomenal existences of the real world.” Faith has always utilized imagery and symbolism in order to disclose itself, as well as to maintain its liminal
aspect. As G. K. Chesterton would have it, religion is “perpetual revolution”—and its critical capacity is fixed in this tension between what happened, and what should, may have, or will happen, under the transfigurative power of a particular event or call.

Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht understood that “realism” is not really an aesthetic concept—i.e., a set of rules to write, paint, or sculpt by. Conceived as such, it becomes mimetic naturalism (which John Berger calls “a thoughtless, superficial goggling at appearances”), and thus a beast of quite a different sort, easily susceptible to dogma and socio-political control. Perhaps the gravest problem associated with realism-as-naturalism is the fact that, as such, images lose their explosive and symbolic aspects, and become purely visual—i.e., static and univocal. (Rushdie warns us that as well as being tools for understanding our world, “through images we sometimes seek to subjugate and dominate others.”) This is the basis of what I call imagoguery: the use of images (or myths, or symbols) in a dogmatic fashion, as ineluctably fused with an atemporal (and universal) singularity of presence, in order to compel obedience or submission, even if in the more subtle form of controlling the imagination by way of a dominant theory of understanding. “Premodern people,” Walter Truett Anderson notes, “knew there was a profound connection between a word and its referent. That was what made magic possible.” Moreover, “visual symbols had the same kind of power. That was what made idolatry possible.” The trick, whether for “pre” or “post”-moderns, is (with apologies to Niebuhr) having the grace or the ability tell the one from the other.

John Berger posits an alternative form of realism, similar to the one I have attempted to limn in the preceding chapters: realism as an attempt to respond as fully as possible to the circumstances of the world at the present time. Realism, in this sense, is a concerted effort to manifest presence—but, given the often fractured and fragmented reality we encounter daily, it is perhaps the task of a full or human realism to reveal not
congruency and synchrony but rather diachrony, dissolution, non-contemporaneity—and always with an acknowledgment of the Romantic-structuralist ethos of *bricolage* and refunctionalization. For “picture-making, imagining, can also be a process of celebration, even of liberation. New images can chase out the old.” But this is true only if we recognize that imaging and imagining are fluid categories. For though “[i]t can now be admitted that words are not pictures, that words behave differently from things… it might be argued that we now study the secret lives of words as though they were dreams, and restore to our theories of communication the essential Romantic magic.”

**The Lure of Disillusion: Hermes, Son of Maya**

In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic faculties; something never before experienced struggles for utterance—annihilation of the veil of *maya*, oneness as the soul of the race and of nature itself.

Against ‘meaninglessness’ on the one hand, against moral value judgments on the other…

– Friedrich Nietzsche

Above I referred to Erasmus as the “first European” thinker. I have borrowed the title of this book, *The Lure of Disillusion*, from a man who has been called the “last European thinker”: E. M. Cioran. Cioran’s *bon mot* is manifest with allusion, and encompasses well the argument of the present study. Most importantly, this phrase alerts us to the temptation towards despair that is rather prevalent in academe (if not popular culture) as we enter the third millennium of the Common Era. Disillusion may be the result of many
things, but it quite certainly is connected with the disruption, in the past several centuries, of religion (and myth) from reality (whether by such is meant the world of reason and “common sense” or the epirical world of everyday personal and social existence).

A parallel can be drawn between the radical disinvestment of language and poetics after Mallarmé—who effectively made the break between poetic language and the world—and the similar dissociation perpetrated by sundry god and myth-killers of the past century and a half. This break, in much of Symbolist and Modernist poetry, became the cause for despair, decadence and nihilism; but it also, by its very decisiveness, cleared the path for new deviations and insinuations, culled out of the broken mirrors and slashed cords. As George Steiner argues regarding the Mallarméan revolution, it is only by way of such total disinvestment that the “magical energies” of words can be restored—waking within them “the lost potential for benediction or anathema, for incantation and discovery.” In short: “Only so radical a break of what was a philosophically mendacious and utilitarian contract can recuperate for human discourse the ‘aura’, the unlimited creativity of metaphor which is inherent in the origins of all speech.” Perhaps the same can be said for religion and its break with reality.

Perhaps we should rethink our commitment to disillusionment. In doing so, we might re-examine the entire category of illusion and falsity, vis-à-vis religious faith, looking to the study of illusion in art and aesthetics. Seventy years ago, following on the heels of nineteenth-century deicides Feuerbach and Marx, Freud called religion, Christianity more particularly, an “illusion” without a future among reasonable modern human beings. Illusions, says the father of psychoanalysis, are not quite errors but rather, being derived from our wishes, serve to mutate reality through the lens of desire. Whereas a “delusion” involves a blatant opposition to reality, illusions may in fact be possibilities,
though they remain, for Freud, decisively on the side of the unlikely (the Resurrection is his example of an illusion on the far side of unlikelihood).

Whatever the status of illusion for science, things are quite different when it comes to the arts, where:

The function of ... illusion is not ‘make-believe’ as many philosophers and psychologists assume, but the very opposite, disengagement from belief—[ ...]he knowledge that what is before us has no practical significance in the world is what enables us to give attention [Sorge] to its appearance [Schein] as such” (Langer, 1953, p. 49).

Illusion is part of all human thinking and expression—thus illusion has important place within cognition. Thinking, according to Gilles Deleuze, “requires the release of a phantasm in the mime that produces it at a single stroke; it makes the event indefinite so that it repeats itself as a singular universal.” And this idea is not merely some postmodernist fancy; it has been stated in varying fashion by Aristotle, Hegel, and Flaubert, the last of whom proclaimed that he believed in the eternity of one thing only: “of illusion ... which is the real truth [la vraie vérité]. All the others are merely relative.” Freudian illusions are ultimately fictions—i.e., metaphorical or mythical “statements” that perform as models to be acted upon as “factum” in spite of their possible falsity—in order, according to Suzanne Langer’s Schillerian addendum, to disconnect or displace content in a human direction. Schiller distinguishes between the “logical illusion” that can be “delusion” (i.e., furnish us with “false” information) and “aesthetic illusion,” which, being metaphorical and fluid, lays no claims to either truth or falsity. In a telling statement, Freud asserts that it is “merely illusion” (that is, not “delusion”) to expect anything from religious experience, since such can give us “nothing
but particulars […] never information about the questions that are so lightly answered by the doctrines of religion." As the Romantics have shown us, however, it may be in these “particulars” that the doctrines of religion can be more fully glimpsed. God in the details.

Whether this rethinking of illusion will cure our disillusionment is, at this point, a questionable proposition. However, it might do us well to note that, besides the fact that the illusory nature of religious faith, in terms of mimesis, explanation, and designation, can be a liberating aspect of faith, the lure towards disillusionment is merely the flipside of the same realist coin. As Stanley Cavell would have it: “the pretense that there is a grand metaphysical solution to all of our problems and sceptical or relativistic or nihilistic escape are symptoms of the same disease,” namely: the inability to accept the world and other people “without the guarantees.” Indeed, “[s]ometimes illusion is the midwife of reality, and paralysis from the fear of illusion may mean that reality will forever escape us.” Take, for instance, the great tragedy that is the final disillusionment of Don Quixote, who wakes from his chivalric dream a battered and spent old man; no longer Don Quixote de La Mancha but Alonso Quixano the Good, destined to die quietly in his bed, a “good Christian,” denouncing his mad chivalric misadventures. Whatever his follies, the Hidalgo (along with Russian writer Iurii Olesha) warns us that our enemies don’t always turn out to be windmills. Occasionally what we would very much like to take for a windmill will turn out to be an enemy after all—and that our illusioned glance is, in some cases, actually the more propitious one. If being alienated is part of our inescapable contemporary personae, the “solution” lies in learning “to live with both alienation and acknowledgment.”

Maya is an ancient Sanskrit term meaning “illusion,” and one that plays a significant role in Hinduism (and to a lesser degree in Buddhism), denoting the “veil” that
hangs before our limited mortal eyes and prevents us from seeing reality or the divine facie ad faciem. As such we mistake the illusion, our world-(or word)-pictures, for reality itself. But, if we may be permitted a bit of free cultural borrowing for the purposes of rhetoric, the Western pantheon also has a Maia, the Greek (and Roman) goddess of nature, growth, and ability. Perhaps these two are the same deity, transmuted into univocal remnants of a once-splendid pluriform nature. The Indologist Hiriyanna notes that, indeed, maya may have a positive connotation, “in the sense that it gives rise to a misapprehension, making us see the manifold world where there is Brahman and only Brahman.” Whatever the case, connecting the Asian maya with the Western Maia, we may come to see in illusion, not a distortion or cover, but a refraction that alters our standard sense of vision and understanding. Maia, after all, gave birth to a son by Zeus, and called him Hermes—the patron saint of hermeneutics and interpretation.

Ernst Cassirer, perhaps the foremost name in the twentieth-century study of myth, developed a theory of the so-called “mythic consciousness” that determines the form of language and the whole structure of reality in which a people dwell. As time passes, the mythic mode comes to be supported by the very language it has formed and “the progressive articulation and sharpening of the supreme instrument ultimately breaks the mythic mold.” A new mode of thought, the “scientific consciousness” supersedes the mythic, to a greater or lesser extent, in the “common sense” of a cultural group. Along with Owen Barfield (Falck’s mentor), Cassirer’s work was instrumental in challenging Max Müller’s theory that myth is a “disease of language.” Yet Barfield and Cassirer fall into a trap, even as they “rescue” myth from the designative tradition of Locke and Müller. For it is an error to think that all myths do is hint, vaguely, at something beyond or behind the veil of illusion; and that, as such, the sharpening of language works against the vague mysticism of myth and symbol. To assume that myths only have significance in
a culture where the mythological consciousness is hegemonic is to underestimate the power of myth, metaphor and symbol—of fiction and figuration—to shape our world, even (or especially) in so-called “scientific” times.

What these interpreters, with Colin Falck, miss, is the structuring as well as the cognitive function of myths: myths are not just fancy tales, they are also—and as I have suggested, mainly—interpretive tools, allowing for the distillation or condensation of the shards of the broken mirror of human history; converting the “vast multiplicity of its connections” into “images easy to comprehend.” Myths, pace those intent on “demythologization” in the conventional sense, are not so much flawed descriptions of reality as alternative responses to reality, responses based on certain (usually communal) principles and purposes, which act to transform all who participate in the myth. In Eliot’s Waste Land, it is not the narrative content of the myth that is essential, but rather its capacity for symbolic condensation: “Myth’s task is not to put an end to the futility and anarchy that is contemporary history, but to give them ‘a shape and significance’.” This is to create, in short, a perceptual or semblance of order, not a real (dogmatic, univocal) order or presence. Myth is frame for history; at its best a counter-frame to the unendliche Melodie of chronatic time. Myth tames polyphony, without destroying, through objectification, the chorus of events.

As such, myth becomes a sort of worldly corrective that works upon our vision, individual as well as collective, of the world around us. Demythologization, conceived in the (David) Straussian sense of the abandonment of myth as a mode of understanding and expression the variegations of reality, is the foremost result of the Lure of Disillusion, which, even as it proclaims the end-times, revels in its sense of comfortable disinheritance. Demythologization, reconceived according to Bultmann’s de-objectifying imperative, his sense of the transfigurative kerygma, and addended by a Lutheran-
Romantic sense of “realism,” serves as a formidable tool for *bricolage*—for rebuilding or, perhaps, re-habituating ourselves to the political, cultural and religious climate. As such it parallels Hans Blumenberg’s own project, his work on myth, which, in the process of “making myth manifest,” may involve the reduction of credibility in the veracity or accuracy of myth. Most importantly: “What pushes myth along is not the effort of explanation but the relation to a scenario.”

It is not so much a *remythologization* that is required, in terms of the creation or appropriation of myths, but rather a *recosmologization*, which was the *Leitmotif* of post-Romantic Modernism: “the attempt by modern man to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves at home in it.”

Postmodernists like to speak of the floating signifier, as if symbols, metaphors, and myths, like (allegorical) signs, can float freely—like dandelion seeds in the wind—without and connection at all with the “signified” to which they point, or once pointed. It is true, and it has always been true, that is every sign and symbol there is “an oscillation between a fairly well-defined semantic core and a vague, jagged periphery.” Yet the postmodern reaction to the realist vacuum, the denial of any oscillating wind, and the resulting one-sided concentration on the openness of the sign, redresses the balance with a hurricane, destroying any sort of representation, even the *presentation* of the symbol as semblance, and the myth as structural critique.

Home-making can never be definitive or settled, for all that is solid, as Marx well knew, will melt into air, especially in our fluid postmodern situation, where, as the public expands, it shatters into a Babel of incommensurable private languages, and “the idea of modernity, conceived in numerous fragmentary ways, loses much of its vividness, resonance and depth, and loses its capacity to organize or give meaning to people’s lives.” Chesterton once referred to “the main problem of philosophers”—the apparent
irreconcilability of adventure and comfort—as the problem of welcome and wonder. “How,” asks GKC, “can we contrive to be at once astonished at the world [i.e., naïve] and at home in it [i.e., critical]? His answer? “That mixture of the familiar and the unfamiliar which Christendom has rightly named romance.” Home-making requires some sense of (re-)presentation, even if such is non-mimetic—or magical. “It is not that we are connoisseurs of chaos, but that we are surrounded by it, and equipped for coexistence with it only by our fictive powers.” As if this were not enough.
Magical thinking does not allow for basic conceptual distinctions between things and persons, inanimate and animate; between objects that can be manipulated and agents to whom we ascribe actions and linguistic utterances. Only demythologization dispels this enchantment, which appears to us to be a confusion between nature and culture.

– Jürgen Habermas, “The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment”

Unless—the world being a perpetual flux of things—appearance on the contrary were to be all that is truest, and illusion the one true reality.

– Satan, in Flaubert’s *Temptations of Saint Antony*
Notes


2 Ibid., p. 59.


5 “Saussurean theory has given us a suitable object of study only by giving us an object of study which is incoherently abstracted from the nature of language as a living process and which is therefore without any real philosophical or human significance”; like logic, philosophy becomes “an artificial or dead object” (Falck, 1994, p. 10).

6 In *Renewing Philosophy*, Putnam gives some credit to Derrida, or at least to his good intentions: “Derrida, I repeat, is not an extremist. His own political pronouncements are, in my view, generally admirable.” And yet—“the philosophical irresponsibility of one decade can become the real world political tragedy of a few decades later. And deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility” (Putnam, 1992, p. 133).


9 Ibid., p. 248.

10 Ibid., p. 247.


12 Ibid., p. 187.

13 Goethe, 1893, p. 12.

14 *COJ* §9, A.K. 217.

15 Ibid.

16 *GM* III.VI.

18 COJ §59, A.K. 352.

19 COJ Intro. §4, A. K. 179.

20 Goethe, 1893, p. 121.

21 Coleridge, 1839, p. 437.

22 Ibid.


25 Coleridge, 1839, p. 436.


27 Ibid.

28 Northrop Frye, like Bloom and Kermode, but contra Abrams, considers Romanticism “unfinished.”

"The Romantic movement in English literature seems to me now to be a small part of one of the most decisive changes in the history of culture, so decisive as to make everything that has been written since post-Romantic, including, of course, everything that is regarded by its producers as anti-Romantic [i.e., Modernism, Futurism, Surrealism]” (Frye, 1963, p. 3).


30 Blumenberg, 1982, p. 112.

31 Suzanne K. Langer, in Feeling and Form (1953), provides a detailed review of the manifold meanings of “symbol” for contemporary critics. For Langer herself, a symbol is “any device whereby we are enabled to make an abstraction” (x)—an interesting divergence from the standard Romantic vision of the symbol as “concrete” particularity versus the “abstraction” of allegory. However, it does reflect the “semblance” or “artifice” of the Symbol as per Schiller (and Bely).

32 Of course, Schleiermacher, Blake, and to some extent Schelling, were also caught between “religion” and “poetry”—but the former, by the time of his Glaubenslehre (1822), had reneged much of the Romanticism of his Speeches to the Cultured Despisers (1800), and Blake and Schelling frequently
drifted well beyond the pale of orthodoxy, and thus were not, as Coleridge was, pressured to create a meeting-place for religion and poetry.

33 Coleridge, 1839, p. 438.


35 Falck, 1994, p. 34.

36 The second edition of *Myth, Truth and Literature* (1994) includes an Appendix on Romantic poetics, where Falck extrapolates the roots of his own ideas. In the “Preface” to this second edition, Falck gleefully relates the “collapse” of Anglo-American literary poststructuralism shortly after the original publication of his book in 1989, due, he admits, not so much to his own work, as its own internal contradictions, i.e., “its inability to appeal to any but the most aesthetically insensitive and theoretically obsessed of readers” (p. xi).

37 Falck, 1994, p. xv. It is important to note, however, that Falck does not insist on a conflation of literature, religion and philosophy (he cites Coleridge’s maxim: “I hope philosophy and poetry will not neutralise each other”; Falck, 1994, p. xv). Rather, he sees them as supplementary if distinct modes that can be understood in similar and related ways—and as such may jointly and equally contribute to the “creation of values” by functioning as “tools for liberation.” Yet it is clear that for Falck poetry is, ultimately, the final arbiter of values.

38 Ibid., p. xii.

39 Ibid., p. xi. This phrase “at last once again move forward”—wondrously encapsulates the beauty, somehow both vacuous and profound, of Romantic theorizing at its best (or worst): the invocation of a lost ideality of origins as a spur to future “success.”

40 Falck, 1994, p. xvi.


42 See Harold Bloom’s *Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the Present* (1989).

43 Cf. Keats’s concept of “negative capability”: i.e., “when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact or reason.” As G. K. Chesterton adds, only madmen and materialists are sure of themselves (*Orthodoxy*). According to Falck, this submissive aspect contributes to the darker side of Romanticism, and given the horrors of mytho-political
Romanticism (i.e., Nazism, fascism) this is evident. But I wonder whether the other side, the “lighter” side, cannot be just as dark—Faustian (non-tragic) hubris is an evil that the modern world (and earth) knows all too well.

44 Falck, 1994, p. 16.

45 Goethe, DW III, 11.

46 In *The Double Flame: Love and Eroticism* (1995), Octavio Paz dwells upon this at some length, making note that though such a theory has a long pedigree, stretching back to the Greeks, it has recently been strengthened by findings in neurological science (p. 237). See also Edelman, *Bright Air, Bright Fire, On the Matter of the Mind* (1993), and the works of Nelson Goodman, whose constructivist philosophy is developed in *Ways of Worldmaking* and *Of Mind and Other Matters*.


49 Ibid., p. 239.


51 Ibid., p. 246. The connections I draw here also find voice in the seminal fictive philosophical tome of the 1970s—Robert M. Pirsig’s *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (1974)—an acknowledged spur for the work of Colin Falck (see his final acknowledgment, p. 170, n. 43).

52 Santayana, 1955, p. 159.

53 *AE* XXI & XXII.

54 Herbert Read, the foremost English expositor of Surrealism, suggests that it was this movement that resolved the “conflict” between Romanticism and classicism by temporizing the classical impetus (Read, 1936, pp. 17–91). Walter Benjamin disagrees: “Romanticism [was] the last movement that once more saved tradition” (Benjamin, 1969, p. 39).


56 In *Imaginary Homelands* (1991), Rushdie speaks of his own attempts to “inform” reality by way of the promulgation of “imaginative truth[s]”—which, he admits, along with Coleridge, is a risky venture, “simultaneously honourable and suspect” (pp. 10–11), given, one assumes, the misuse of myth and history by totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. The procedure Rushdie is describing is akin to
the everyday creative and informative capacity of human memory, which, given the fragmentary nature of reminiscence, constructs and refashions the reality of the past—in coming to terms with what is most evocative about certain past events (cf. Proust’s aesthetic of “lost” and “regained” time).

57 The romantic spirit is, in reality, an everpresent, an enduring principle, in the artistic temperament; and the qualities of thought and style which that, and other similar uses of the word romantic really indicate, are indeed but symptoms of a very continuous and widely working influence” (Pater, 1987, p. 243). Pater connects a “true romanticism” with the spirit of the Renaissance, calling Dante (along with Molière) the pre-eminent Romantic poet (p. 256).

58 Langer, 1953, p. 17.

59 This interconnection might be fruitful to an investigation of Richard Rorty’s irreconcilable distinction, posed in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), between “public liberal hope” and “private self-expression.”


62 “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Benjamin, Illuminations (1969). Though also see below on Benjamin’s thoughts on metaphor, which sound remarkably Coleridgean.

63 A claim supported, though with certain idiosyncratic emendations, by Franco Moretti, in his recent expansive work on Modern Epic: The World-System from Goethe to García Márquez (1996).

64 Culler, 1975, p. 229.

65 Ibid.

66 Culler, 1975, p. 229.

67 Ibid., p. 230.

68 Culler, 1975, 230, my emphasis.

69 To the unfeigned glee of Camille Paglia, de Man was posthumously “exposed” as a neo-Nazi sympathizer. Though this does not dismiss his work, it raises some serious questions about his talk of “blindness” in rhetoric and philosophy. Der Fall des Heideggers (or des Pounds, des Lawrences, des Célines) rears its ugly head once again, in Der Fall des de Man. And if this were not enough, de Man
praises Rousseau, as being a “non-blinded” author, yet Rousseau is notorious for his questionable behaviour towards his loved ones.

70 de Man, 1983, p. 188.
74 Borges, 1988, p. 127.

25 Novalis: “Our life is no dream but it should and perhaps will become one.” Or, as per the more cynical Marx (and Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus), a “nightmare” from which we must persistently strive to awaken.

75 Benjamin, 1969, p. 199.
76 de Man 1983, p. 207.
77 Ibid., p. 207.
78 Ibid., p. 208.
79 Ibid., p. 207.

80 Nostalgia for the Absolute is the title of a book by George Steiner (1974), on the lure of contemporary totalizing “myths” such as Freudianism and Marxism; Real Presences, a later work by Steiner (1988), examines language and religion, while “ideality of origins” is a phrase used by Michel Foucault in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, 1977) to characterize the study of “history” (vs. Foucault’s own “genealogy”).

81 Falck, commenting on Culler’s allegorocentrism, suggests that, for structuralists, “all mystery is mystification” (1994, p. 152)—that is, there is no room for translucence, or a sense of wonder: irony topples naïveté, and with it, sincerity. The poststructuralist “anxiety” over the mysterious may reflect a reaction to the New Critics, who inscribed mystery, and their own brand of Protestant orthodoxy, into literary analysis.

82 Culler, as well, seems ready to make this conflation, suggesting of allegory that it “flaunts the gap we must leap to produce meaning” (Culler, 1975, p. 229). Again, this may be attributing to much “self-awareness” to allegory, thus turning it into quite a different beast from Bunyan’s lapdog.
Fiction, says Aristotle in the *Poetics*, “is truer and more universal than history.” A fascinating study of the implications of the Renaissance “misreading” of Aristotle in terms of mimesis is Luiz da Costa Lima’s *Control of the Imaginary* (1988). In this work, the author discusses of the replacement of medieval Christian cosmological centering with a “cult of reason” which led to the “evacuation of poesis from the concept of mimesis”—“thus deforming the Aristotelian notion by restricting subjectivity to the imitation of an external reality in accordance with the precepts of hegemonic rational paradigms” (Chanady, 1995, p. 125). It was the Romantics who would most forcibly challenge this “control of the imaginary.”

“Schiller’s treatise is not just one of the greatest works in the German language. It is also one of the few works in world literature … which seriously explores the relation between art and politics” (Wilkinson And Willoughby, 1982, p. viii). Schiller is thus closer to the early Wordsworth than to Coleridge; his *haute vulgarisation* echoes the “popular poetry” of the “Preface” to *Lyrical Ballads*

Cf. C. G. Jung on the “virtual character” of all “aesthetic objects.” Jung uses Schiller’s semblance to derive an exemplary case of illusion, not in the reflected image, but in the dream, which involves all the senses. The Surrealists also picked up on this.

Wilkinson and Willoughby note, wryly, that by retrieving *Zeichen* from the “taint” of *Schein*, Bense rendered it so “rich” and “complex” as to be virtually meaningless.

Nietzsche: “It is a moral prejudice to assert that truth is worth more than appearance (Schein)” (BGE 34). Schiller: “Only impotence and perversity will have recourse to dishonest and dependent semblance; and single individuals, as well as whole peoples, who either ‘eke out reality with semblance, or (aesthetic) semblance with reality’—the two often go together—give evidence alike of their moral worthlessness and of their aesthetic incapacity” (AE XXVI.12).

Stevens, 1951, p. 77.

Falck, 1994, p. 175.

Wilkinson and Willoughby, 1982, xi.

Ibid., p. xii.

Though he claims to have awakened from his “dogmatic slumber” by reading Hume, later critics have seen in this “awakening” merely a dream within the prolonged slumber of onto-theological metaphysics. Carlyle, comparing Kant to Schiller, refers to the latter’s break with the “Night of Kantism,” and Nietzsche, ever pleasant, labelled Kant “the great delayer,” who eventually “became an idiot”—slobbering “all over his philosopher’s gown.”

This same critique can be applied to the work of neo-Kantians like John Rawls, whose monumental Theory of Justice (1971) tempts us with its rigor and clarity, but (like Kant’s Critiques) is ultimately dry as dust.

Schiller’s reputation outside of Germany as a paradigm Romantic has been attributed to the popularization of his Aesthetic Education by the illustrious Madame de Stäel, who was not altogether clear on the distinctions within German thought and letters. On a lighter note, Wilkinson and Willoughby suggest that Schiller’s sequestration in the Romantic camp may be due to phonetics and phonetics alone—i.e., Schiller, Schelling, Schlegel (x2), Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, and so on (Wilkinson and Willoughby, 1982, p. cxiv).

Lakoff, 1980, p. 236.


Blumenberg, 1985, p. 7.
“[I]t is through our moods, which must underlie and surround all our conscious experience and conceptual formulation, that we have our most fundamental apprehensions of the nature of the reality around us” (Falck, 1994, p. 59).

Falck, 1994, p. 36.

For Oscar Wilde and some radical constructivists, this “creation” refers not only to the world of our relationships and our thoughts and ideas, but also to “nature.” See “The Decay of Lying,” especially the line: “Things are because we see them” (Wilde, 1994, p. 986).

Langer, 1953, p. 180. Langer, with Charles Morris (in *Signs, Language, and Behavior*) distinguishes between “signals”—which are comprehended if they make us notice an object or situation—and “symbols”—which are understood when we conceive the idea presented (Langer, 1953, p. 26).

Taylor, 1990, p. 15.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 10.


Taylor 1990, pp. 11–12.

“The revolutionary idea implicit in Herder’s expressivism was that the development of new modes of expression enables us to have new feelings, more powerful or more refined, and certainly more self-aware” (Taylor, 1990, pp. 20–21).

See *Ideen sur Philosophie*, book IX, chapter 2, on the importance of speech for Herder.

Taylor, 1990, p. 15.


Camille Paglia makes much of this, contrasting her own brazen cisalpine character against the cold clinical quietness of the transalpine poststructuralist types.

I. A. Richards (like Alexander Smith before him) grounded both his semantic and poetic theory on the opposition between the “symbolic” (or, oddly, “scientific,” but more correctly, “descriptive”) use of words for “the support, the organization and the communication of references,” and the “emotive” use of words “to express or excite feelings and attitudes” (Abrams, 1971, p. 15). Richards tried
(disastrously, to my mind) to separate “poetic” from “scientific” truth by speaking of the “truth” of poetry (like Vico), but only as “pseudo-statements”—i.e., true if suiting a particular attitude, for example, “sincerity.” Something similar is evident in John Stuart Mill’s misreading of Romantic poetry, in which symbols “are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which they exist in the poet’s mind” (Abrams, 1953, p. 25); another form of (atemporal, or even epiphanic) “correspondence,” which remained strong in T. S. Eliot’s “objective correlatives.”

131 They are, as someone (possibly Nietzsche) said of Goethe’s Faust, “gorgeous failures.”
133 Richard Rorty likes to speak of the foundationalist and representationalist world as one “well lost.” The work of Georges Bataille, though often co-opted and misrepresented by poststructuralists, is an extensive commentary on the loss of the “sacred” (see Bataille, 1988, p. 10), and on the “disillusionment”—what he calls, felicitously, “the self-acknowledged suffering of the disintoxicated”—of those who renounced, in renouncing fascism, “the only form of passionate life” that seemed to remain (p. 10). For Mircea Eliade, the new popularity of symbolism and mythology is part and parcel of the longing for the lost sacred world. Yet Bataille is not blind to the lure of disintoxication, in itself a longing for a “pre-intoxicated” innocence or ideality of origins.
134 See previous note, and Berdiaev: “The end [!] of modern history is characterized in all its spheres and achievements by a deep sense of disillusionment…; the same is true of art” (Berdiaev, 1936, p. 177).
137 Culler, 1975, p. 19.
138 Which was actually less of a backlash than a case of “anxiety of influence”—for the connections between Romanticism, Symbolism, and the avant-garde movements of the twentieth century are plain
to see. In reality, the avant-garde distaste for Romanticism was born of a distaste for the “degenerate”
Romanticism “become conventional, a pathetic mode, a taste for the sensational” (Mario Bontempelli,
quoted in Poggioli, 1968, pp. 47–49). See also Herbert Read’s essay on “Surrealism and the Romantic

139 Jean Clair speaks of Schnitzler’s use of the term \textit{Das weite land}—a distant, forever foreign land—to
invoke the Symbolists reversal of the Romantic boundless landscape of the mind. See also Rilke: \textit{Jede
dumpfe Umkehr der Welt hat solche Enterbte, denen das Frühere nicht und nicht das Nächste gehört}
(\textit{Duino Elegies}, Die Siebente Elegie, l. 63); and Kafka, “demanding from every single moment a new
confirmation of [his] existence … in truth, [like Rilke] a disinherited son” (Heller, 1952, p. 34).

140 Kobry 1995, pp. 45–46. Symbolism, Kobry concludes, was “a laboratory of ideas, which created the
new theories and forms that permeate our century.”

141 Wilde, 1994, p. 936.

142 See the Comte de Passavant’s speech against Symbolist “detachment” in André Gide’s
\textit{Counterfeitors}: “the great weakness of the symbolist school is that it brought nothing but an aesthetic
with it; all the other great schools brought with them, besides their new styles, a new ethic, new tables,
a new way of looking at things, of understanding love, of behaving oneself in life. As for the
Symbolist… he didn’t behave himself at all in life; he didn’t attempt to understand it; he denied its
existence; he turned his back on it…” (Gide, 1955, p. 127).

143 George Steiner: “In so far as this equation [Keats’s “truth is beauty, and beauty truth”] and the
Kantian concept of the special freedom of the poetic, of the disinterestedness of the fictive, help us see
more clearly the authority and singularity of the aesthetic experience, they are of eminent value. At the
same time, any thesis that would, either theoretically or practically, put literature and the arts beyond
good and evil is spurious” (Steiner, 1989, p. 142).

144 It bears noting that Novalis (Georg Friedrich Philipp von Hardenberg, 1772–1801) was the first
person, to the best of my knowledge, to utilize the term “magic realism” [\textit{magischer Realismus}], while
contrasting two modes of philosophy (the other being magic idealism [\textit{magischer Idealismus}]) more
than a century before Franz Roh’s pioneering essay on magic realism in literature.
A term used by critics to describe the aesthetic of Walter Pater, father of the Aesthetic Movement and author of the infamous paean to “secular epiphany,” his “Conclusion” to *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (1870). In “Baroque and the Marvelous Real,” Alejo Carpentier fights against this popular image of Romanticism more generally: “the Romantic man was action and vigor and movement and will and declaration and violence” (Carpentier, 1995, p. 97).

Les rêveries du promeneur solitaire (1782), Rousseau’s late book on his solitary peripatetic expeditions, was intended to be a joyous reclamation of aged serenity. Instead, it reads as a bleak and bitter testament to the author’s growing paranoia.

“Lines written a few miles above Tintern Abbey,” line 38, in *Lyrical Ballads* (1798).

Ibid., line 97.


Kierkegaard, 1980, p. 87. “Only with the moment does history begin …. The moment is that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept of temporality is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time” (Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 52). See also Nietzsche’s *Augenblick* as the crucial point of the Eternal Recurrence (*Will to Power*, §1038) and Heidegger’s own characterization of the *Augenblick* in *Sein und Zeit*, §328–30.

Abrams, 1971, p. 87. While the first finds its Modernist locus in Proust—whose mammoth *À la recherche du temps perdu* (1919–1930) is an extensive reflection on the nature of the “present of things past” and the search for “lost time,” the last can be conceived as “eschatological hope,” or a sense of the apocalyptic infusing the everyday, the Now; i.e., the Present as Portent.


Abrams, 1953, p. 418.

Marshall Berman, in *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*, laments (like Gide’s Comte) the one-sided rants of twentieth-century Modernist manifestos, such as that of the Italian Futurists, the self-styled “gay incendiaries with charred fingers” ready to engulf the past (and, in their fascistic dreams, the present and the future) in flames, while searching for “the creation of the nonhuman type in whom moral suffering, goodness of heart, affection, and love … will be abolished” As Berman wryly notes,
those Futurists who did not die by the machines and the war they so loved were left to become hacks of Mussolini’s fascist “revolution”—as was, sadly, Ezra Pound (Berman, 1988, pp. 24–25). These figures are precisely Max Weber’s “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart … caught in the delusion that [they have] achieved a level of development never before attained by mankind” (Weber, 1976, p. 182). Art for art’s sake, as Kandinsky (Über das Geistige in der Kunst, 1911) and D. H. Lawrence (contra Roger Fry) saw, forges a dissociation—a chasm too wide to be readily bridged—between art and human existence, with often disastrous results, for human existence no less than for art.

156 Ibid., p. 204.
157 Culler, 1975, p. 175.
159 Rousseau, 1966, p. 54.
163 Ibid., p. 15.
167 De Man’s dismissal of Derrida’s critique of Rousseau has itself been challenged by Kathleen Wheeler, who suggests that de Man, by positing a “real” and “nonblinded” Rousseau misread by Derrida, himself lapses into a form of essentialism. As a poststructuralist, he should acknowledge that, while it may be true that Rousseau’s words can be read rhetorically as well as declaratively, there is no “real” Rousseau whose intentions undergird his “meaning” (Wheeler, 1993, pp. 225–26). Despite this important counter-critique, I think de Man’s purpose, in pointing to the possibility that the primary texts have the ability to “deconstruct” or “re-read” their interpreters, stands
Where “diachronic structures such as music, melody, or allegory are favoured over pseudo-synchronic structures such as painting, harmony, or mimesis because the latter mislead one into believing in a stability of meaning that does not exist” (de Man 1983, pp. 132–33).

In *De Profundis*, a chastened Wilde takes his erstwhile mentor Pater (and Pater’s hero and mouthpiece *Marius the Epicurean*) to task for being “little more than a spectator.” Wordsworth is also blamed by Wilde for making poetry a detached (i.e., disinterested) contemplation of the world with “appropriate emotions” (Wilde, 1994, p. 922). Even Goethe, though praised by Novalis for his sense of “distance,” is chastised by Heine for his belief in poetry as “a secular gospel which announces its presence by freeing us, through inner serenity and outward pleasure, from the earthly burdens that oppress us.” Like a *montgolfier*, says Goethe, it “affords a bird’s eye view of the intricate labyrinths of the earth below” (Heine, 1982, p. 2). For Heine, Borges and the magic realists, there can be no escape from the Labyrinth.

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172 Lakoff and Johnson, 1985, p. 229.


175 Moretti, 1996, p. 220.

176 Abrams, 1953, p. 86.

177 Rosenzweig, 1970, p. 20.


180 In Kermode’s eyes, Symons: “did well to mention the connection between magic and symbolism early. It is an important one, by no means as isolated from the concerns of modern poetry as might appear” (Kermode, 1957, p. 109).


182 Kermode, 1957, p. 110.

183 Frye, 1957, p. 61.

184 Moretti, 1996, p. 89.
Cleanth Brooks, in *Modern Poetry* (1939), alludes to Coleridge’s yearning for “the balance of reconcilement of opposite or discordant qualities.” The New Critics, though in many ways fellow travellers with poststructuralists, have been soundly chastised by the latter for their “religious” leanings. Brooks also speaks of Richards’s quest of “resolving the apparent discords,” and in Brooks’s own work, complexity relies upon homogeneity—discord is not endemic or structural, but a passing phase, a dark night to be passed through; an apparition, not a reality. Finally, Falck suggests that while there may indeed be a veil between ourselves and ultimate reality—“there might be special moments, or—in later literary parlance—epiphanies, in which reality could be seen as revelatory itself with special profundity and in and through the appearance of everyday life” (Falck, 1994, p. 36).

“I]t is the essential function of literature to show us *how things are*—not by describing them in their actuality, but by revealing them in their essential forms and their essential rhythms…. No Saussurean theorist has yet had anything significant to say about rhythm: and yet rhythm, both within literature and outside of it, most—through its connections with temporality—lie very close to the essence of life itself” (Falck, 1994, p. 33).

An aria being, as per *The Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, “a long, accompanied solo”; a sonata: “a composition for one or two instruments in several movements with one or more in sonata form”—sonata form being “a type of composition in three sections (exposition, development, and recapitulation) in which two themes (or subjects) are explored according to a set of key relationships” (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 8th edn, 1990). George MacDonald uses the sonata as an analogy for literature and God’s message.

This point is convincingly argued by Hans-Georg Gadamer in *Truth and Method* (Gadamer, 1988, p. 174).

Langer, 1953, p. 127.
“The myth is the central informing power that gives archetypal significance to the ritual and archetypal narrative of the oracle” (Frye, 1963, p. 15).


Ibid., p. 174.

Langer, 1953, p. 18.

CPR A.K. 120.

Langer, 1953, pp. 46–47.


Hick, 1993, p. 3.

Feuerbach, 1959, p. 158.

Ibid., p. 159.


Ibid., p.4.

Hick, 1993, p. 15.

Ibid., p. 9.


Feuerbach, 1959, p. 163.

Nietzsche, AC [24].

See Nietzsche, “The Use and Disadvantages of History for Life.”


As a counter-reading of the Symbolist epiphany and those “blessed moods,” Virginia Woolf (in *To The Lighthouse*) speaks of the “unreal” (cf. Eliot’s “Unreal City”) but “penetrating and exciting universe which is the world seen through the eyes of love.” Woolf’s heroine feels “how life, from being made up of little separate incidents which are lived one by one, became coiled and whole like a wave which bore one up with it and threw one down with it, there, with a dash on the beach” (Woolf, 1977, p. 24). See below for more on the relations of love and transfiguration.
Schleiermacher, 1987, p. 101. This is connected in Schleiermacher with a deeply “pluralistic”
(Herderian, we might say) ethical sense: “religion does not, even once, desire to bring those who
believe and feel to one belief and one feeling … because each seer is a new priest, a new mediator, a
new organ, he flees with repugnance the cold uniformity which would again destroy this divine
abundance” (Schleiermacher, 1987, p. 55). Shockingly, Schleiermacher goes on to suggest that he
prefers heathen Rome in many instances to Christian Rome—on account of the former’s “boundless
mixture of religions,” and the latter’s “godlessness,” exemplified in its inhuman treatment of heretics.
A true “liberal,” Schleiermacher could not abide the inhuman, even (or, especially) when done in the
name of God or “Truth.”

COJ A.K. 353. Kant goes on to suggest: “Whoever regards it as schematic—while including in it the
properties of understanding, will, etc., whose objective reality is proved only in worldly beings—falls
into anthropomorphism, just as anyone who omits everything intuitive falls into deism, which allows
us to cognize nothing whatsoever, not even from a practical point of view” (COJ A.K. 353).

Culler, 1975, p. 165.

Ibid., p. 169.

Ibid., p. 170.

So argues Henri Meschonnic, in a critique of Julia Kristeva. Foucault, in his last works, seemed to
be heading towards a reappraisal of his earlier proclamations about the “death of man.” In The History
of Sexuality (especially Volume Three: The Care of the Self, 1984) and his essay of “Technologies of
the Self” (1982), the concept of subjectivity becomes of critical concern.

Falck, 1994, p. 29.

“The importance of such deictics as technical devices in poetry can scarcely be overestimated, and
in our willingness to speak of a poetic persona we recognize from the outset that such deictics are not
determined by an actual situation of utterance but operate at a certain distance from it… A whole
poetic tradition uses spatial, temporal and personal deictics in order to force the reader to construct a meditative persona” (Culler, 1975, pp. 165–67).

227 Hans Blumenberg, in On Myth (Arbeit am Mythos, 1985) concurs, bracketing out the question of the foundations, whether in terms of philosophical anthropology or the origin of myths (see the “Introduction” by Robert M. Wallace, pp. xvi–xvii).

228 Coleridge, 1839, p. 437, my emphasis.

229 Ibid., my emphasis.

230 Löwith, 1949, p. 185.

231 Karl Löwith: “The significant now of the kairos qualifies the retrospect on the past and the prospect upon the future, uniting the past as preparation with the future as consummation” (Löwith, 1949, p. 185).

232 Aquinas defines the aevum as “medium inter aeternitatem et tempus, utroque participans” (Brabant, 1937, p. 75). Frank Kermode, in The Sense of an Ending, notes the connection between Aquinas’s aevum, Spinoza’s Duree, and Bergson’s Durée, the latter of which was instrumental in the development of the Modernist aesthetic, particularly that of Proust.

233 Brabant, 1937, p. 75.

234 Ibid. Jacques Maritain, in his study of Descartes (Trois Réformations, II: “L’Incarnation de l’Ange”), charges Descartes with forgetting the limitations of the human mind by applying Aquinas’s angelic aspects to such. Brabant concurs, suggesting several differences between angelic and human time. We can “demythologize” this by accepting the aevum and kairotic time, not as verum of some “real” angelic sphere, but as an alternative sense of religious experience, including religious reading and language.

235 Brabant, 1937, p. 16.


237 Nicolai Berdiaev was: “inclined to believe that the mysteries of the divine as well as of the human and world life, with all their complexity of historical destiny, admit of solution only through concrete mythology. The knowledge of the divine life is not attainable by means of abstract philosophical thought based upon the principles of formalist or rationalistic logic, but only by means of a concrete
myth which conceives the divine life as a passionate destiny of concrete and active persons, the divine
Hypostases” (Berdiaev, 1936, p. 52).

Richardson, 1994, p. 77.

Goethe, Faust, Part Two, ll. 682–83.

Marsh, 1952, p. 149.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, in “The Relevance of the Beautiful,” sides with Luther at Marburg, and
suggests that: “if we really want to think about the experience of art, we can, indeed must, think along
these lines: the work of art does not just refer to something, because what it refers to is actually there”
(Gadamer 1986, p. 35). Father John Hardon, in a publication of The Canadian Catholic News, insists
that no less than: “[t]he future of the western world depends on the restoration of faith in the real
presence of Christ in the Eucharist”; only as such, he argues, can Christians recall the Hereness of
Jesus Christ. One might wonder where non-Christians (or non-Catholics) fit here, but that may be to
miss Father Hardon’s point.


Chiron in Faust: “[D]en Poeten bindet keine Zeit” (“The poet is not bound by chronology”) (ll.
7426–33).


Coleridge, 1905, p. 270.

Fiction: from Latin fictio, –onis, from fingere = to form, to fashion. Synonyms: 1. tale, romance,
fable; 2. fabrication, figment; 3. falsehood, fib (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language, Unabridged; note the progressively “negative” connotations.)


Berdiaev, 1936, p. 21.

Ibid., p. 25.

Grant, 1995, pp. 8–9.

Ibid., p. xvi.

Perrin, 1969, p. 44.
“History isn’t what happened. History is just what historians tell us. There was a pattern, a plan, a movement, expansion, the march of democracy; it is a tapestry, a flow of events, a complex narrative, connected, explicable…. The history of the world? Just voices echoing in the dark; images that burn for a few centuries and then fade; stories, old stories that sometimes seem to overlap; strange links, impertinent connections” (Barnes, 1989, p. 240).

Salman Rushdie, commenting on “Unreliable Narration in [his novel] Midnight’s Children,” writes: “History is always ambiguous. Facts are hard to establish, and capable of being given many meanings. Reality is built on our prejudices, misconceptions and ignorance as well as on our perceptiveness and knowledge. The reading of Saleem’s unreliable narration might be, I believed, a useful analogy for the way in which we all, every day, attempt to ‘read the world’” (Rushdie, 1991, p. 25).

Nietzsche, “Use and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 43.

Nietzsche, Will to Power 1:4.


Berdiaev, 1936, p. 38.

Augustine, Confessions XI.20.


Rosenzweig, 1970, p. 50.


Lakoff, 1980, p. 5.


Blumenberg, 1985, p. 97.

Frye, 1957, p. 32.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 137.


273 Ibid., p. 197, my emphasis.

274 I. A. Richards, an early battler against anti-metaphorical biases in criticism and theory (The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 1936), equates metaphors with psychological “transference”—so that a command of metaphor will go deep into “the control of the world that we make for ourselves to live in” (Richards, 1936, p. 135).


276 Rorty: “On a Davidsonian view of language, metaphors do not have meanings. That is to say that they have no place in the language-game which has been played prior to their production. But they may, and indeed do, have a crucial role in the language-games which are played afterwards. For, by being literalized, becoming ‘dead’ metaphors, they enlarge logical pace” (Rorty, 1991a, p. 124).

277 See Milan Kundera’s essay on Kafka’s use of “Metaphor as Phenomenological Definition” (1995).

278 Borges, 1988, p. 5.

279 Blumenberg: “Myths are stories that are distinguished by a high degree of constancy in their narrative core and by an equally pronounced capacity for marginal variation. These two characteristic make myths transmissible by tradition: Their constancy produces the attraction of recognizing them in artistic or ritual representation as well [as in recital], and their variability produces the attraction of trying out new and personal means of presenting them. It is the relationship of ‘themes and variation,’ whose attractiveness for both composers and listeners is familiar from music. So myths are not like ‘holy texts’, which cannot be altered by one iota” (Blumenberg, 1985, p. 34).


281 Kofman, 1993, p. 3.

282 “Words are sounds designating concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite images designating frequently recurring and associated sensations, groups of sensations” (Nietzsche, BGE §268).

283 Winchester, 1994, p. 44.

“[M]etaphor is an essential instrument in the process of reweaving our beliefs and desires; without it, there would be no such thing as a scientific revolution or cultural breakthrough, but merely the process of altering the truth-values of statements formulated in a forever unchanging vocabulary” (Rorty, 1991a, p. 124). Natural historian Stephen Jay Gould concurs: “When we are caught in conceptual traps, the best exit is often a change in metaphor—not because the new guideline will be truer to nature (for neither the old nor the new metaphor lies ‘out there’ in the woods), but because we need a shift to more fruitful perspectives, and metaphor is often the best agent of conceptual transition” (Gould, 1991, p. 264).

Stevens 1951, p. 115.

Ibid., p. 33.

“In the rupture, which is the achievement of the aesthetic form, the fictitious world of art appears as true reality” (Marcuse). Tolstoy, in *War and Peace*, creates a virtual history; he is not interested in an exact account of the events of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, nor even in the evolution of particular characters and their rôles, but is rather interested in history as a dimension of human existence (Kundera, 1990, p. 238). Frye, in *Fables of Identity*, speaks of Stevens’s conception of the transfigurative capacities of poetry: “A nature is created in what it says” (Frye, 1963, p. 240). And Albert Thibaudet: “The genius of the novel makes the possible come to life; it does not revive the real” (*Reflexions sur le roman*, 1938)—a line which André Gide, in the “Journal to *The Counterfeiters*,” approves.


Ibid., p. 120.

Kermode, 1967, p. 41. It is true that Kermode warns that we must, at all times, “remember the status of fictions,” however “supreme,” and goes on to posit a distinction between *fiction* and *myth*, the former being, it would seem apolitical: “you neither rearrange the world to suit them, nor test them by experiment, for instance in gas-chambers” (Kermode, 1967, p. 41). While his wariness is well taken, the distinction seems to me to be rather facile, and naïve, in the sense that fictions *are* political, and, being akin to metaphor, have great effect upon our creation of the worlds in which we dwell, even
when we know of them as “fictive.” Kermode also suggests: “myths call for absolute, fictions for conditional consent. Myths make sense in terms of a lost order of time [illud tempus]; fictions, if successful, make sense of the here and now [hoc tempus]” (p. 39). But, after the temporal investigations of Modernism, how can we sustain such a distinction?

293 Falck, 1994, p. 115.

294 Nietzsche, AC §15.

295 See, e.g., Nietzsche WP §616: “What can be thought must certainly be a fiction.”


298 Falck, 1994, p. 143.

299 Kermode, 1967, p. 36.


301 “The true ‘creation of the world’ [Weltwerdung] is not a secularization (‘becoming worldly’) in the sense of the transformation of something pre-existing but rather, as it were, the primary crystallization of a hitherto unknown reality” (Blumenberg, 1985, p. 47).

302 Goethe, Faust, Part Two §6436–38.


304 Paracelsus, 1979, p. 256.

305 Goethe, Faust, Part Two §672–73.

306 Goethe, Faust, Part Two §377–79.

307 The alchemical term for this process is égrégare.

308 “Cervantes sought to set right the balance between the imagination and reality. As we come closer to our own times in Don Quixote and as we are drawn together by the intelligence common to the two periods, we may derive so much satisfaction from the restoration of reality as to become wholly prejudiced against the imagination. This is to reach a conclusion prematurely, let alone that it may reach a conclusion in respect to something as to which no conclusion is possible or desirable” (Frye, 1963, pp. 9–10). It is, in fact, to forget the tragedy of disillusionment that, for Dostoevsky, Heine, and Kafka, among others, is the key to an understanding of the Quixote.

Fuentes, 1995, ??.


Ibid., p. 166.

Ibid., p. 169.

Ibid., p. 170.


Stevens, 1951, p. 28.

Said, 1983, p. 171, my emphasis.


Ibid., p. 12.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 13.

Bloch, 1977, p. 22.

Kermode, 1967, p. 46.

Sorge, as I have been using it in this dissertation, refers to Heidegger’s emphasis on “concern,” “care,” “attention,” which is picked up by Falck (see below). See George Steiner’s Real Presences for an extended discussion of art and cortesia.

Falck, 1994, p. 72.


Falck, 1994, p. 103.

Ibid., p. 61.


Alter, 1975, p. 11.


Alter, 1979, p. 30.

Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu, III, p. 100 (Cities of the Plain, 1981, p. 95). Also see Sartre, who lamented the unbridgeable “distance” between lover and beloved; and between Self and Other.
Perhaps it is Sartre’s recognition of this gap leads to the dictum that “hell is other people”—hell being the pain of an imperfectible love.) Love, for Octavio Paz, is itself a gift of Romanticism, coming from the chivalric traditions of the Provençal poets and Minnesänger: “The Romantics taught us how to live, die, dream, and above all, how to love” (Paz, 1995, pp. 168–69).

Calvino: “Literature remains alive only if we set ourselves immeasurable goals, far beyond all hope of achievement. Only if poets and writers set themselves tasks that no one else dares imagine will literature continue to have a function. Since science has begun to distrust general explanations and solutions that are not sectorial or specialized, the grand challenge for literature is to be capable of weaving together the various branches of knowledge, the various ‘codes’, into a manifold and multifaceted vision of the world” (Calvino, 1995, p. 112).


Barnes, 1989, p. 238.

Barnes, 1989, p. 242

Ibid.


Kermode, 1967, p. 64.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 160.

Since Franz Roh, in his 1925 essay, Magic Realism: Post-Expressionism [Nach-Expressionismus, Magischer Realismus: Probleme der neuesten Europäischen Malerei], did not give Magischer Realismus a prefix (i.e., der magischer Realismus = magical realism), the term is best translated as magic realism, though it is more commonly given as magical realism. Though the former seems, at first, a bit cumbersome, it points, more effectively I think, to the propinquitous element of the aesthetic: the chance encounter of two things or events, usually dissociated, without turning “magic” into a mere qualifying adjective of “realism.” Irene Guenther, in her article “Magic Realism, New Objectivity, and the Arts during the Weimar Republic,” concurs: “The juxtaposition of ‘magic’ and ‘realism’ reflects
the monstrous and marvelous Unheimlichkeit within human beings and inherent in the technological surroundings of which both Freud and de Chirico wrote” (Guenther, 1995, p. 63 n. 52).

344 Alter, 1975, p. ix.

345 The Cuban novelist brought magic realism to Latin America, with his “On The Marvelous Real in America [Lo real maravilloso americano]” (1949) and, a quarter century later, “Baroque and the Marvelous Real [Lo barroco y lo real maravilloso]” (1975).

346 In stories like “Nevsky Prospekt,” “The Overcoat,” “The Nose,” and “The Portrait,” Gogol “seems to be inventing the twentieth century out of his head” (Berman, 1988, p. 198).

347 Márquez to Kundera: “It was Kafka who showed me that it’s possible to write another way,” breaking through the plausibility barrier, “[n]ot in order to escape the real world (the way the romantics did) but to apprehend it better” (Kundera, 1995, pp. 52–53). Rushdie, echoing Berman on Gogol, says: “Our sense of the modern world is as much the creation of Kafka, with his unexplained trials and unapproachable castles and giant bugs, as it is of Freud, Marx, or Einstein” (Rushdie, 1991, p. 123).

348 One could certainly extend this to the visual arts, extending back as far as Giotto, whose work conveys “a keener sense of reality, of life-likeness than the objects themselves”—more than the Things ever dreamed of existing, one is tempted to addend (Rilke’s Neunte Duino Elegie). The comment on Giotto is Berenson’s, quoted in Roger Fry’s Vision and Design (1920).


351 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, s.v. “propinquity.


353 Kundera, 1995, 50.

354 Zamora and Faris, 1995, p. 3.


356 Zamora and Faris, 1995, pp. 3–4. “In such cases, magical realist works remind us that the novel began as a popular form, with communal imperatives that continue to operate in many parts of the world.”

357 Blumenberg, 1985, pp. 5–6.
George Steiner: “Music could have initiated the sensation and later the controlled experience, of the multiple existence within space and time in the psyche of different levels of energy, of different and even conflicting currents of self-consciousness. Metaphor in language—the prime mover—and relations between chromatic values and spaces which are the matter of the arts, would, thus, be an evolutionary modulation or translation into more semantic, representational codes of the arc of melody” (Steiner, 1989, p. 182).


“This kind of man, “ says Roh, “is neither the ‘empirical’ Machiavellian politician nor the apolitical man who listens only to the voice of an ethical ideal, but a man at once political and ethical, in whom both characteristics are equally prominent. The new position, if it survives, will exist on a middle ground not through weakness but, on the contrary, through energy and an awareness of its strength. It will be a sharp edge, a narrow ledge between two chasms on the right and the left.”

Rushdie, 1991, p. 301. “The only truth,” Rushdie adds ruefully, “is that you are being lied to all the time.”

Vargas Llosa, 1990, p. 5.

John Barth says that postmodern literature is and/or strives for a literature more democratic in appeal, more broad-based or worldly than did Modernism (Anderson, 1995, p. 152) Perhaps it is Goethe’s Weltliteratur ideal reborn. Alejo Carpentier sought to distance his lo real maravilloso americana from Roh’s post-Expressionism and French Surrealism—with which he had been involved, and whose work he had, by 1949, come to consider affected, jaded and “boring,” merely substituting “the tricks of the magician for the worn out phrases of academics or the eschatological glee of certain existentialists” (Carpentier, 1995, p. 86).
See Schiller’s Über naïve und sentimentale Dichtung (1795), a work that apparently converted Friedrich Schlegel to Romanticism. In this work “naïve” poetry, characteristic of the ancients, is an immediate, detailed and particularized representation of the sensuous surface of life, thus “realistic”; “sentimental” poetry, for Schiller, tends to substitute an ideal for the given reality; the “sentimental” poet “can suffer no impression without immediately attending to its own part in the performance, and by reflection, projecting outside and opposite itself that which it has in itself” (Abrams, 1953, p. 238). Shakespeare, whose apparent “coldness” is his greatest merit, his naïveté, partakes of this appropriate vulnerability—“the object possesses him entirely” (p. 238).

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370 Langer, 1953, p. 344.

371 Ibid.

372 Calvino, 1986a, p. 29.

373 Polanyi, 1958, pp. 16–17.

374 Taylor, 1985, p. 112.

375 Torrance, 1969, p. ix.

376 Ibid., p. x.

377 Ibid., pp. x–xi.

378 Ibid., p. xi.

379 Ibid., pp. xiii–xiv.

380 Ibid., p. xvii.

381 Ibid., p. 9 n.2.

382 Ibid., p. 11.

383 Ibid., p. 288.


385 Torrance, 1969, 289 n.2.

386 Ibid., p. 88.

387 Ibid., p. 89.

388 Ibid., p. 88.

389 Ibid., p. 89.
390 Torrance, 1969, p. 94.

391 Ibid., pp. 94–95.

392 Kant, Critique of Judgment, §353.

393 Torrance, 1969, p. 288.

394 Ibid., p. 223.


399 Tillich, 1987, p. 68.

400 Ibid.

401 Ibid.

402 Ibid., p. 78.

403 Bonhoeffer, 1988, p. 90.

404 Polanyi, 1958, p. 279.

405 Ibid., p. 280.

406 Green, 1991, p. 11.


408 Torrance, 1969, p. 294.


410 Barth, 1991b, p. 89.

411 Ibid.

412 Barth, 1991d, p. 323.

413 Wilde, 1994, p. 1108.

414 Ibid., p. 1109.

415 Ibid.

At one point I was intending this very question to be the starting point of the present study; since I have realized that much groundwork needed to be laid, particularly in terms of the roots of magic realism in Romantic and modernist poetics. The question thus provides a working hypothesis that, though touched upon here, needs to be further developed in future research (probably by someone else, given that I have since reincarnated as an Asianist).


A responsibility sometimes forgotten within the nominally socialist “dialectical theology,” despite Barth’s bon mot about the newspaper and Bible and his “Nein!” to the Nazis and the German Christian movement.

Of course, the term “being-in-the world” [in-die-Welt-Sein] hearkens once again to Heidegger, whose work had significant influence on Bultmann (and vice versa); the concept of the Uncanny [das Unheimlich] was a Freudian trope, and perhaps filtered into Bultmann’s language.

Falck adds: “It will then be obliged to look for whatever support [in Supreme Fictions of literature, for example] it can find among the actually revealed spiritual meanings of the world” (Falck, 1994, p. 133).


Grant, 1995, p. 8. Stephen Niell translates these as “mere” (Historie) and “real” (Geschichte) history, but this is confusing, and bespeaks an (unfeigned) value judgment.

See George Herbert Mead on the “significant symbol.”

The question arises as to whether the kerygma itself may be an obsolete metaphor for the Call of God. Given the status of (what’s left of) the world’s monarchies, the imperative voice of a King or Queen hardly gives us hope, or even fear, let alone respect. Perhaps the Qur’anic Iqra’ gives a fuller
and more adequate conception of *kerygma*. A single word command, it connotes not merely “Proclaim!” but also “Read!” “Recite!” and “Rehearse!” (*Surah* 96).


432 Ibid.

433 Norman Perrin, in his otherwise adulatory *The Promise of Bultmann* (1969), admits that Bultmann’s understanding of myth may be dated, but suggests that the theologian: “is not attempting to make a contribution to the study of myth and symbol; he is attempting to make the proclamation of the New Testament and of the Church intelligible to man” (Perrin 1969, p. 77). Given the significance of representation to understanding, and of an adequate theory of myth and symbol—of aesthetics and epistemology—to theology and the study of religion, this is a rather shallow “apology.”


435 Of course, this is not new with Bultmann. Eliza Doolittle sang the same song: “Don’t talk of love, show me!”


437 Cullmann, 1951, p. 96.

438 “The prophetic element in the sacred historical books thus manifests itself on the one side in the total prophetic interpretation of the entire reported history, and on the other side in the inclusion of purely individual features which support the total interpretation” (Cullmann, 1951, p. 100).


442 Anderson, 1995, p. 3.


444 Kermode, 1957, p. 162.

445 Steiner, 1989, p. 98.

446 Foucault, 1977, p. 178.


448 *AE* XXVI.5.


453 Hiriyanna, 1985, p. 25.

454 Langer, 1953, p. 189.

455 Moretti, 1996, p. 111.


458 Blumenberg, 1985, p. 130.

459 Berman, 1988, p. 5.

460 Moretti, 1996, p. 222.

461 Berman, 1988, p. 17.

462 Chesterton, 1990, p. 10.

463 Ibid.

464 Kermode, 1957, p. 64.
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