



James Mark Shields

Eros and Transgression in an Age of Immanence: Georges Bataille's (Religious) Critique of Kinsey¹

[M]an of the dualistic conception is opposite to archaic man in that there is no longer any intimacy between him and this world. This world is in fact immanent to him but is so in so far as he is no longer characterized by intimacy, in so far as he is defined by things, and is himself a thing, being in a distinctly separated being.

Bataille, *Eroticism*

In January of 1999 an incident made headlines across Canada involving a man named John Robin Sharpe of British Columbia. Mr. Sharpe, age 65, had successfully defended himself on charges of possessing child pornography. As one irate journalist remarked, he did this not by *denying* the charge but rather by *proclaiming* it loudly to all who would listen. Sharpe is a man with a mission: to eliminate all such laws restricting freedom of choice in sexual matters. And this mission extends beyond merely possessing dirty pictures of infants: Sharpe, it seems, wants to dignify having sex with children; he questions whether child sexual *abuse* is even a possibility. Of course, these views have outraged many from coast to coast; but perhaps more surprising is the level of support for Sharpe. Norman Doidge, writing in *The National Post*, suggests that the Sharpe case indicates that we as a society “do not dare articulate, in sexual terms, what healthy sexuality is and is not.”

How has North American society come to such a point? Doidge goes on to lay the blame on two rather unexpected sources: the ancient Greek philosopher Plato (427–347 BCE), and the late French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984). Doidge’s charge against Plato is straightforward: in the *Symposium*, where Socrates and company discourse on love, pederasty is high on the menu, even when the talk turns to more spiritual forms of desire. As for Foucault, the “most influential and insidious post-modernist thinker,” he destroyed the very notion of healthy sexuality and discarded the possibility of perversion, and thus “invented sexual political correctness, and stifled rational speech about sexual differences.”²

Whether or not we accept this critical evaluation of Foucault's work on sexuality, it is to me a rather extraordinary claim: namely, that a philosopher, and a difficult one at that, could have such an effect on "mainstream society" in such a short span of time: some fifteen years!³ Certainly, Foucault's effect on certain sectors of the academy is indisputable, one could say of us in fields connected with sociology of knowledge and history of ideas, that we are all to some degree Foucauldians. But what about the majority of those outside the ivory towers? What about John Robin Sharpe? When I read Doidge's piece, what struck me was not so much his accusation against Foucault as his omission of someone much more roundly viewed as a key figure in the shaping of contemporary North American sexual values: Alfred Charles Kinsey (1894–1956). Have Foucault's fancy postmodernist phrases about the links between sex, confession and the *Ars Erotica* really affected mainstream society to the extent that Kinsey et al.'s cold hard facts did in the immediate postwar years? Who does Hugh Hefner (and if anyone should know, it is he) proclaim the father of the Sexual Revolution? Foucault? Hardly; after all, it was the author of the *History of Sexuality* who once said: "sex is boring." John Robin Sharpe is no Foucauldian; he is, perhaps as we all are to some degree, a Kinseyan. Or rather, he, like us, is immersed in a culture whose thinking about sex is deeply imbued with Kinseyism.

In this paper, I will explore what it means to be living in an age of Kinseyism, and particularly some of the *religious* implications of Kinseyism. I will do this by focusing on an article written by a man claimed by Michel Foucault as a mentor. The article is "Kinsey, the Underworld and Work," published in the book *L'Erotisme* in 1957. The man is Georges Bataille (1897–1962).

II. A Short, Highly Circumspect, but Necessary Digression on Eros in the Western World

... in the contemplation of beauty absolute, a beauty which if once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you...

Plato, *Symposium*

We are dealing here with several notoriously huge and nebulous concepts: love, sex, desire, religion. Yet, I will forge on nonetheless, in the spirit of the courtly knight-errant (with emphasis given to the *errant*). Western tradition—and here I mean primarily but not exclusively its ideational tradition, extending from Plato and Aristotle, through Augustine and Aquinas, to Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer—has been marked by a distinction between love and sex, with desire and passion fitting somewhat uncomfortably between. Plato, once again in the *Symposium*, situated love and *eros* against sexual desire; though love involves embodied beings, it cannot be satisfied either with the contemplation or with the possession of a body in the act of desire. Plato was faced with something of a paradox: how could erotic love, born seemingly from base desire, emerge as the highest of

human impulses? His answer is, as we might imagine, highly Platonic: erotic love escapes or transcends physical lust by way of the perception of the beautiful form of the other, which is itself nothing more than the sensuous embodiment of the immortal soul. Thus, according to Plato, physical desire, far from being an extension of love, actually impedes love's fruition—it distracts from the true aim of *eros*, which is dispassionate and impersonal: the love of Beauty, Truth, and the Good.⁴ According to Roger Scruton, here we have the basis of “the most influential of all theories of the erotic, according to which love is by its own nature set on the path to renunciation.”⁵

Naturally, this Platonic distinction infiltrated Christian thought, not least through the Alexandrian school of the 3rd–4th centuries, and the writings of Origen (c.185–c.254) in particular—Origen, whose self-mutilation stands as the logical, if heterodox, outcome of Platonic bifurcation.⁶ A strange thing happened, though, in the Christian appropriation of Platonic categories—*eros*, the linchpin and driving force of Platonic love, was squeezed from the scene, replaced by the less frolicsome *agape/caritas*: self-giving love.⁷ This effectively eliminated the Platonic paradox: *Eros* no longer needed to be redeemed or purified; he vanished from the scene, only to emerge in our times as the chubby cherubic icon of a commercial holiday named for Saint Valentinus.⁸

III. Kinsey, the Sexual Revolution and the Return of *Eros*

Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, but degenerated—into vice.

Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*

For many in the 1960s and 1970s, the Sexual Revolution heralded the return of *eros* after several millennia of combined church and state repression; for others, this so-called “revolution” was and remains a cause/symptom of the degeneracy and immorality of our modern era. Kinsey's Reports on male and female sexuality, published in 1948 and 1953 respectively, are alternatively praised for unlocking the prison of sexual repression or opening a Pandora's box of sexual license.

Lately there has been more blame than praise: in the past two decades, Kinsey and his Institute have come under a barrage of attack. Without going into detail, two examples will suffice. Judith Reisman, a scholar who has spent the better part of her career bashing Kinsey and his Revolution, paints a disturbing picture of a “Grand Scheme” by which, under the guise of objective scholarship, Kinsey et al. have undermined American values and human decency. Reisman claims no religious motivation; she works under distinctively “humanist” and “liberal” ideals.⁹ Michael Jones, by contrast, attacks Kinsey from a Christian perspective. His recent work, *Degenerate Moderns*, makes a deceptively simple (some would say undeceptively simplistic) argument: the major figures of modern art, science and scholarship

have produced their grand theories as little more than justifications for their own sexual misbehaviour. In Jones's eyes, Kinsey, along with Margaret Mead and Pablo Picasso, stands as the primary exemplar of this trend. In fact, as his work deals directly with sexual deviance, Kinsey is the genius of this continuing enterprise.¹⁰ In the critiques of Reisman and Jones we have a pretty good summary of the anti-Kinsey backlash; in short, Kinsey was himself a degenerate, and his degeneracy translated into an ideological commitment which perverted and distorted his "scientific research," to the detriment of the good and decent folk who make up the bedrock of North American society. According to this logic, just as Origen was the "logical" outcome of Neoplatonist dualism, so to John Robin Sharpe (or perhaps, Bill Clinton) is the "logical" outcome of Kinseyan laxity.

However seriously we want to take these charges, I would like to shift the discussion away from Kinsey's morals and the supposedly corroding effects of his Reports to a discussion of Kinseyism as a social phenomenon, a general way of conceiving the goods of sex and sexuality. And this is where we come upon Bataille, who offers not a *moral* critique of Kinsey, but rather a *religious* critique, which, in contrast to the charges of Jones and Reisman, stands on the "near side" of the erotic.

Again, whatever we think of the specific charges of Reisman and Jones, it does seem clear that for Kinsey there was no absolute Good to which human beings were naturally attuned; morals were, he thought in good sexological fashion, hypocritical masks for those who were probably the most immoral of all. Kinsey was a materialist, and thus believed in the materialist line, borrowed from Alexander Pope (but also, perhaps, from the Catholic Church's own Natural Law theory) that "whatever is, is right." This is not a strange way of thinking; it is probably the most common way of thinking about morals in our times.¹¹ The charge that Kinsey used this type of materialist rhetoric—even at the expense of the facts—to justify sexual diversity and, moreover, sexual deviance, is one that cannot be easily discounted.

In Kinseyism, we have what seems to be an inverse Platonism at work:¹² Kinsey's overt plan to refute Victorian moralism and Catholic prudery led to a privileging of "sexual acts" in their many forms, over and above any talk of morality or love—which are deemed not so much bad as merely inconsequential or unscientific. As Foucault might say, the "truth" of sex under the assuredly "scientific" gaze of Kinseyan sexology became, for the first time, wholly "natural." Whereas in Plato, erotic love miraculously transforms itself from the desire for the loved being (in particular the desire for boys, *paiderastein*) to the contemplation of divine beauty itself (*auto to theion kalon dunasto monooides katidein*)¹³—that is, by progressively erasing the physical body from the lover's gaze—in Kinsey the body is progressively brought into focus, as the sexualized object, through scientific techniques and unblinkerered rational inquiry. The process of *revelation* is replaced by

one of *exposure*.¹⁴ In both cases we are faced with “objectification”—either as a stepping-stone towards the Ideal or as the final locus of arousal and release. Roger Scruton calls this “the true meaning of ‘Kinseyism’... the device whereby the sexual act is given back to objective nature and rid of its meaning. It is the device whereby all that is ‘inner’, ‘subjective’, ‘value-laden’ in our sexual experience is discounted.”¹⁵ As we shall see, in Bataille’s terms, this makes Kinsey culpable in the progressive “desacralization” of sexuality.

IV. Georges Bataille on the possibility of Sex in a World Come of Age

I believe that eroticism has a significance for mankind that the scientific attitude cannot reach. Eroticism cannot be discussed unless man too is discussed in the process. In particular, it cannot be discussed independently of the history of religions.

Bataille, *Eroticism*

Michael Jones, in his “Case Against Kinsey,” claims that Kinseyism is an ideology based on the pseudo-Darwinian notion that deviance—here, sexual deviance—is not only acceptable but is, in fact, the “cause of all progress.”¹⁶ The question necessarily arises, to those familiar with the work of Bataille: is Kinseyan “deviance” equivalent to Bataillean “transgression”—that is, also the driving force behind a fuller human existence? The short answer is no.

Bataille began his writing career as a member of the French surrealists, but eventually broke with them over a number of issues, not the least of which was the vulgar anti-clericalism he saw underpinning the movement: they had not, it seemed to Bataille, taken Nietzsche’s proclamation of God’s death with enough seriousness, thinking they could fill the gap with art, revolution, or art-as-revolution. After splitting with Breton and company and establishing his own “Cercle Communiste Démocratique,” Bataille developed one of his fundamental concepts: the “heterogeneous”—a category including all those elements which “resist assimilation to the bourgeois form of life and to the routines of everyday life.” Like Kinsey, Bataille was intent on criticizing (and, as a communist, actively resisting) the conventional wisdom of bourgeois life. However, as a good Nietzschean, Bataille was also suspicious of materialism and the cult of scientism: his “heterogeneous” also includes those elements which “evade the methodical grasp of the sciences.”¹⁷ As with institutional religion and capitalist society, science ultimately breeds homogeneity and conformity—it contributes to the establishment of social rules and identities as well as codes of normality, all of which work against the aims of real communication, creativity, and any “collective effervescence” which does not serve a “useful” purpose.

According to Bataille, sex became problematic for Christianity precisely because it affirms transgression (effusion) rather than simply the utilitarian task of reproduction. Christianity (under the sway of Neoplatonism) fought against the transgressive element in eroticism by neutralizing sex—confining it in a highly specific direction, a “useful” direction. By doing so, however, Christianity effectively limited its own sacred power by cutting itself off from this privileged locus of meaningful communication within and between human beings. In *The Tears of Eros*, Bataille goes so far as to call the transgressive element in eroticism “the decisive moment in human life,” and asserts that “[i]n casting eroticism out of religion, men reduced religion to a utilitarian morality. Eroticism, having lost its sacred character, became unclean.”¹⁸

Kinsey, fighting against the sexual repression of a still Christian society, proclaimed that, in fact, all sex is good.¹⁹ But rather than resacralize sex or retrieve *eros*, this blanket approval reaffirms, albeit in a slightly different fashion, the compartmentalization of sexual activity in terms of *utility*. This is most apparent in the infamous Tables themselves: here we have a classification and quantification of sexuality in terms of the strictest economy: the avalanche of numbers forms a hymn to sexual efficiency, or, in Kinsey’s tellingly overused term “sexual outlet.” Bataille accuses Kinsey of denuding²⁰ sexuality by reducing it to orgasmic release, and leaving out sexual play altogether:

Sexual play consumes a far from negligible sum of energy in its own right. The expenditure of energy of an anthropoid whose orgasm is over in about ten seconds is obviously less than that of an educated man whose sexual play goes on for hours... On this point the Report fails to give its usual wealth of detail. (1986, 160)

Besides the contrast drawn between “useless” play and goal-oriented orgasm, Bataille uplifts here the essentially communicative and interpersonal element in eroticism, which is nowhere to be seen in the Reports.

Important to Bataille’s argument is the issue of work. Contrary to Kinsey’s repeated insistence that it is religion which forms the greatest barrier to human sexual pleasure (and thus human evolution), Bataille notes that their data shows otherwise—that it is *work* which is the greatest barrier to sexual expenditure. In contrast with animals, human nature seems “geared to specific ends in work, [and] tends to make things of us at the expense of our sexual exuberance.” This is not entirely a negative thing, for “work as opposed to sexual exuberance is the condition of our objective awareness;” yet when taken to its extremes in a modern homogenous society, the life of humanity is bereft of its most sacred element.²¹ Thus, in a backhanded fashion, while ostensibly relocating the Sexual Good in pleasure, health and individual will-being, Kinsey’s Reports expose the essentially non-utilitarian basis of sexuality.

Thus, according to Bataille's understanding of the fundamental significance of eroticism and sexual play in human life, Kinseyism, for all its liberatory claims, merely repositions sexuality within the economy of useful work: the goal of sex is no longer procreation, or even companionship, but orgasmic release which brings an end to tension and guilt. Though I began by positing Kinseyism as an inverse Platonism, it is more correct to see it as the flipside to the classical Christian approach to sexuality.²² Where Plato tried to incorporate *Eros*, even if only to eventually phase him out of the picture, Kinsey, continuing the mainstream Christian tradition, refuses to acknowledge even the instigatory power of the erotic. Both, according to Bataille, are complacent and ultimately dehumanizing attitudes; neither are properly religious; neither allow for transgression, which is at the root of the sacred.

In short, it is not so much Kinsey's findings that Bataille objects to, nor his personal inclinations or ideological programme, but the grossly materialistic ethos which gives credence and "truth" to his work, and, in the process of its dissemination, continues the long desecralization of human sexuality. At issue is a naïve view of sexuality, blinded by the rhetoric of scientism and materialism, that is ultimately the opposite of "liberating." By rendering sexuality, in its many facets, "normal," Kinseyism effectively subverts the erotic element at the core of transgression, and thus, in Bataille's view, at the core of the sacred. In fact, Kinsey's flaw is that of the surrealists: by privileging subversion over all taboos—by denying the very existence of taboos—the transgressive impulse loses its power, and eroticism dies.²³ But we must also note here the fact that for Bataille, *all* human sexuality is transgressive, not simply the forms called deviant or perverse by bourgeois society. Sex is ultimately transgressive because it involves "pure effusion," or "waste," and also because, as eroticism, it negotiates the "limits of the isolate being"—it reaches out to another in "communication."²⁴

V. Implications: *Eros* and Feminist Theo-ethics

*Sex is something that is regarded as sacred in some cultures and while, to some extent, it remains sacred in our society, there is nothing sacred about twelve year olds losing their virginity because it's the "cool" thing to do.*²⁵

What are the implications of the Bataillean critique of Kinsey? I believe the most significant is the potential of such a critique for feminist theological reflection upon the place and power of the erotic. A tension between the struggle for sexual freedom and the struggle for women's rights has existed since the early 1960s, as both the modern women's movement and the Sexual Revolution began to make waves in North America. The near-simultaneity of their birth and fruition has led many to believe that they are, in fact, the same movement, or at least fraternal (or rather, sibling) streams of a broad river of change. Many, usually on the feminist side, disagree. In the very first

issue of *Ms.* magazine, we find the comment that “the Sexual Revolution and the Women’s Movement are polar opposites in philosophy, goals, and spirit... the so-called Sexual Revolution is merely a link in the chain of abuse laid on women throughout patriarchal history.”²⁶ Though so-called “third wave” feminists are critical of this rift, the tension remains palpable in contemporary feminist debates.²⁷

In feminist theology, where, if anything, the patriarchal “malestream” looms even more ominously, the desire—indeed, the need—to resurrect *eros* has been a central concern since the pioneering work of Nelle Morton in the late 1970s. While this need has allowed feminist theology to bypass, for the most part, the “anti Sexual Revolution” rhetoric of second-wave feminism, it has also led to a certain amount of naiveté with respect to the dangers of “liberated” sexuality. Given the near-blanket “repression” of *eros* by the theological tradition since Augustine, much feminist theological work on *eros* tends to “Kinseyize” desire, if not by rendering it “spiritual” (as in Platonism), by declaring it—in all forms—unequivocally “good.” This tendency is most evident in the work of Carter Heyward, for whom *eros* is “our most fully embodied experience of the love of God.”²⁸ Although Heyward takes an important step beyond Kinseyism in emphasizing the *mutuality* that is essential to true eroticism, she, along with Rita Brock and Sheila Briggs, speaks little of the connection of violence and *eros*—of the Batailleian possibility that *eros* itself involves transgression, and that transgression often if not always involves violence. Suggesting, as Heyward and other feminist theologians do, that “pornographic” *eros* is not *eros* at all, but simply a patriarchal distortion, may be too simple—a Kinseyan cop out. The liberation of *eros*, as we have seen, does not come without cost. In order to face squarely the implications of a liberated *eros*, feminist theologians and theo-ethicists must seriously engage with a more nuanced understanding of eroticism.²⁹ Part of this engagement is a recognition that, as much as the Church remains anti-erotic, mainstream society has become resolutely Kinseyan. The struggle for *eros* is, and must remain for the time being, a two-front war.

VI. Conclusion

The Kinsey Report corresponds with the naïve and often moving protest against the survivals of a first partly irrational civilization. But naivety is a limit we do not wish to be bound by. On the contrary we follow the endless movement whose meandering in the end brings us silently to the awareness of our secret life.

Bataille, *Eroticism*

The sexual act is in time what the tiger is in space.

Bataille, *The Accursed Share*

Ultimately, Bataille concludes, Kinsey’s Reports are of great significance—not because they helped to liberate sexuality from moral and religious

constraints (the precise implications of this "freedom" are still much in dispute) but because they inadvertently reveal the impotence of an "objective" treatment of human sexuality, whether by science or in the course of everyday life. Bataille's critique was, I believe, highly prescient, yet his biggest foe in the struggle to recover eroticism remained the Christian church. Bataille died in 1962, too soon to see the Kinseyan harvest reaped by Hugh Hefner and, perhaps, by John Robin Sharpe. Perhaps now it is Kinseyism that, by disclosing itself as another, more subtle and disingenuous, branch in the long attempt to eliminate *Eros*, will allow for the emergence of a non-moralistic religious reflection upon contemporary sexuality.

Notes

¹ This article is based on a paper delivered at a conference entitled "Implications and Interpretations: Interdisciplinary Studies in Religion and Culture," held at Concordia University, Montréal, May 1999.

² Norman Doidge, "The Muddy Waters of Sexuality: Adult-Child Sex Phaedrus to Foucault," *The National Post*, Friday, January 15, 1999.

³ Foucault's three volumes on *The History of Sexuality* were published between 1976 and 1984; English translations 1978–86.

⁴ Plato, *Symposium*, §201–212; cf. *Phaedrus* §231–257. Robert Solomon (1995, 247–48), along with Martha Nussbaum (1979), argues that Plato did not entirely concur with Socrates's "Platonic" idealism, but that the voice of the drunkenly sensual Alcibiades (§215–222) must be read as, if not a refutation, certainly a necessary counterpoise to the Socratic position.

⁵ Scruton 1994, 217.

⁶ See Nygren 1953, 349–92, for an extended analysis of "The Eros Type in Alexandrian Theology."

⁷ We see the best example of such agapic supersessionism in Augustine's discussion of *caritas* (see Nygren 1953, 449–562).

⁸ To be fair, the attempt to revive a moribund *eros* for Christian thinking began in the mid-twentieth century, in the work of Nygren (1953), Lewis (1960), and Thielicke (1964). However, as Gilson (1995) has shown, each of these attempts ultimately maintains the old Neoplatonic hierarchy in which "vulgar *eros*" remains subservient to "spiritual *eros*" / *agape/caritas*. Bailey (1962) comes closest to a real integration of the two, but rests his theory on a strict gender complementarity, thus perpetuating the theo-ethical "malestream." More recent feminist investigations have begun to open up the possibilities of a rapprochement between *eros* and *agape*—Brock 1988, Heyward 1989, Gilson 1995; see section V, below.

⁹ Reisman 1998, xv–xxii.

¹⁰ E. M. Jones, 1993.

¹¹ This claim derives from first-hand experience of the moral reasoning of some 1500 university students.

¹² Cf. Scruton 1994, 217: "Platonism is the other side of Kinseyism. Each is based in the same misdirection of desire; the first extends a universal frown, the other a universal smile, towards an activity which, in truth, is too integrally bound to the totality of our moral choices to be the proper object of either attitude."

¹³ *Symposium* §211B–212A.

¹⁴ Cf. Bataille 1986, 131, on the correlation of nakedness and objectification.

¹⁵ Scruton 1994, 349–50.

¹⁶ E. M. Jones 1993, 104–7.

¹⁷ Habermas 1987, 212.

¹⁸ Bataille 1989, 74.

¹⁹ James Jones 1999, 343.

²⁰ I use this term deliberately. Nudity is another of Bataille's important concept, signifying not, as one might expect, a natural state, but its opposite. As Richardson (1994, 38) puts it, "The idea of there being a natural state from which we are separated by social conventions and which can be recovered by laying ourselves bare is a particularly pernicious form of puritanism for Bataille, for whom nudity is rather a laceration, a terrifying shattering of our being."

²¹ Bataille 1968, 147–48.

²² See Derrida's fascinating appraisal of the relation of Christian and Platonic thinking in his discussion of the work of Jan Patočka: "Whether ethical or political the Christian consciousness of responsibility is incapable of reflecting on the Platonic thinking that it represses, and at the same time it is incapable of reflecting on the orgiastic mystery that Platonic thinking incorporates" (1995, 24).

²³ "Eroticism as seen by the objective intelligence is something monstrous, just like religion... Unless the taboo is observed with fear it lacks the counterpoise of desire which gives it its deepest significance. The worst of it is that science whose procedures demand an objective approach to taboos owes its existence to them but at the same time disclaims them because taboos are not rational" (Bataille 1986, 37).

²⁴ "Essentially, eroticism is the sexual activity of man, as opposed to that of animals. Not all human sexuality is erotic, but it is erotic often enough not to be simply animal sexuality" (Bataille 1986, 37).

²⁵ This quote comes from an assignment written by a female student in my class, *The Ethics of Sex in Western Religion and Philosophy*, taught at McGill University, 1999.

²⁶ Dell'Olio 1972, 104; see Friday 1996, 315–24.

²⁷ See Adele M. Stan, ed., *Debating Sexual Correctness* (New York: Delta), 1995.

²⁸ Heyward 1989, 99.

²⁹ "Human reflection cannot be casually separated from an object that concerns it in the highest degree; we need a thinking that does not fall apart in the face of horror, a self-consciousness that does not steal away when it is time to explore possibility to the limit" (Bataille 1991, 14). This does not, of course, preclude a simultaneous feminist critique of Bataille; is his vision of the erotic androcentric?

Bibliography

Bailey, D. S. 1962. *Common Sense About Sexual Ethics: A Christian View*. New York: MacMillan.

Bataille, Georges. 1986 [1957]. *Erotism: Death & Sensuality*. Trans. Mary Dalwood. San Francisco: City Lights. *L'Érotisme* (Paris: de Minuit).

_____. 1988 [1954]. *Inner Experience*. Trans. Leslie Anne Boldt. Albany: SUNY Press. *L'expérience intérieure* (Paris: Gallimard).

_____. 1989 [1961]. *The Tears of Eros*. Trans. Peter Connor. San Francisco: City Lights. *Les Larmes d'Eros* (Paris: Pauvert).

_____. 1988-91 [1967]. *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy*. 2 volumes. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Zone Books. *La part maudite* (Paris: de Minuit).

- _____. 1992 [1973]. *Theory of Religion*. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Zone Books. *Théorie de la Religion* (Paris: Gallimard).
- Brock, Rita Nakashima. 1988. *Journeys by Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power*. New York: Crossroad.
- Cahill, Lisa Sowle. 1996. *Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Callahan, Sidney Cornelia. 1969. *Exiled to Eden: The Christian Experience of Sex*. New York: Sheed & Ward.
- Dell'Olio, Anselma. 1972. "The Sexual Revolution Wasn't Our War." Ms. Spring.
- Derrida, Jacques. 1995 [1992]. *The Gift of Death*. Trans. David Wills. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. *Donner la mort in L'éthique du don, Jacques Derrida et la pensée du don* (Paris: Transition).
- De Rougemont, Denis. 1956 [1940]. *Love in the Western World*. Trans. Montgomery Belgion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. *L'Amour et l'Occident*.
- Evola, Julius. 1991 [1969]. *Eros and the Mysteries of Love: The Metaphysics of Sex*. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions International. *Metafisica del Sesso* (Roma: Edizioni Mediterranee).
- Foucault, Michel. 1979 [1976]. *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction*. London: Penguin. *La Volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard).
- Friday, Nancy. 1996. *The Power of Beauty*, New York: HarperCollins.
- Gilson, Anne Bathurst. 1995. *Eros Breaking Free: Interpreting Sexual Theo-Ethics*. Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1987 [1985]. "Between Eroticism and General Economics: Georges Bataille" In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, pp. 211-37. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Heyward, Carter. 1989. *Touching Our Strength: The Erotic as Power and the Love of God*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
- Hiltner, Seward. 1953. *Sex Ethics and the Kinsey Reports*. New York: Association Press.
- Jones, E. Michael. 1993. *Degenerate Moderns: Modernity as Rationalized Sexual Misbehavior*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.
- Jones, James H. 1999 [1997]. "The Radical Motives of Kinsey's Sex Research." In *Sexuality*, ed. Robert A. Nye, pp. 341-45.

- Kinsey, Alfred C., et al. 1948. *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*. Philadelphia and London: W. B. Saunders.
- _____. 1953. *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*. Philadelphia and London: W. B. Saunders.
- Lewis, C. S. 1960. *The Four Loves*. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- Mace, David R. 1970. *The Christian Response to the Sexual Revolution*. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.
- Nussbaum, Martha. 1979. "The Speech of Alcibiades." *Philosophy and Literature* 3 (2).
- Nygren, Anders. 1953 [1930-36]. *Agape and Eros*. Trans. Philip S. Watson. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. *Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna, Eros och Agape I, II* (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag).
- Paz, Octavio. 1995 [1993]. *The Double Flame: Love and Eroticism*. Trans. Helen Lane. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company. *La llama doble, amor y erotismo* (Mexico City: Circulo de Lectores).
- Plato. 1952. "Symposium." In *The Dialogues of Plato*. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica.
- _____. 1952. "Phaedrus." In *The Dialogues of Plato*. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Reinisch, June M, ed. 1990. *The Kinsey Institute New Report on Sex: What You Must Know to be Sexually Literate*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Reisman, Judith A. 1998. *Kinsey: Crimes & Consequences—The Red Queen & the Grand Scheme*. Arlington, VA: The Institute for Media Education.
- Richardson, Michael. 1994. *Georges Bataille*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Scruton, Roger. 1994 [1986]. *Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation*. London: Orion Books.
- Soble, Alan. 1995. "Reconciling Eros and Agape." In *Philosophical Perspectives on Sex & Love*, ed. Robert M. Stewart, pp. 227-30. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Solomon, Robert C. 1995. "The Virtue of (Erotic) Love." In *Philosophical Perspectives on Sex & Love*, ed. Robert M. Stewart, pp. 241-55. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sontag, Susan. 1982 [1967]. "The Pornographic Imagination." In *Georges Bataille, Story of the Eye*, pp. 83-118. London: Penguin Books.
- Thielicke, Helmut. 1964. *The Ethics of Sex*. New York: Harper & Row.